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ABSTRACT 1
 
  
Abstract
 
 
Research has been conducted at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia on the ‘Improvement 
of Aircraft Accident Investigation through Expert Systems’. This research project aims to 
analyse aircraft accident investigation and to review some of the off-the-shelf tools that support 
these investigations. An analysis of the investigation process and tools will provide a possible 
avenue for updating the aircraft accident investigation and for implementing mitigation 
measures to enhance air traffic safety. The research framework is presented below in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: The design and development process for expert systems applied to aircraft accident 
investigation. 
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The work starts with discussing the aircraft accident investigation which is defined as a 
process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention and focused on the circumstances of 
the accident including gathering, recording and analysing all of the available information, the 
drawing of conclusions, and the determination of accident causes [116]. 
Despite the attitude and commitment to achieving the above purpose, accident 
investigations may become a cumbersome task associated with significant costs and 
uncertainty. This can potentially contribute to some accidents being assigned an unknown 
cause as seen in global aircraft accident statistics for the past 50 years. Thus, the investigation 
process has been subjected to constant review in order to improve its outcomes and to help 
enhance air traffic safety.  
This research work aims to contribute to this constant review process by examining 
possible methods of improving the efficiency of aircraft accident investigation. As a result, 
initially the question of how to comprehensively consider the complex investigation procedure 
was raised. 
The work concludes that an intuitive and interdisciplinary approach must be vital 
elements of any contemporary method used for establishing a set of priorities for further 
improvement of aircraft accident investigation. Hence, the interpolations methods, including an 
analysis of accident statistics and Delphi enquiry, are appropriate tools in analysing and 
drawing conclusions for further improving the investigation. The statistical data examined 
contained the number of accidents which occurred between 1950 and 2004 worldwide 
including accident distribution over the past, causal factors, and casualty count. The 
importance of statistics as a research tool has long been appreciated by ICAO (International 
Civil Aviation Organization) which sees accidents statistics as a tool for ‘understanding the 
past, explaining the present and planning for the future’ [114]. 
In addition, a Delphi enquiry, which is formalised regarding the procedure for carrying 
out research activities, has provided a comprehensive analysis of the investigation procedure 
including investigation techniques. A team of experts created for this purpose has conducted a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of the factors having an impact on investigation outcomes. 
The Delphi application, by conducting a comprehensive survey without bringing the 
participants physically together, reflects the modern age of highly developed technology, 
experts, specialisation, and the period of globalisation. 
The Delphi study has indicated that there is great potential for further improvement of 
aircraft accident investigation. It has pointed out areas of the investigation process where 
significant improvements could be achieved. Moreover, the Delphi method has shown that 
ABSTRACT 3
investigations could be significantly improved with the application of a global expert system as 
a tool for storing and analysing the forensic data of aircraft accidents worldwide. 
As a consequence, the computer program GP1020 has been created in order to 
demonstrate how expert systems could contribute to facilitating and enhancing investigation 
results. The outcome of GP1020 is a novel investigation tool in the form of a data mining 
method designed to improve forensic data use by the aircraft accident investigators. The 
GP1020 program interface asks the user a tree-based set of questions related to conditions of 
wreckage, accident site and other circumstances relevant to accidents/incidents. Given enough 
information, the program is capable of narrowing down all known possibilities to indicate the 
most probable causes of the accident/incident. 
This work provides the answers to several questions relating to the improvement of 
investigation outcomes. First of all, the research indicates the factors that could contribute to 
obtaining better results of an aircraft accident investigation. Next, this research shows the 
facilities and procedure resources that have an impact on outcomes of aircraft investigations. 
Additionally, this study explains that a global expert system is a useful tool in aircraft accident 
investigation. This work also demonstrates how an expert system could enhance the 
investigation results. Moreover, in view of the growth in air traffic, this research points out the 
possible measures for reducing the number of aircraft accidents and their severe consequences.  
This research concludes by stating its limitations and possible solutions for overcoming 
them. Finally, several areas requiring further research are suggested. 
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 Chapter 
 1 
 
Man must rise above the Earth to the top of the atmosphere and beyond, for only 
thus will he fully understand the world in which he lives. 
SOCRATES (469 BC – 399 BC) 
 
Introduction 
 
One of the biggest achievements of mankind has been the rapid growth in the aerospace 
industry, in particular air traffic. At the beginning of the twenty first century, airlines operate 
more than 22 million passenger flights annually worldwide, transporting over one billion 
passengers globally.1 Consequently, air traffic has become the prevalent means for carrying 
passengers and transporting goods over long distances, far exceeding marine and road traffic.2 
Aircraft frequently cross great oceans, vast featureless deserts, immense ice wastelands, and 
enormous desolate regions in complete safety in spite of the adverse conditions of the terrain 
below. 
 Despite the huge progress in air traffic safety, human errors, equipment malfunctions as 
well as unusual events3 occur and therefore accidents still do take place [129, 171]. Air 
accidents are relatively rare, but when they do happen they are devastating. In the past 50 
years, over 1600 accidents have occurred worldwide resulting in more than 64,000 deaths4, 
indicating that air traffic is still imperfect. 
                                                 
1 Figure 27, 28 (page 108) 
 
2 The human ambition to fly was manifested even in an ancient Greek legend about Daedalus and Icarus. But, it 
was not until 21 November, 1783, that human efforts to fly literally got off the ground, when a balloon designed 
by Montgolfier brothers, Joseph and Etienne, ascended into the air and drifted 5 mi across Paris. However, Orville 
and Wilbur Wright’s demonstration of the world’s first powered, controlled, and sustained flights on 17 December 
1903 marked a turning point in human history. One century after the first flight of the Wright brothers, airplanes 
are commonplace. They can fly with speed beyond 2000 km/hour performing varieties of different services. 
 
3 For instance, in the case of the crash landing of a DC10 at Sioux City on 19 July 1989, experts say that the odds 
of a rear engine malfunction, which severs all hydraulic connections to the rudder and flaps, leaving the aircraft in 
the air out of control, are a billion to one [85, 75]. 
 
4 Table 2, 5 (page 107, 110) 
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The first mishap5 can be traced back to the ancient Greek legend of Daedalus and 
Icarus. According to the legend, Daedalus was an engineer who was imprisoned in Crete by 
King Minos. To escape his confinement, he made wings of wax and feathers for both himself 
and his son, Icarus, to fly away with. Daedalus flew successfully from Crete to Naples, but 
Icarus tried to fly higher and higher and eventually flew too close to the sun. The wings of wax 
melted and Icarus fell to his death in the sea. According to the legend, the cause of the crash 
was Icarus flying too high, from which a lesson can be learnt. Similarly, through aircraft 
accident investigation the causes of accidents are determined and measures to improve aircraft 
and air traffic safety are established. 
 
 
Figure 2: Icarus [143]. 
 
The major objective of an aircraft accident investigation is to determine the causes of 
an accident and to help establish consistent measures to avoid similar occurrences under related 
circumstances. To accomplish this objective, all circumstances and details within an aircraft 
accident are examined, documented and correlated. In most occurrences there is a chain of 
factors that combine to form the causes of the accident/incident.  
Within an investigation all aspects of the accident are equally important, including 
determining the cause of the accident, the circumstances relating to the survivability of 
passengers and damage to the aircraft, as well as issuing recommendations. However, the sole 
objective of the investigation of an accident or incident is to help prevent future reoccurrences 
or, in other words, it is not the purpose of the accident investigation to apportion blame and/or 
                                                 
5 The first known aviation crash with fatalities occurred on 15 June 1785 in which the balloonists Pilatre de Rozier 
and Pierre Romain lost their lives, whereas the first powered fixed-wing aircraft fatality in history occurred on 17 
September 1908 when Thomas Selfridge was killed in the plane piloted by Orville Wright. 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 6
liability. Determining personal errors or responsibilities are thus not included in the duties of 
aircraft accident investigators. Yet it is inevitable that in the course of an investigation, any 
omissions or errors made by individuals or organisations will be revealed. Simply, 
investigators determine what happened, how it happened and why it happened. During this 
procedure, investigators seek out evidence, analyse suspicious equipment, draw conclusions 
and, where appropriate, issue recommendations. 
The main cause of an accident is occasionally ambiguous. For instance, the failure of a 
system can result from poor control or maintenance. Similarly, if a human error appears as an 
accident cause then it is investigated from all aspects relevant to the procedure. Moreover, the 
investigation does not finish when a failure is deduced or detected, but rather it strives to find 
out why this failure occurred. Within this capacity, experience shows that poor design, human 
error, inconsistency or poor procedure may significantly distract or confuse the crew and other 
personnel. However, statistics indicate that most aircraft accidents occur due to human error, or 
circumstances that lead to human error, including deficient design, manufacturing, testing, 
maintenance, control and/or operation. Identification of these elements can occasionally be 
very difficult, but can still be discovered by careful, comprehensive and persistent examination.  
Sometimes accidents can result from an organisational deficiency such as a lack of 
training or poor management. For instance, the aircraft owner could have issued procedures or 
instructions that do not meet all aspects of air traffic safety. Therefore, the relevant aircraft 
accident investigation is usually extended to other organisational services and departments that 
are not directly linked to the accident.  
Within an investigation, particularly when the causes are unclear, all assumptions are 
investigated in detail to help find possible causes for the accident. This approach leads to a 
lengthy procedure, but this is the only way to investigate thoroughly an aircraft accident 
occurrence.6 
 
The main aim of this thesis can be summarised as: 
 
                                                 
6 For instance, crash investigation of Swissair Flight 111, which crashed into the Atlantic Ocean on 2 September, 
1998 after an in-flight fire, is one of the biggest investigations in aviation history [92]. NTB of Canada spent 4.5 
years and 40 million dollars on the investigation concluding that flammable materials must be removed from 
commercial aircraft. The FAA gave the deadline of 2005 to remove flammable material from all commercial 
aircraft.  
 
Moreover, investigations can change aviation history such as the investigation of the Concorde accident that 
occurred on 24 July 2000 in Paris, whose conclusions grounded all Concorde flights forever. 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 7
To pursue a thorough analysis of the aircraft accident investigation process, 
followed by identifying areas where significant improvements could be 
achieved, and finally demonstrating an expert system tool for improving 
investigation outcomes. 
 
1.1. The Contribution of this Thesis 
The contribution of this thesis is twofold: a contribution to the methodology for analysing the 
process of aircraft accident investigation as a complex multi-factorial issue, and a contribution 
to the demonstration of expert systems as an effective tool for enhancement of aircraft accident 
investigation outcomes. 
The contribution to the research methodology is the introduction of the Delphi method 
as an efficient technique for comprehensively analysing an investigation, whilst the 
demonstration of an expert system is the creation of a novel investigation tool in the form of a 
data mining method for the improved use of a large database of stored expert knowledge. 
 
1.1.1 Research Methodology Contribution 
The first challenge faced in this work was the research approach to accident investigation and 
creating research strategies to help answer posed research questions. As experimental methods 
were clearly not appropriate techniques for considering aircraft accident investigation 
procedures, non-experimental research methods for the thorough analysis of aircraft accident 
investigation including statistical analysis, classification, interviews, intuition and other 
prospective techniques were focused on. 
By considering current research in the field of accident investigation, it is easy to 
conclude that an analysis of the investigation process is still a challenging task. There are, 
however, a number of written materials and research currently being undertaken towards the 
enhancement of investigation outcomes, but most of them focus on a particular segment of the 
investigation process. Whilst developing certain segments of an investigation is essential for a 
holistic approach and the improvement of investigation outcomes, a strong sense of 
cohesiveness within the investigation must be maintained. This is only possible by analysing 
the investigation as a whole. Thus, by using this approach this work makes a significant 
contribution to research methodology in the field of aircraft accident investigation. 
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Due to the variety of disciplines participating within an investigation, the proposed 
methodology suggests using expert systems as the most effective tools for analysing the 
accident investigation process. Thus, comprehensive conclusions have been drawn by 
considering the statistics (forensic data) of accident investigations carried out worldwide, 
followed by an application of the Delphi enquiry. The Delphi exercise has surveyed a team of 
aviation experts in order to extract estimates for further improving the accident investigation 
procedure. 
This research approach managed to identify the areas and stages of aircraft accident 
investigation where significant improvements can be made by employment of contemporary 
technology and science. Additionally, expert systems methodology has pursued a qualitative 
and quantitative analysis of the factors that have an impact on investigation outcomes. Finally, 
this methodology has suggested that investigation outcomes could be significantly improved 
with the application of a global expert system as a tool for storing and analysing the forensic 
data of aircraft accidents worldwide.  
This research contribution is not limited to the entire aircraft accident investigation 
procedure, but can be extended to portions of the investigation as well. This could include 
potential uses in both technical investigation of aircraft systems and analysis of human factors.  
The methodology used can also be applied to other fields where complex multi-
factorial issues are considered. 
 
1.1.2 Demonstration of Expert Systems Contribution 
Two main areas have been actively used within this contribution. The first one involves the 
previous results of a Delphi enquiry into aircraft accident investigation which suggested the use 
of expert systems for improving the investigation process. Whilst this procedure does not 
present any new theoretical approach for analysing complex issues (the Delphi enquiry is 
formalized through procedures for research activities), its specific use in accident investigation 
is an original work. The second aspect of this contribution is the demonstration of an expert 
system for accident investigation via the GP1020, a computer program which is a novel 
investigation tool for enhancing investigation outcomes. This computer program uses a data 
mining method to sift through a database containing a large number of causal factors for 
accidents/incidents and their associated evidence. 
The GP1020 interface asks the user of the program a series of questions related to 
various factors of the accident/incident and, based on the information provided, the tool 
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narrows down all known possibilities to indicate the most probable causes of the 
accident/incident. 
The success of this solution lies in the amount of stored and classified expert 
knowledge designed to give aircraft accident investigators improved use of forensic data. 
 
1.2. Thesis Outline 
The thesis is comprised of 8 main chapters, including the Introduction and Conclusion. The 
content of these chapters is briefly outlined below. 
It is assumed that the reader has a general understanding of aircraft theory and the 
general procedure of an aircraft safety investigation.  
Chapter 1: Introduction describes both the scope of the research as well as the nature 
and span of the study. This chapter also elaborates on the benefits of this research, followed by 
a brief overview of the thesis structure. 
Chapter 2: Background provides the reader with brief relevant information related to 
the procedure of aircraft accident investigation. The first section of this chapter gives an 
overview of international standards of aircraft accident and incident investigation by discussing 
parts of Annex 13 to the Convention of International Civil Aviation, followed by a concise 
description of air safety investigations in several developed countries. 
In addition, this chapter provides technical details about conducting an investigation 
including an analysis of the accident site, wreckage analysis, and the examination of other 
factors relevant to a safety event.  
Chapter 3: Literature Review. In this chapter comments on recently published works 
pertinent to airline accident investigation are given regarding the relevancy of techniques used 
and their technical merits. For more technical details the reader is referred to the works cited. 
Chapter 4: Application of Expert Systems to Aircraft Accident Investigation discusses 
the research tools available to comprehensively examine the aircraft accident investigation 
process. This chapter introduces the intuitive methods and, in particular, trend interpolation 
methods and the Delphi method as the most suitable tools for examining the aircraft accident 
investigation process. This chapter advocates the use of those methods and the credibility of 
their prospective conclusions. 
Chapter 5: Air Traffic Safety Analysis through Statistics contains some original 
conclusions in relation to air traffic safety derived by analysing the statistics of accidents that 
occurred worldwide between 1950 and 2004. Due to several reasons addressed in the chapter, 
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this technique helped demonstrate the benefits of interpolation methods within intuitive 
methods that were introduced in Chapter 4 as appropriate tools for analysing aircraft accident 
investigation. 
Chapter 6: Application of the Delphi Method to Aircraft Accident Investigation 
describes the Delphi enquiry carried out for the purposes of this research. It explains the whole 
procedure conducted following an analysis of results derived from a two round Delphi 
exercise. The results of this survey method with feedback have provided the answers to most 
research questions posed and directed the further course of research towards creating a 
computer tool for analysing the forensic data of aircraft accidents occurring worldwide.  
Chapter 7: Demonstration of Expert Systems to Aircraft Accident Investigation follows 
on from the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6 and introduces the computer program named 
GP1020. The chapter discusses the application of the GP1020 to aircraft accident investigation 
including its design, features, and limitations.  
Chapter 8: Conclusions discusses the key results of the research. The chapter includes a 
brief critique of the research methodology. The areas requiring further work are identified 
along with possible areas of future research. Finally, a brief conclusion to the research is given. 
 
The major research area of this work is the investigation of an aircraft accident or 
incident occurrence. For clarification, this candidate uses in the proceeding chapters several 
different expressions such as ‘accident investigation’, ‘accident/incident investigation’, and 
‘investigation’. All of these phrases have an identical or very similar meaning. Similarly, the 
expressions ‘investigation procedure’, and ‘investigation process’ are used interchangeably. 
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Every accident has its own forerunners, and every one happens either because 
somebody did not know where to draw the vital dividing line between the 
unforeseen and the unforeseeable or because well-meaning people deemed the risk 
acceptable. 
STEPHEN BARLAY, The Final Call: Airline Disasters Continue to Happen, 1990. 
 
Background 
 
This chapter will provide the reader with a brief overview of current international aircraft 
accident and incident investigation standards, followed by an outline of a safety investigation 
in several developed nations including Australia, United Kingdom, USA, Canada, Germany 
and France. Additionally, a general overview of standard investigation procedures with some 
specific techniques for analysing wreckage, its systems, human involvement and other factors 
relevant to investigation outcomes is given.  
This chapter assumes that the reader has a basic knowledge of aircraft accident/incident 
investigation procedures, and will therefore use some terms that have special meanings when 
considered within this context. 
 
2.1 International Standards to Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation: 
Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation 
The International Civil Aviation Organization was established in 1944 by 52 nations whose 
aim was to enhance the safe, orderly and economic development of international air transport 
[114]. It is a United Nations specialised agency presenting the ‘global forum for civil aviation’ 
[117].  
ICAO realises its objectives of safe and secure air transport as well as sustainable 
development of civil aviation through cooperation amongst its member States. The 
Organisation is currently working on implementation of the following strategic objectives 
[118]: 
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1. Safety - enhance global civil aviation safety,  
2. Security - enhance global civil aviation security,  
3. Environmental protection - minimise the adverse effect of global civil aviation on the 
environment,  
4. Efficiency - enhance the efficiency of aviation operations, and 
5. Continuity - maintain the continuity of aviation operations.  
 
The most significant document issued by ICAO relating to aircraft accident occurrences 
and investigations is Annex 13 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation. This annex 
presents a collection of standards and recommended practices for aircraft accident inquiries 
and has been adopted worldwide in accordance with Article 37 of the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago, 1944) subject to Article 26 of the Convention [114]. 
Article 26 imposes an obligation on the State in which the aircraft accident occurs to conduct 
the inquiry in accordance with ICAO procedures. Furthermore, in order to obtain a superior 
investigation outcome, Annex-13 addresses the importance of using a uniform procedure and 
specialised knowledge of competent experts as well as co-operation among all contracting 
States. The content of Annex-13 applies to activities associated with accidents and incidents 
where they have occurred. 
Annex-13 defines and regulates the important issues relating to aircraft 
accident/incident inquiry. It provides definitions for all relevant terms used within an 
investigation including accident, incident, investigation, recommendation and so forth. Hence, 
the definition of an accident involves some degree of damage or injury associated with the 
operation of an aircraft, whereas an investigation is defined as follows [116]:  
 
‘A process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes the 
gathering and analysis of information, the drawing of conclusions, including the 
determination of causes and, when appropriate, the making of safety 
recommendations.’ 
 
The annex emphasises that the purpose of investigation is not to establish blame, 
liability or claims. It also deals with other pertinent issues including dealing with notification, 
responsibility within the process of an investigation and other relevant concerns. 
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2.1.1 Aviation Safety Investigations Worldwide 
Investigators from investigative agencies worldwide do an extraordinary job of piecing 
together the evidence in major airline accidents and determining the causes of these accidents 
under the most difficult circumstances. They correctly try to identify and assess evidence of 
these events so that corrective actions can be undertaken to prevent future accidents in similar 
circumstances. 
Safety investigations being conducted by investigating agencies in several developed 
nations are presented below. This section aims to introduce and compare briefly the duties of 
those specialized institutions within the framework of Annex 13, rather than detailing their 
tasks and responsibilities. 
 
2.1.1.1 Aviation Safety Investigation in Australia 
Australia’s agency for transport safety investigations is the Australian Transport Safety 
Bureau (ATSB), which is an independent body within the Australian Government Department 
of Transport and Regional Services. The goal of the ATSB is to maintain and improve 
transport safety and it does so through conducting independent investigations of transport 
accidents including aircraft accidents. Among other tasks, the ATSB is responsible for 
recording safety data, carrying out analysis and research, and raising safety awareness and 
knowledge [13, 14].  
Australian law has entirely adopted the provisions of Annex-13 to the Convention of 
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention 1944) through the Transport Safety 
Investigation Act 2003 (TSI). Consequently, investigations are completely focused on 
enhancement of air transport safety, rather than assignment of blame or liability. The Bureau is 
separate from transport regulators (Civil Aviation Safety Authority) and from service 
providers.  
The Bureau does not investigate all accidents or incidents. In accordance with Annex-
13 it is focused on fatal accidents and the most significant ‘serious incidents’. Thus, the ATSB 
concentrates its resources on in-depth investigations that will most likely initiate 
recommendations to enhance aviation safety.  
The ATSB has classified aircraft accidents into five categories based on the priority list 
of activities, upon which it allocates its resources. The first category includes accidents 
involving passenger aircraft (large aircraft) with or without fatalities; the second category – 
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cargo aircraft with or without fatalities, and so on, with the last category including accidents 
involving sport aviation aircraft. The decision making process of whether or not to conduct an 
on-scene investigation depends on the findings of the assessment.  The various aspects taken 
into consideration include the potential safety value that may be gained by conducting an 
investigation, on board fatalities and/or serious passenger injuries, provision of support to state 
coroners, the public profile of the occurrence, the resources available and any risks associated 
with not investigating. 
The Bureau investigates, as do many equivalent organisations overseas, in accordance 
with TSI Regulations 2003.  The owner, operator or crew of an aircraft must notify the ATSB 
of all aviation occurrences. The Bureau communicates with police, emergency services, air 
traffic control, coroners and the aircraft operator to ensure that the scene of the accident is 
secured, and that investigators can be dispatched to the accident site and conduct the 
investigation.  
Investigators photograph and record all evidence on the ground and later examine the 
aircraft’s logbooks and maintenance records. They may then arrange for the aircraft wreckage, 
components and other material evidence to be transported to the Bureau’s Canberra office, or 
some other secure area, for further examination and testing. ATSB investigators will, where 
possible, interview the pilot, passengers and other witnesses. They may also visit the departure 
and destination airfields and interview the pilot’s acquaintances and officials, including air 
traffic controllers who came in contact with the pilot before the flight. They may ask for 
records relating to the pilot’s training and experience and may require company documents 
relating to the aircraft’s operation. Maintenance records and interviews with maintenance 
personnel may also be required.  
Since the ATSB’s aim is future safety, it cannot use the power of the TSI Act against 
individuals or companies regardless of the role they have played in the accident. The Act 
allows investigators to interview persons directly or indirectly involved in an accident or to 
remove and retain relevant documentation and physical evidence for further examination and 
analysis.  
Issuing the final report of an accident occurrence generally takes several months. It 
includes findings relating to interviewing individuals, examination of suspect equipment and 
advice given by other technical experts. As required under the TSI Act, reports are not 
produced with purpose to blame or to determine liability. If appropriate, the report will include 
safety recommendations. A copy of the final report is sent directly to the involved individuals 
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and organisations or their representatives. Since the ATSB is not a regulatory authority, the 
Bureau cannot enforce the other interested parties on adoption of the recommendations issued. 
The state or territory coroner may conduct an inquest into a fatal aviation accident. The 
coronial investigation and the ATSB investigation are complementary.7 
 
2.1.1.2 Aviation Safety Investigation in the United Kingdom  
The Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) is responsible for the investigation of civil 
aircraft accidents and serious incidents within the United Kingdom (UK). It also assists in UK 
military accidents and investigations abroad.  The AAIB is an independent part of the 
Department for Transport, separate from the Civil Aviation Authority. The AAIB’s power to 
investigate the accidents comes from the Civil Aviation Act, Civil Aviation (Investigation of 
Air Accidents) Regulations [2]. 
In accordance with Annex-13, the AAIB investigates the occurrences in order to 
prevent future accidents through conducting a thorough investigation and establishing safety 
recommendations. Since the AAIB is not a regulatory authority it cannot enforce its 
recommendations. Investigations are not conducted with the intention of establishing blame or 
liability.  
According to the procedure of accident notification, when an accident occurs the AAIB 
must be notified of the occurrence. It then liaises with the police, emergency services, air 
traffic control and the aircraft operator in order to secure and impound the evidence associated 
with the accident. Investigators are dispatched to the scene of the accident and conduct the 
investigation.  
Operations investigators carry out investigations relating to the flying procedures and 
techniques, human factors, aircraft performance, survivability, weather, airfields, air traffic 
control and so on. Other engineering inspectors examine aircraft airworthiness, systems, 
engines, structure, failure and fault analysis, maintenance procedures, records and 
documentation. Investigators are authorised to take signed statements from anyone involved 
directly or indirectly with the accident. Pertinent books, papers and other relevant documents 
can be removed and retained by investigators and, if needed, investigators may enter the 
aircraft for the purposes of completing their inquiries.  
                                                 
7 ICAO’s audit report Universal Safety Oversight Audit Program states that the ICAO team was highly satisfied 
with the legislative and organisational framework established by Australia and the ATSB enabling the conduct of 
aircraft accident and incident investigations [27]. 
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As with any forensic investigation, all evidence at the scene of the accident is 
photographed and recorded. The log books and maintenance records are examined as well. The 
AAIB investigators (inspectors) are responsible for the wreckage and the safety of the site. In 
addition, the recording devices and suspect parts of the aircraft are removed and transported to 
the AAIB headquarters, where this material is examined.  
Another group of investigators is responsible for obtaining statements from witnesses 
and proceeding with their enquiries with the intention of determining the circumstances and 
causes of the accidents. The investigators have the authority to investigate all human factors 
associated with an accident by taking statements from individuals that may contribute to 
determining the causes of the accident. Thus, the pilot’s training, experience and other 
important documents are made available to the investigators.  
When inspectors return to the AAIB headquarters they present their initial findings to 
the chief inspector of air accidents. The chief inspector then decides how the investigation will 
proceed and the form of the final report.  
The preparation and release of the final report can take several months. It includes 
details of the data recovered and the results of analysis carried out. It also contains interviews 
from various individuals, the results of the examination of suspect equipment and other 
significant findings. If appropriate, the final report contains safety recommendations which can 
be issued earlier during the investigation.  
A draft copy of the report is sent to the pilot and other representatives who may be 
affected by the content of the report. The final report includes the remarks and suggestions 
from the involved parties and it is sent to those persons and organisations before it is 
published. 
 
2.1.1.3 Aviation Safety Investigation in the United States 
All investigations of civil aviation accidents in the United States of America (USA) are 
conducted by or on behalf of the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). The NTSB 
can also participate in investigations abroad if a US carrier or US manufactured plane is 
involved in an accident. The NTSB is an independent agency not affiliated with any of the 
Department of Transportation’s agencies including the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA). The NTSB has no regulatory or enforcement powers. 
The NTSB has responsibility for determining the probable causes of transportation 
accidents and promoting transportation safety. Within its activities, the Board investigates 
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accidents, conducts safety studies, evaluates the effectiveness of other government agencies' 
programs for preventing transportation accidents, and reviews appeals of enforcement actions 
[158]. 
To meet its mission of preventing future accidents, the Board develops safety 
recommendations. Safety recommendations are one of the more important aspects of the 
investigation. They can be issued immediately after an accident (often before completion of 
investigations) or as part of the final report. Recommendations are based on findings of the 
investigation, and shall prevent the accidents from happening again and correct the deficiencies 
identified during the investigation. The recommendations are issued to federal, state and local 
government agencies including industry and other organisations which are in a position to 
improve transportation safety. 
NTSB investigation is based on the “Go Team” investigations of major aviation 
accidents which engages specialists for clearly defined sections including operations, 
structures, power plants, systems, air traffic control, weather, human performance, and survival 
factors. An investigation of this type could involve more than 100 technical specialists and 
other representatives of a number of interested parties including federal and local government 
agencies. Each investigating group establishes the facts which each member of the group 
approves. These factual reports go into the public docket and are available to the Board. When 
the field investigation is complete, the investigator in charge prepares an analytical report 
covering their analysis of the accident and proposed findings.  
Realisation of the final report typically takes several months and includes a number of 
tests and analysis carried out by safety board staff. The final report then is deliberated in a 
public Board Meeting. Once a major report is adopted at a Board Meeting, an abstract of that 
report containing the Board's conclusions, probable causes and safety recommendations is 
released. The results relating to the determination of probable causes of an accident along with 
other outcomes of the Board’s analysis cannot be used as evidence in a low court. 
The NTSB does not investigate criminal activity. In cases of suspected criminal 
activity, the FBI becomes the lead federal investigative body, with the NTSB providing any 
required support. 
 
2.1.1.4 Aviation Safety Investigation in Canada, France and Germany 
Aircraft accidents in Canada are independently investigated by the Transportation Safety 
Board (TSB). The TSB occasionally aids in foreign investigations involving aircraft that are 
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registered, licensed or manufactured in Canada. In addition, the Board monitors general trends 
and emerging safety issues including developments in transportation safety and safety risks 
[179, 177]. The TSB does not investigate all aircraft accidents. An individual occurrence will 
be investigated when there is high probability that an investigation will reduce the future risk to 
persons, property or the environment, and when an investigation has the potential to improve 
transportation safety. 
The TSB’s methodology of investigation addresses the field phase, the post-field phase 
and the report production phase. The ultimate goal of every investigation, as adopted 
worldwide, is the establishment of safety recommendations. These recommendations are an 
essential part of the TSB's efforts to improve safety in the nation's transportation system.  
The Bureau of Investigations and Analysis (Bureau Enquêtes Accidents - BEA) is 
responsible for conducting the technical investigations of civil aviation accidents and incidents 
in France. It is established within the Ministry of Transportation and carries out independent 
investigations including final reports and recommendations. The sole objective of 
investigations is determining the causes of accidents as far as possible with the intention of 
preventing future accidents and incidents [77]. In accordance with Annex-13 to the Convention 
on International Civil Aviation, European Directive 94/56/CE and the French Civil Aviation 
Code, the investigation into an accident or incident is intended neither to apportion blame, nor 
to assess individual or collective responsibility. In view of Annex-13 the BEA can be required 
to issue recommendations before the publication of the report.  
The German Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (Bundesstelle fuer 
Flugunfalluntersuchung - BFU), as an independent body in the framework of the Federal 
Ministry of Transport, is responsible for the investigation of civil aircraft accidents and serious 
incidents within Germany. The goal of the BFU is to improve aviation safety by determining 
the causes of accidents and serious incidents and making safety recommendations intended to 
prevent recurrence. The investigation does not serve the purpose of establishing blame, liability 
or claims. The investigation of accidents and incidents in civil aviation in Germany is based on 
the law relating to the Investigation into Accidents and Incidents Associated with the Operation 
of Civil Aircraft, which is harmonised with Annex-13 to the ICAO Convention and the 
European Union Directive on accident and incident investigation (94/56//EC) [79]. 
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2.1.1.5 Summary 
The information presented above clearly illustrates that Annex-13 of the Convention of 
International Civil Aviation has been adopted universally. Worldwide, investigations are 
carried out following the same or similar procedures, addressing the two major objectives of:   
 
- Enhancement of air transport through independent investigation, and 
- Determination of the circumstances leading to the accident, rather than establishing 
blame, liability or claims. 
 
Minor differences in conducting an investigation amongst countries exist and those 
variations depend on air traffic intensity and influence from the local aviation industry. 
Nevertheless, investigative teams around the world represent a very important part within 
aviation transport safety and they are generally composed of a number of specialists 
responsible for a certain segment of the investigation.  
In some cases, the causes of accidents are revealed in the early stages of the 
investigation and all efforts of the investigation are then focused on one relatively confined 
field. On the other hand, when the causes of accidents are not obvious (in most cases) the 
investigation is extended to a larger scale, engaging a large number of experts and external 
specialists. However, when a larger accident occurs, the investigation includes a wide range of 
examination, testing and analysis provided by both independent and coordinated expert groups. 
Some of the activities of the various groups may overlap, although through proper management 
and feedback, results can be achieved successfully. The following is a (general) example of the 
distribution of investigation activities through the various working groups operating within an 
investigative team [180]. 
Investigator in Charge (Chief Inspector, Director) - The Investigator in Charge (IIC) is 
responsible for organising, conducting and managing the process of investigation. The IIC 
establishes a base within the zone of accidents that is used for supervising all activities 
associated with the investigation and meeting investigators during the field investigation. The 
IIC decides how the investigation will proceed and the form of report appropriate to the type 
and seriousness of the accident or incident.  
Operations Group – Investigators in this group examine the circumstances associated 
with pilot qualifications and experience, operational procedures, aircraft loading, flight plan, 
aircraft performance, operational technique and history of the flight seeking to determine if the 
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crew was qualified to fly the plane and whether the plane was operated within performance 
limits. 
Group for interviewing witnesses - This group interviews and examines the statements 
given by all persons that have seen or heard a part of the flight or possess information about 
flight or meteorological conditions at the time of accident. This group may provide information 
about the altitude, sound, and attitude of the aircraft at the moment of the accident. 
Group for aircraft structure analysis - This group examines the main structure of the 
aircraft and its control devices. It usually includes reconstruction of the aircraft structure and is 
used to determine the first impact of the aircraft and to examine the process of disintegration.  
Meteorology Group - This group is responsible for gathering and dealing with data 
relating to weather conditions. Specialists consider the actual weather information on the 
ground and at flight altitude and the forecast issued thereof. Once the experts have established 
the weather at the time of the accident they determine its affect on the airplane. 
Air Traffic Control Group - Investigators of this group inspect original documentation 
of air traffic control services and examine radio and phone as well as radar records. Outcomes 
of this analysis may provide determination of the flight path of the aircraft and other significant 
information including ground speed, acceleration, rate of climb, or descent. 
Group for registration of flight data and conversation - This group is responsible for 
reading out the data recorded in flight data recorders, cockpit voice recorders and other 
recording devices, as an essential source of information for determining the circumstances of 
the accident.  
Human Factors Group - This portion of investigation is performed by medical 
personnel or individuals with specialised training in the human performance area. The group 
examines injuries and determines the cause of death of passengers as well as a number of 
psychological and physiological factors such as fatigue, spatial disorientation, drugs, alcohol, 
nutrition and other factors that may have contributed to the accident.  
Power-plant Group - This group conducts an examination in order to determine if the 
engines and their attached accessories were working normally or abnormally during the 
accident. 
Aircraft Systems Group - Specialists in this group examine the contribution of aircraft 
systems to the accident. This portion of the investigation considers the hydraulic system, 
electrical and electronic systems, radio communication system, air-conditioning system, 
pneumatic system and anti-icing system. Due to the severity of some aircraft accidents, it is not 
always possible to examine all systems.  
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Maintenance Group - This Group is responsible for inspection of the maintenance 
records available in order to determine if the aircraft was properly maintained. Hence, 
specialists check the airworthiness of the aircraft, the number of working hours of the engine 
and other pertinent parts as well as records focusing on defects and their repair. 
Evacuation and Rescue Group - This group examines the circumstances associated with 
the search, evacuation, and rescue of passengers and crew aboard the aircraft. 
Group for determining the circumstances of accidents - Specialists from this group are 
responsible for determining the circumstances that lead directly to the accident based on their 
knowledge and experience. Investigators use different methods to determine or confirm certain 
facts so that an accident is considered from many different aspects. The progress of the 
investigation, as a whole, is achieved by regular exchange of findings among investigators 
from all groups. The mass of work can occasionally be completed during the field examination, 
although often laboratory analysis reveals most of the circumstances leading to the accident. 
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2.2 Overview of Aircraft Accident Investigation  
Upon receiving notification of an accident, initial actions of liaising with police, emergency 
services, air traffic control and the aircraft operator are undertaken. This is to ensure that 
evidence associated with the accident is secured. Subsequently, the investigative team is 
dispatched to the accident site and the long process of aircraft accident investigation begins.  
At the base of operations (located near the scene of the accident) the first meeting is 
conducted where investigators are advised about the circumstances of the accident. This 
includes information about the rescue procedures, the injured, casualties, condition of the 
wreckage, cargo features, and other important information. This meeting also addresses the 
potential hazards to the investigative team associated with the accident site including chemical 
hazards, liquid oxygen pressure, vessels, pyrotechnic hazards, and so forth. However, the list of 
potential dangers depends on the type of aircraft and cargo involved in the accident.  
The investigation process and its outcomes depend very much on the preparation of the 
investigation. Therefore, the results of the investigation are a reflection of experts’ knowledge, 
the investigation equipment available and effective management of the investigation.  In order 
to conduct a proper investigation, investigators take a number of tools and other apparatus to 
the accident site. The type of equipment that is taken depends on the accident location, 
weather, type of aircraft and the investigator’s specialty.  
The general equipment list includes personal survival items (appropriate severe weather 
clothing, gloves, hat and so forth), diagramming and plotting equipment (compass, GPS 
receiver, notebook and so on), technical data (catalogues, handbooks, investigation manual), 
witness interviewing equipment (recorders, hand microphone), evidence collection equipment 
(investigation kits), administrative equipment, personal items, and certainly photographic 
equipment. 
 
Figure 3: Universal investigation kits [81]. 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 23
On arrival at the accident site, expert groups within the investigative team conduct an 
initial walkthrough of the wreckage.  This is carried out to create a first impression about the 
condition of the wreckage and the components that affect the whole process of further 
searching and preservation of evidence.      
Nonetheless, the first priority of the investigation scene is more than likely to be 
searching for human remains and their identification. The process of identification is conducted 
by the forensic identification unit along with pathologists. 
 
2.2.1 Accident Scene Recording and Collecting Evidence 
Recording of the accident scene is conducted as soon as humanely possible subsequent to 
accident notification and location of the wreckage. Within an investigation a number of 
general, macro and micro photographs and a large amount of video material are taken that 
present a tremendous source for completing the further analysis and preparation of the final 
report. It is also advantageous for the accident scene to be recorded by stereo-camera, which 
can (if required) recover the factual (real) positions of all objects located on the photographs. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Aerial view of a wreckage distribution. 
 
(Aircraft accident on 20 November, 1993 at approach phase near Ohrid, Macedonia) 
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Firstly, depending on the circumstances, photographs and video material of the crash 
aftermath or rescue in progress are taken following the recording of the general view of 
wreckage and the terrain where the accident occurred. If possible, aerial view records are 
taken, which present the greatest constellation of wreckage and the terrain where the accident 
happened. After that the other perishable evidence, such as cockpit instrument panel readings, 
switch positions and flight control position, that last for a period of time and are most likely to 
change or disappear during the field investigation, are recorded.  
Investigators pay particular attention to impact scars, craters and anything hit by the 
aircraft prior to impact that is also matter for still and video recording. Other significant marks 
such as fracture patterns, scratches and gouges, fuel faucet position, radio equipment, 
suspicious cracks, engine lever systems, fire damage and land marks are also recorded.    
All items recorded are associated with markers (usually numbers), which commonly 
appear in the diagrams of the final report. It is common practice to prepare one or more 
accident diagrams for inclusion in the written report. The accident type and wreckage 
distribution will ultimately determine the type of diagram that will be used. For instance, 
wreckage or scene diagrams plot the location of the impact and the subsequent distribution of 
the wreckage, whereas the flight path diagrams depict the flight path of the aircraft prior to 
impact. 
 
 
Figure 5: Wreckage distribution (polar diagram) [115]. 
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A high quality scene or wreckage diagram is essential for most calculations involving 
crash sequence and survivability. A flight path diagram can be very helpful in depicting 
information from various sources such as the flight data recorder (FDR), cockpit voice recorder 
(CVR), and air transport control (ATC) radar (Figure. 6). A plot of this information by time 
and location enables the investigator to see how a number of different events are related to 
each other. Depending on the accident several techniques can be used including grid system, 
polar system, single point system, and straight line systems to create diagrams. 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Approach profile (in red) derived from FDR data and terrain profile overlaid on an extract 
approach chart [73]. 
 
After recording the terrain, wreckage and all significant marks at the accident scene, 
investigators collect the evidence. They start with perishable evidence such as fluid samples 
(fuel, oil and hydraulic samples), then evidence of icing as well as loose papers, maps and 
other documents. Also, included in this list are switch positions and instrument readings, 
control surface and trim tab positions, flight data recorders and cockpit voice recorders. The 
location and recovery of the aircraft recorders including the cockpit voice recorder and flight 
data recorder, is a vital key to the investigation. 
If there is suspicion that some of the wreckage systems are directly associated with the 
accident, the equipment is primarily examined at the accident site and then transported to the 
authorised organisation for further examination. For some accidents only a field investigation 
is conducted, whereas for others a cursory field investigation may be carried out, however 
engines and other key components of the aircraft are taken and examined in detail.  
Where possible, investigators will interview the witnesses of the accident in separate 
groups. The first group of witnesses is comprised of flight participants including crew 
members, passengers and flight controllers. In the second group are eyewitnesses that were by 
coincidence around the accident site and finally, statements may be taken from crew members’ 
next of kin and friends, then mechanics, the weather briefer and so forth. The process of 
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witness interviewing could be one of the most important parts of an investigation, especially if 
there is no recoverable wreckage, survivors or recorded information. 
 
2.2.2 Wreckage Analysis 
Taking an inventory of the wreckage is common procedure, which can also at times contribute 
to revealing the circumstances of the accident. In particular, if there is a missing part of an 
airplane, this finding is likely to be significant to the investigation. Moreover, the inventory can 
recognise some parts that may originate from another aircraft8. The location of wreckage and 
other parts of the plane along with field traces are entered into a wreckage diagram.  
Accidents can occur anywhere in the world and sometimes a wreckage scene is 
inaccessible so that wreckage recovery is difficult or even impossible. In the case of 
underwater wreckage, location and recovery may be very difficult and expensive. However, the 
wreckage will be recovered if there is the potential of gaining significant knowledge by 
investigating this particular accident, regardless of the cost of the procedure. 
As mentioned above, all relevant facts at the accident site including wreckage, impact 
marks, land scars, and many others, are located, secured and recorded in detail. Based on this 
information a number of diagrams are created as important elements of the further examination 
and the final report.  This is very important because well drawn diagrams may present the 
sequence of wreckage disintegration. Consequently, although aircraft accidents can occur in 
different ways, there are certain elements that are common to aircraft impacts and wreckage 
distribution. By organising those common elements, most impact situations can be explained.  
Wreckage distribution and crash dynamics are influenced primarily by aircraft velocity 
and the impact angle. Thus, the velocity of the aircraft affects the degree of disintegration of 
the wreckage, whereas the impact angle has an effect on distribution manner. It is clear that 
except for aircraft velocity and the impact angle, the terrain configuration has a vital influence 
on wreckage distribution. Consequently, by considering the wreckage distribution at the 
accident site, the attitude, impact velocity and impact angle including the survivability of the 
accident may be determined. 
In cases of water impacts, distribution of the wreckage primarily is dependant on 
aircraft velocity. The water acts as a solid object if the aircraft is going fast and it breaks into 
many pieces similar to a crash on land. On the other hand, an aircraft that is deliberately 
ditched probably sinks to the bottom undamaged. The impact angle may be determined by 
                                                 
8 A typical example is the ‘Concorde’ accident that occurred on 25 July, 2000 at Paris 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 27
examination of the wreckage taking the influence of waves into account. Distribution of 
wreckage on the bottom of a lake or ocean is influenced by depth, current and the tendency of 
various parts to float or to sink in different ways. This means that distribution of submerged 
parts does not contribute significantly to determining the accident circumstances. The situation 
is quite different when the distribution of wreckage has resulted from an in-flight break-up. 
When considering land impacts, the wreckage distribution can be categorised into 
several types depending on the impact velocity and angle. If an aircraft crashes at a very high 
angle and high velocity, the aircraft creates a crater and the front parts of the aircraft may stay 
in the crater covered by dirt. Other parts of the aircraft are distributed randomly around the 
crater. The bulk of this distribution will occur on the side in the direction of the aircraft.  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Evidence of impact at slow forward speed and low angle of attack [104]. 
 
In addition, when an aircraft has impacted the ground with high velocity and low angle, 
the wreckage creates an initial impact scar and the aircraft starts to break apart immediately. In 
general, the wreckage is distributed in a fan-shaped pattern from the impact point. The heaviest 
portions of the wreckage such as engines travel farthest. 
Furthermore, when a plane crashes at a high angle and low velocity, the impact crater is 
shallow and the plane is largely intact. At low velocity and low angle impact (Figure 7), the 
plane hits the ground several times and during the deceleration wings and engines can be torn.  
Stall or spin impacts have specific features that are a result of low velocity and high 
angle impacts. In these accidents, the planes are not in control and do not necessarily impact 
nose first. If a spin is involved then distribution of wreckage can suggest the nature of the spin.  
Determining the impact attitude and impact angle is gained from the evidence on the 
ground, and it is usually captured by the nose of the aircraft. Another way to obtain the impact 
angle is by the condition of damaged objects that the plane hit prior to impact. In terms of 
impact velocity, there are several possible sources. The impact velocity can be recovered from 
a flight data recorder or an ATC radar plot can help establish velocity prior to the impact. In 
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some accidents, the impact velocity can be captured by the airspeed indicator in the cockpit 
(Figure 8). Finally, after determining the impact velocity and impact angle, the forces involved 
in the accident can be assessed to find the impact survivability.   
 
  
 
Figure 8: Scrape marks on pilot’s encoding altimeter face from pointer [73]. 
 
If there is suspicion of in-flight disintegration, then the inventory can reveal this 
information. In such cases, parts of the wreckage are usually scattered over a wide area that 
may include forest, lands, and resident areas. Then searching for missing parts is an important 
stage of the investigation.  
Finally, if the circumstances allow, a reconstruction is conducted that is a useful 
technique for structural and fire investigation. It is not often that the whole plane is 
reconstructed; only the parts of the wreckage of particular interest are moved from the accident 
site and reconstructed in an open space or hanger. The damage to every part is defined and 
analysed to determine if it is a result of impact on the ground or other obstacles, or due to in-
flight failure.  
In terms of defining the wreckage damage, an examination for a possible structural 
failure is conducted. First of all, overstress on a part can occur and later cause a structural 
failure by improper pilot operation or adverse weather conditions including turbulence, wind 
shear, downwash, and wing tip vortices. Secondly, a part can fail as a result of improper 
design, manufacture, maintenance and inspection. Finally, a structural in-flight failure can 
occur because of aerodynamic overstress, which means that in the course of the flight a part 
may be overloaded beyond its capacity.  
Determining the type of failure is mainly based on appearance of metal fracture. 
Additionally, these findings must be consistent with wreckage distribution, accident site 
conditions and crash dynamics. This segment of the investigation becomes very complicated if 
the aircraft sustains severe mechanical damage and post impact fire.  
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 29
When analysed, there may be either a single fracture zone or two or more distinct 
zones. If there is only a single fracture zone, then it refers to an overstress failure, which is the 
most common type of failure found in aircraft wreckage (Figure 9). 
 
 
 
Figure 9: A single fracture zone representing an overstress failure. 
 
In contrast, if the fracture has more than one distinct zone then it may suggest in-flight 
failure. Evidence of this type of structural failure is the existence of corrosion or metal fatigue 
patterns on the metal fractions (Figure 10). 
 
  
 
Figure 10: Evidence of corrosion and fatigue patterns on the metal fraction. 
 
At this point of the investigation, the accident site is recorded and examined. Some 
parts of the aircraft equipment are taken for further laboratory analysis and the process of 
investigation is moved from the accident site to the headquarters, laboratory and other 
specialised offices. 
2.2.3 Power-plant Analysis 
Failure or malfunction of any of the power-plant systems will most likely cause an accident. 
Therefore it is essential to the investigation to determine if the engines were working at the 
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time of the accident. Generally, engine failure is mostly associated with accidents during 
takeoff when full engine power is needed and a sudden loss of power will most likely cause an 
accident, rather than during the approach or landing phases when the engines are at lower 
power and when the demand for power from the engines is less. 
Engines cannot be examined completely at the accident site because their inspection 
requires special tools and conditions, although, on-field examination may give a good idea of 
whether the engine contributed significantly to the accident and requires further laboratory 
examination. 
The first stage of engine examination includes reviewing the basic facts of the accident, 
witness statements and radio transmissions that may provide some information about the 
engine condition at the moment of the accident. If there is a flight data recorder (FDR) or 
cockpit voice recorder (CVR), the engine investigation is mainly focused on the recorder. 
However, there are some basic techniques that are used by the field investigators.  
On-field engine investigation begins with searching for all of the engine components 
and looking at them for evidence of mechanical failure or over-temperature that preceded the 
impact. Since the engines are the heaviest components of the airplane, it is common for them to 
separate from the aircraft at impact and travel a great distance from the wreckage trail. Engine 
examination for gross evidence of failure is based on obvious indications of mechanical failure 
such as holes that were either burned or punched through the casing from the inside. If the 
engine components that would have been inside the hole match the damage, then the 
investigation already has significant evidence regarding the cause of the accident. 
 
Figure 11: An engine lateral section [112]. 
 
In addition, on-field engine examination includes checking for fuel capacity and 
inspecting the engine for any obvious evidence of fuel leak. Similarly the amount and quality 
of oil and other components of the lubricating system are examined. Samples of fuel, in 
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particular engine oil, may be taken for laboratory analysis. However, some engines can be 
comprehensively examined by using a bore scope. The remainder of the engine examination 
procedure depends on whether the aircraft involved in the accident was equipped with a turbine 
or reciprocating engine. Although there are differences in engines made by different 
manufacturers, turbine or reciprocating engines have the same basic components leading to a 
similar engine investigation procedure being adopted for both engine types. 
Taking an engine apart on the field is impractical, although sometimes a small 
reciprocating engine can be disassembled at the accident site. However, if the engine within an 
investigation needs to be disassembled, it is usually taken to an engine facility where all 
conditions needed such as hoists, mounting stands, tools and sufficient lighting are provided. 
Further engine examination is focused on determining the engine power or thrust and engine 
range temperature at impact. 
 
2.2.3.1 Turbine Engine Examination 
The accurate value of engine torque at impact, if any at all, can be recovered from an FDR or 
CVR. Conversely, if the aircraft flight data is not recorded then determining whether the 
engine was turning or not and whether it was turning fast or slow is provided by an 
examination of any rotational damage present (or lack of it). The determined value of engine 
power or thrust based on the evidence of rotational damage has only approximate accuracy. 
This is because there are a number of factors affecting the value of engine torque and upon 
further analysis would lead to several approximations and assumptions. 
The internal engine examination is based on several postulates and facts whereby the 
engine power and RPM (resolutions per minute) at impact can be determined.   
 
- First of all, a turbine engine does not develop a wear pattern internally in normal use. 
The only metal-to-metal contact points are the bearings and the accessory drive gears. 
Therefore if there is rotational evidence elsewhere, then the engine was either turning at 
impact or there was an in-flight failure or malfunction. 
 
- Next, the compressor is the first moving part of the engine encountered by anything 
entering it. Thus, at an accident occurrence, the compressor will impact the ground or 
other obstacles first and receive the most damage.  
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- Furthermore, an engine in normal use does not produce traces of combustion, melting 
or soot in the compressor section. If there is such evidence then it refers to engine 
abnormalities.  
 
When the rotating compressor section of the engine hits the ground, the compressor 
blades are bent in the opposite direction of rotation and they are bent alike. This consistent 
bending is evidence that the compressor section was turning at impact (Figure 12). In contrast, 
if the blades are not bent or bent in different directions, it is most likely because of impact 
damage and not rotational damage. 
In terms of determining the engine RPM, the distance that ingested quantities of dirt 
and debris that travel through the engine may be taken as an indication. If the engine was not 
running, the debris will not travel very far.  
If the engine was turning at high RPM, the debris can be found deeply in the turbine 
section. Another indication of RPM is presence (or lack) of signs of turbine section 
interference with the casing. The investigators can conclude that the engine was running at 
high RPM if the turbine blade tips are bent down and if there is rotational scoring inside the 
casing. Moreover, evidence of rotational damage providing an indication of RPM can be seen 
on compressor rotor blades and the adjacent stator vanes, as well as engine shaft or transitional 
casing.  
 
 
 
Figure 12: Blades bending: the compressor section was turning upon impact [104]. 
 
In particular, when the engine has seized, the ends of the compressor blades may leave 
blade-shaped marks on the inside of the casing where the impact forces were felt. These typical 
marks suggest that the engine was not running at impact.  
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When an engine goes into the water, rotational damage of the compressor blades will 
occur depending on the power developed by the engine. If the engine was running, the blades 
are bent opposite the direction of normal rotation and most likely the compressor casing will be 
torn due to hydrodynamic effect.  
When engines with variable geometry are examined, investigation is focused on the 
condition of mechanisms that change the size and shape of the intake such as variable inlet 
guide vanes (IGV) and variable stators. Both of these devices move as a function of RPM and 
are directly related to it. Thus, if the IGV or variable stator position is determined then the 
RPM and thrust can be calculated. 
Another indication of engine power can be obtained by examining the condition and 
position of bleed air valve, fuel flow and cockpit instrument indications. Depending on certain 
circumstances, these findings may be credible evidence in determining the engine power at 
impact.  
The second essential issue facing investigators is whether the engine in an accident 
flight was operating within a normal temperature range. Investigators endeavour to find out 
this answer by focusing on turbine section analysis. Evidence of traces of combustion, melting 
or soot in the compressor section suggests that the engine was running at high temperature. If 
the engine temperature is very high then the turbine can melt rapidly. Other evidence of over 
temperature exposure is the existence of longitudinal cracks of turbine blades or a metallic grit 
layer on the blade surfaces. Otherwise, if the turbine blades are intact and have not picked up 
any metallization, the engine was in all probability operating within its normal temperature 
range. 
 
2.2.3.2 Common Turbine Engine Problems  
Investigation of a turbine engine is associated with several common problems which include:  
 
- Foreign object damage 
- Volcanic ash ingestion 
- Compressor stall 
- Accessory failure 
- Thrust reverser failure 
- Bearing failure 
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Foreign object damage (FOD) is the most common source of damage to turbine 
engines. It is likely that the ingestion of any solid object will produce some amount of damage 
to the compressor section. In an aircraft accident, FOD may occur as a result of impact and the 
resulting damage may be of no significance to the accident. Differentiating between the 
rotational damage due to impact and pre-existing FOD damage can be difficult to determine. 
In general, rotational damage during ground impact is most severe at the front of the 
engine and tends to become less severe in the internal compressor stages. Thus, a metal object 
may hit a blade hard enough to leave an imprint on it and this can be seen during the engine 
inspection. Moreover, microscopic traces of objects causing the damage can be 
spectrographically analysed to determine the composition of the object.  
On the other hand, the in-flight FOD tends to produce opposite indications. The early 
compressor stages may be relatively undamaged. The foreign object may be ingested through 
the first stage not causing significant damage to the blades.  
The three principal sources of in-flight FOD are birds, ice and metal parts from the 
aircraft itself. Birds leave sufficient traces that can be proven by simple laboratory 
examination. Ice can come from a leak in a lavatory drain system, aircraft wings, or on the 
intake or cowling lips during flight and can cause severe engine damage and result in 
accidents. Most aircrafts have anti-icing systems to preclude this. The investigation is focused 
on the anti-icing system to determine if it was on and working. 
If the ingestion of a metal object is suspected, the investigation is focused on the intake, 
cowling and aircraft structure forward of the engine searching for imprint marks. 
Volcanic ash ingestion is a special form of FOD. Volcanic ash is a dust that is almost 
pure silicon and when it gets into the engine, it is converted into glass in the combustion 
section and the turbine guide vanes, nozzles, blades and cooling passages are coated with this 
molten glass. If the volcanic ash is suspected as a factor in the accident then the glazed coating 
in the turbine section should be visible.  
Compressor stall can occur in special circumstances and witnesses, if any, may report 
that there was fire coming out of the front of the engine. Since the compressor is supposed to 
be clean and cool, marks of combustion and molten material is evidence that severe 
compressor stall has occurred.  
Examination of engine accessory is based on marks of rotation and external forces if it 
was turning at impact, or lack of evidence of external forces that may suggest in-flight 
malfunction. The analysis refers to understanding the external damage and defining the 
fractures.  
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Thrust reverser failure can be exhibited as breakdown or unwanted deployment. Thrust 
reverser examination is based on witness statements, if any, and analysis of surrounding impact 
damage of reversing devices including clamshells, buckets, shields or spoilers. Examination 
includes determining whether the damage occurred before or after the reversers were deployed. 
Additionally, thrust reversing systems can be examined by checking the cockpit controls and 
comparing it to the reversers’ position at the accident site.  
Bearing failure occurs in most cases because of lack of lubrication. If the bearings fail 
the engine suffers massive destruction and the bearing parts (races, retainers and rollers) may 
be widely scattered. The bearing examination is focused on determining the intensity of the 
wearing pattern and checking the oil for formation of metallic elements.  
 
2.2.3.3 Reciprocating Engine Examination 
When reciprocating engines require further investigation, great attention is paid to the 
propellers. This is because inside the reciprocating engines there is always evidence of normal 
wear pattern, and existence of other marks may be difficult to identify and define. Essential for 
this examination is determining if the propeller feathered or stopped at impact as well as the 
power performance. Moreover, if it is concluded that a deliberate shutdown was made by the 
pilot, the investigation seeks to discover the reasons for this operation. The reciprocating 
engine examination also includes analysis of the feeding and lubricating system, cockpit 
instruments and switches. However, most of these answers could be provided by examination 
of the propellers. 
Before taking the engine for further laboratory examination, investigators at the 
accident site attempt to determine if the engine was fed properly with fuel and oil. Thus the 
fuel quantity and quality on board is checked. The fuel quantity can be determined indirectly 
by considering fuel consumption and the duration of the flight since last refueling, and directly 
by examining the tanks if they have not been destroyed. Evidence of fire in the accident 
suggests the presence of fuel, which also can be detected by chemical analysis of ground 
samples (Figure 13).  
In addition, the tank, fuel lines and carburettor are examined for any obstruction that 
would prevent the fuel from flowing freely to the engine. The induction system and the throat 
of the carburettor are also inspected for any obstacles or damage. This part of the investigation 
finishes by examining the electrical system, spark plugs, and magneto switch in the cockpit.   
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Figure 13: Detection of traces of arson at an accident site. 
 
If an engine fails then the internal engine inspection will reveal the damages that led to 
this malfunction. Otherwise, if an engine was not producing full power, then the investigation 
is focused on the induction system of ice, ignition system failure etc. Induction system ice or 
carburettor ice can be possible causes for partial engine failure. With reduced air flow the 
engine may quit and cause an accident. For this particular type of accident finding the positive 
evidence of carburettor ice is very difficult as it melts before on-field investigation starts. 
Another possible cause for partial engine failure is spark plug or cylinder failure, dirty filters, 
and lubricating system failure. In terms of the lubrication system, examination includes 
checking the oil tank, lines, oil pump as well as oil filters and sump drains for the presence of 
contaminants. If needed, samples of the oil are tested in a laboratory.  
 
2.2.3.4 Propeller Examination  
Propellers are common to reciprocating and turbine engines (turboprops). An examination of 
the propeller damage sometimes can be very useful in determining the engine condition during 
the accident. In any case, it is not possible to completely explain all of the bends and twists that 
can occur, because the propeller’s final condition depends on many variables such as RPM, 
airspeed, attitude and the nature of the surface or soil where the propeller hit. 
In the case of a turning propeller, all blades are bent opposite the direction of rotation. 
There must be similar curling or bending at the tips of all blades as well as the damage to the 
leading edge of the blades. Additionally, torsion damage to the propeller shaft or attachment 
fittings can be seen. Propeller examination is focused on identifying and defining this evidence. 
However, the procedure becomes more complicated because the propeller is almost always 
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turning at impact. Even if the engine failed or was shut down, the propeller will windmill at an 
RPM high enough to produce these indications of rotation.  
 
       
    
Figure 14: Propeller under power and propeller wind milling at impact, respectively [115]. 
 
Taking the above into account there are two major phases in investigating the engine: 
 
- First, finding absolutely no evidence of rotation leads to in-flight engine failure. Thus, 
if the engine seized internally, there will be evidence of intensive damage that should 
be defined during the investigation. 
- Second, if there is evidence of rotation then this examination requires additional 
analysis.  
 
In terms of determining the impact engine RPM and power, the deformation of the 
propeller’s blade tips may provide a rough idea of the RPM related to velocity. This analysis 
includes examining the curling of blade tips that must be similar in appearance to all blades. 
Thus, the tips of blades may bend either forward or backward depending on the relationship 
between the RPM and forward velocity. If the RPM is high compared to the forward velocity, 
then the end of the blades are bent forward. On the other hand, if the RPM is low compared to 
the forward velocity, then the end of the blades are curled backward. This analysis provides 
only the ratio of RPM and velocity and not the absolute value of RPM. For instance, the RPM 
may be high, but if forward velocity is also high, the blade tips are likely to curl backward and 
so on. The above phenomenon occurs at relatively low angles of impact (by 5 degrees) whereas 
if the angle of impact is high then the blade tips are going to bend backward regardless of the 
RPM. Within an engine examination, investigators try to identify and define this deformation. 
In the case of propellers with constant speed, propellers maintain constant engine (or 
propeller) RPM, where the power is adjusted by the changing blade pitch angle. The blade 
angle is maintained by hydraulic powered pistons. The aim of such an examination of the 
propeller is to determine the impact pitch angle, although this analysis in many cases is 
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unsuccessful. This is because when the aircraft crashes, engine oil pressure is lost and the oil in 
the propeller dome either leaks out due to damage or bleeds back into the oil system. Therefore 
when this occurs, there is nothing holding the blades in any particular pitch angle and they are 
free to move in any direction. 
In addition to this, if the aircraft involved in the accident was fitted with full feathering 
propellers the propeller dome oil may be lost and the propeller blades tend to twist themselves 
toward the feathered position due to a feathering spring. Thus it is normal to find the propellers 
in the high pitch position after an accident. By disassembling the propellers, the pitch angle can 
be measured, although there are difficulties in determining the correct pitch angle, particularly 
if the propeller is damaged.  
The existing slash marks made by the propeller as the aircraft impacted can allow 
determination of the propeller RPM in terms of velocity. There is a linear mathematical 
relationship involving the distance between the slash marks, the number of blades on the 
propeller, the RPM of the propeller, and the forward velocity of the aircraft. To work out this 
calculation either RPM or velocity must be known. Satisfactory results can be obtained by 
applying the appropriate data of RPM related to engine features and aircraft velocity 
limitations. 
 
2.2.4 Aircraft Systems Examination 
Aircraft systems investigation can become very complicated for several reasons. Firstly, they 
are spread across the whole aircraft and during the accident may suffer sustained damage. 
Secondly, the actual condition of the aircraft systems does not necessarily show their state in 
the course of the accident. Finally, the post impact damage or fire can completely destroy all 
credible evidence. However, an aircraft system examination along with any witness statements 
and recorded data may provide an overall indication of their contribution to the accident.  
On the other hand, the basis of aircraft systems operation is rather simple. They transfer 
the power or energy from the source or reservoir to the working devices such as actuators or 
motors in order to perform aircraft functions. The energy transfer can be carried out by using 
the mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic systems. This indicates that although all 
aircraft systems are not alike, they all have significant similarities.  
As a result, investigation of aircraft systems actually means examining the aircraft 
mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, and pneumatic systems, or a combination of these, for any 
evidence (or lack) of abnormalities that affect the aircraft operation.  
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Aircraft systems investigation applies some common techniques to examine the aircraft 
systems from several aspects. Consequently, this methodology firstly includes examining the 
supply that is a fluid reservoir for pneumatic or hydraulic systems, then the generator or battery 
for electrical systems, or pilot actions for mechanical systems which, through the force applied 
to levers, control columns and pedals. Next, the system investigation is focused on the pump 
and other devices which furnish the pressure or power, followed by an inspection of the 
cockpit control devices. In addition, the protection devices such as pressure regulators, fuses 
and circuit breakers, along with emergency reservoirs and pumps, are examined. Special 
attention is paid to power distribution such as electrical wiring, hydraulic and fuel plumbing, 
cables, pulleys, and so forth, that is frequently destroyed or severely damaged in an accident. 
Finally, the universal approach to investigation includes examining the working devices that 
include a number of electrical motors, and other electrical appliances, actuators, as well as a 
number of levers. 
However, the first part of an on-field examination includes searching for essential 
components of the aircraft systems such as motors, actuators, switches, valves, and so on, 
identifying them and verifying that they are the correct parts. In accordance with the field 
investigation as a whole, they are marked and still and video recorded. This procedure then 
allows the laboratory to restore the moving parts of the aircraft devices to the positions they 
were discovered in at the accident site.  In order to protect evidence from being destroyed, 
some components such as switches or pumps can be recorded via x-ray. After that point the 
components can be tested or opened for internal inspection. The further procedure of aircraft 
systems examination reflects the type and features of the systems that are analysed.  
 
2.2.4.1 Mechanical Systems Examination 
Performing some of the aircraft operation by mechanical systems includes employment of a 
number of mechanical components such as levers, pulleys, rods, torque tubes, and cables. All 
these parts are movable and they can be subject to restriction or blockage if some foreign 
objects are caught or pinched in the machinery.  
There is a list of several possible malfunctions of the mechanical systems that are 
subject to the field and laboratory examination. First of all and most obvious is cable failure. 
Cables are a common method of transferring mechanical force to perform some of the aircraft 
functions such as open landing gear doors or release gear up locks, and then to operate the 
rudder, and trim surfaces. Some systems are single cables which incorporate a spring or 
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retraction device which brings the cable back to neutral position, whereas cables used on flight 
controls are almost always two-cable systems; for instance one moves the rudder left, the other 
moves it right. There are cable systems incorporating tensioning springs so that when a cable 
breaks, the system will be driven by the spring in the opposite direction. In normal use cables 
are tensioned to a specific value and in a severe impact accident, most of the cable systems will 
be loose and not working due to the impact. 
Since the cables are exerted to tension the in-service cable failures are always tension 
failures. If the cable shows evidence of some other failure mode, shear for example, then the 
cable was probably cut during impact. Cables are composed of spirally wound bundles 
consisting of individual strands of wire. When the cable fails, the strands fail individually one 
at a time. Viewed with high magnification, the fracture surfaces have a cup and cone mode 
characteristic of ductile tension failure. If a cable did fail in flight, it is likely that some 
individual strands had already failed and weakened the cable prior to the final failure (Figure 
15).  
Another possible cause of system malfunction is failure of any pulley or bell crank in 
the system resulting in instant loose cable. Investigation techniques include checking the parts 
of the system for consistency followed by detailed laboratory analysis of fracture surfaces.  
 
    
 
Figure 15: Cable fracture (evidence of failure of some strands prior to the final failure). 
 
The laboratory examination can identify fatigue crack, corrosion or metallurgical defect 
that implies in-flight failure, although it could also have occurred during the impact. If the 
fracture suggests an overload that is consistent with the impact forces or the way the part was 
normally loaded in service, this failure probably is not significant to the accident. 
However, the final failure mode does not depend on the time when the failure occurred 
(in-flight or post impact), but it depends on the manner in which the component was 
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overloaded (tension, bending). This means that investigators communicate all findings of the 
investigation in order to determine the nature of failure of mechanical systems.  
 
2.2.4.2 Hydraulic Systems Examination 
Examination of hydraulic systems includes inspecting their components: working fluid, 
hydraulic actuators, hydraulic pumps, hydraulic accumulators, and filters.  
Firstly, the fluid is checked for its correctness and any evidence of contaminants that 
may affect its features. If there are such abnormalities they will be revealed by inspecting the 
system filters. After that, the procedure strives to understand the fluid system leaks that could 
be the result of in-flight failure or impact forces.  
 
      
Figure 16: Fluid leakages due to improper sealant. 
 
Hydraulic systems use actuators which translate the hydraulic pressure into linear 
motion and can operate flight control surfaces, flaps, spoilers, air brakes, thrust reversers, 
landing gear, nose wheel steering systems, propellers and wheel brakes. As a result of this, any 
failure of these systems suggests a possible actuator malfunction.  
The actuator fails when the positive hydraulic pressure on one side of the piston is lost. 
Therefore, examination is focused on determining the position of the actuator piston at the 
moment of malfunction and reasons why it failed. This is important because the known 
extension of the actuator can tell the position of the operating device. Thus, a common actuator 
examination includes all known non-destructive analysis and inspection of the inside, in 
particular the cylinder, searching for impact-marks left by the edge of the piston.  
There are a variety of types of pumps that could be installed in an aircraft (that can be 
either engine driven or electrical). If they were working at the time of impact there will be 
evidence of damage to the movable parts of the pumps. Otherwise, if pump damage does not 
show evidence of rotational marks then it most likely occurred during impact when nothing 
was turning. Hydraulic pumps can be subject to overheating and cavitations that can be 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 42
revealed by examining the internal surface of the pumps for evidence of excessive operating 
temperature or local rough surface damage. 
Hydraulic systems use accumulators to dampen pressure surges and store hydraulic 
power for emergency use. Accumulators can fail if the tank or internal diaphragm or piston is 
damaged and they are subject to examination.  
Hydraulic systems are fitted with filters to keep fluid clean and avoid damage to system 
components. Laboratory analysis of fluid samples taken from the filter can examine the fluid 
for any contaminants. Moreover, viscosity, moisture and flash point also can be checked within 
a laboratory examination. 
 
2.2.4.3 Pneumatic Systems Examination 
Pneumatic systems in an aircraft use a compressed gas to perform some of the aircraft 
operations and are associated with heat and pressurization systems, anti-icing systems, fire 
extinguishing systems and oxygen systems. Pneumatic systems can operate emergency brakes, 
emergency landing gear extension, cabin heat, anti-ice, fire extinguishers, breathing oxygen 
and so forth. The compressed gas can be manufactured by the turbine engine or stored in 
pressurized containers.  
Pneumatic systems have a lot in common with hydraulic systems and many of the 
above investigative techniques can be applied to pneumatic systems. The air pressure of 
pneumatic systems is significantly lower than the fluid pressure in the hydraulic systems, and 
therefore the damage or marks created by movable parts of the system components have less 
intensity. Leaks from pneumatic systems are difficult to detect, particularly after a severe crash 
when the system probably has many leaks. Moreover, engine bleed air systems are potential 
sources of ignition and can aggravate the possibility of in-depth examination.  
 
2.2.4.4 Electrical Systems Examination 
The investigation of an aircraft electrical system is a very difficult task. This is because, from 
the time between when the plane first hits the ground and the time it finally comes to a stop, 
the condition of the electrical appliances may change and become severely damaged. 
Thus during the impact, some circuits can show evidence of a short-circuit, although at 
initial impact they were ‘off’. Understanding all of these marks and determination of the time 
when they occurred is practically impossible. Therefore, electrical systems examination relies 
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on information and findings provided by witness interviews, air traffic control communication 
and FDR/CVR information. That is to say, evidence in the recordings or statements may be 
more credible than the ‘electrical’ evidence in the wreckage.  
However, there are investigative techniques that examine electrical appliances and, 
depending on the evidence available, can draw conclusions on their contribution to the 
accident.  
Electrical systems examination can start by examining the electrical supplies which can 
be DC (direct current) or AC (alternating current) generators or batteries. Nowadays, almost all 
large modern aircrafts have AC systems. A DC generator can be coupled directly to the engine, 
whereas an AC generator needs a constant speed drive (CSD). This CSD is the first potential 
source of failure of electrical systems. Examination of the generator itself is a matter of looking 
for internal shorting or arcing or mechanical interference between the stator and the rotor. 
Similar analysis is applied to examine the emergency power supplies such as auxiliary power 
unit (APU) and ram air turbine (RAT).  
In addition, the electrical systems examination continues with inspecting electrical 
appliances such as motors, lights and electronic equipment. For instance, if a motor was 
damaged during impact, there will be evidence of scoring on the inside of the case if it was 
rotating or lack of scoring if the motor was not engaged.  Evidence of locale head damage to 
AC motors indicates that this device failed or was working abnormally during the flight. 
Analysis of electronic equipment, in general, does not provide any evidence of whether it was 
on or off at impact. 
 
Figure 17: Evidence of an electrical short-circuit9. 
                                                 
9 Analysis of an electrical system is closely associated with an in-flight fire investigation. That is to say, 
overloaded electrical systems, damaged or poor insulating material in the presence of combustible material and 
oxidizer can ignite an in-flight fire. If the fire is not extinguished and the aircraft crashes, a post-impact fire can 
occur, which destroys considerable evidence of the nature and origin of the in-flight fire. Therefore, differentiating 
the in-flight fire from post impact fire is an extremely difficult task within an investigation. However, there are 
common techniques to investigation in-flight occurrence. They are based on a consistent pattern of evidence to 
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In an electrical circuit, the condition of fuses and circuit breakers may provide valuable 
information. Unfortunately, the post impact damage might change their positions and therefore 
they do not have great significance for the investigation process.  
Examination of distribution systems, if the present condition of electrical wiring allows, 
can provide answers on the state of the electrical circuits during the accident and information 
about the dynamics of the post-impact damage and fire. This procedure includes analysis of the 
heavy duty wiring that runs motors and electrical commands coming from the cockpit.  
The wiring examination starts with inspecting the electrical terminals and fuses, 
followed by looking into the internal and external appearance of wires and searching for 
evidence of electrical arcing and shorting. When evidence of shorting is found, it must be 
defined as a primary or secondary short-circuit and in many cases this is practically impossible. 
In addition, the wires are examined along their full length (when applicable). If a wire was 
overheating the circuit itself, then the inside wire would be discoloured, showing a sign of 
excessive working temperature. Otherwise, if the damage is a result of post impact fire the wire 
strands inside should be shiny and bright. In cases of severe post impact fire this evidence is 
destroyed. 
In practice, aircraft systems operate by using one or more basic systems, as discussed 
above. For example, flap systems in modern aircraft are most likely to be electro-mechanical. 
Landing gear systems may be either hydraulic or electric, whereas brake systems are part of 
hydraulic systems and so forth. By examining the components of the basic systems and 
applying logic to understand their final position with respect to the crash dynamics, 
conclusions can be drawn as to their contribution to the accident. 
 
2.2.5 Aircraft Recorders Examination 
Aircraft recording devices, where they exist, are an essential source of information for the 
investigators. There are four general sources providing information about the airplane, its 
performance and its configuration as follows: air-to-ground communications tapes, ATC radar 
data, Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR).  
The FDR and the CVR have been designed to monitor and record aircraft and crew 
performance and this data is used only in the course of an aircraft accident investigation. They 
                                                                                                                                                          
support an argument for an in-flight fire including the flow pattern of the products of combustions and molten 
metal, as well as a logical pattern of impact effects and wreckage damage. 
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have emerged as an irreplaceable tool for determining the causes of accidents particularly if 
there are no survivors, no witnesses, and wreckage destroyed to the point where technical 
investigation is impossible. In such cases the investigation depends primarily on recorded data. 
As a result of this, FDRs and CVRs were first required on scheduled air transports and, over 
time, they have been required on smaller aircraft. In many countries worldwide the FDRs are 
required on all aircraft operating commercially and carrying ten or more passengers.  
 
 
Figure 18: Flight data and cockpit voice recorder [78]. 
 
The first FDRs were analogue recorders recording five basic parameters on steel or 
aluminum tape. Later they were upgraded to 11 parameters. The new aircraft manufactured, 
which require an FDR, have a digital FDR recording 17 parameters. In spite of all this, there 
are still foil FDRs in use throughout the world and they are still encountered during 
investigations. 
The analogue recorder records the data by scratching a trace on a roll of stainless steel 
or aluminium tape placed in a crash-survivable container. Recovery of data requires 
microscopic analysis of the traces and the ability to read the traces is limited to the 
manufacturer of the recorder and major government investigation agencies. When the data is 
transferred to a graph it has limited accuracy. 
The features of a digital data recorder far exceed the analogue recorder. The digital 
recorders improve data collection and readout accuracy. They can record a number of different 
parameters that can be measured and reduced to digital form depending mainly on type, age 
and use of the aircraft. Wood & Sweginnis [184] list 88 parameters which are most required 
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worldwide. They also add that the following 18 parameters may also be most required, 
depending on aircraft certification and the recorder fitted.10  
 
- Time - Autopilot engagement status 
- Pressure altitude - Longitudinal acceleration 
- Indicated airspeed - Pitch control input 
- Heading - Lateral control input 
- Normal acceleration (vertical) - Rudder pedal input 
- Pitch attitude - Primary pitch control surface position 
- Roll attitude - Primary lateral control surface position 
- Manual radio transmission keying - Primary yaw control surface position 
- Thrust/power on each engine - Lateral acceleration 
 
In most cases the data is recorded on Mylar tape and stored on the aircraft in the FDR. 
Access to the data usually requires removal of the FDR and computer analysis of the tape. 
Some installations allow the data to be extracted to a portable recorder plugged into the 
aircraft.   
The whole procedure of data storage and its successful recovery is associated with 
several features or problems that may directly affect the aircraft accident investigation 
outcomes. First, the storage device must survive the impact forces and post impact damage of 
fire and water. To ensure this, the data recorders meet demanding design standards and are 
usually located in the tail of the aircraft. Next, recorders are usually painted a bright orange 
colour in order to facilitate their finding. Furthermore, the recorders are fitted with a ‘pinger’ to 
make it easier to find in the water.  
Investigations from the past reveal that a number of recovered recorders failed, that is 
to say, did not record the data required. In addition, recovery of the recording device 
particularly from the ocean is both expensive and time-consuming. 
The above suggests that although an aircraft involved in an accident may be fitted with 
a recorder this does not necessarily mean that the investigators will always manage to recover 
the flight data. This conclusion has imposed a need for improvement in data recording and its 
recovery. One solution is the current ACARS (Arinc Communications Addressing and 
                                                 
10 Some operators record only the required parameters, whereas others record as many as 250 different parameters 
per aircraft [184] 
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Reporting System), which transfers, collects and stores the data at a central location on the 
ground [184].  
Readout of flight parameters is performed through computer analysis of recorded 
digital data. The readout product presents a collection of charts and tables available for further 
use. For instance, a computer can use the data readout to operate the flight instruments 
graphically depicted on the screen and portray a graphic image of the airplane from any 
vantage point or simulate the actual flight in the course of an accident (Figure 19).  
 
 
 
Figure 19: Simulation of a flight by recovering the flight data recorded [73]. 
 
 
2.2.5.1 Cockpit Voice Recorders 
Cockpit voice recorders (CVR) as well as cockpit area microphones (CAM) are designed to 
record cockpit sound and conversation not otherwise recorded through the radio or interphone 
circuits. The CVR usually has a separate channel for each flight deck crew member and 
records everything that goes through those audio circuits.  
The CVR records everything including engine noise, cockpit switches, motors, warning 
chimes, stick shakers, and runway noises and therefore it would be more properly termed a 
CSR – cockpit sound recorder. Determining the source of the sound is a matter of isolating it 
and matching its signature on an oscilloscope with a known sound. For instance, investigators, 
by using consistent identification techniques, may be able to determine the RPM of each 
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engine based on sound recorded, or identify the sound of an in-flight crack. The CAM records 
cockpit conversations that are not usually recorded by any other recording devices. 
The recording tape is usually a continuous loop 30 minute tape which automatically 
erases and records over itself. It means that events occurring more than 30 minutes before 
landing (or crash) are not recorded. There is no technical reason why the recording is only 30 
minutes in length, although investigators are interested in expanding the current recording 
duration.  
In terms of the CVR data, there are a number of public restrictions related to its use. For 
instance, the information cannot be used in any disciplinary proceedings arising from the 
accident. However, the recordings of CVR and CAM contain valuable information regarding 
crew resource management, cockpit discipline and communication problems, as well as the 
condition of aircraft systems that are significant to determining the causes of an accident.  
 
2.2.5.2 Air Traffic Control Radar  
Modern ATC radar systems are digital systems recording the plane location by converting the 
radar return to electronic symbology that is displayed on the controller’s scope (Figure 20). 
This data is stored in memory and, when needed, can be replayed on another scope. The 
recorded data is used to plot the aircraft flight path or to recreate the situation in a computer or 
simulator. Early air traffic control radar systems were analogue without memory and did not 
contribute at all to the aircraft accident investigation.  
 
 
 
Figure 20: ATC Radar display [123]. 
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Radar antennas sweep once every 12 seconds (in many countries worldwide), so the 
recorded data is composed of a series of data points at 12 second intervals. The stored data 
provides information about aircraft identification including time, altitude as reported by the 
aircraft's encoding altimeter, and location in latitude and longitude. Aircraft location also can 
be depicted in an x-y coordinate system with the radar antenna at the coordinate origin. 
Consequently, by using the data recorded, the investigator can determine: position every 12 
seconds, ground track (average point-to-point heading), reported altitude, ground speed, 
acceleration and rate of climb or descent of the aircraft. Additionally, by adding the known 
wind data and aircraft characteristics the true airspeed and aircraft heading as well as angle of 
attached and ‘g’ loading can be determined. 
The readout data is usually plotted on a large scale map using latitude and longitude 
information. Since the radar takes data of the aircraft’s radar return every 12 seconds, the 
resulting plot is not a smooth line. However, by extrapolation or by applying an interactive 
computer program the most probable flight path and other aircraft performance can be 
reconstructed (Figure 6, page 25). 
In the case of a missing aircraft, plotting the recorded data may indicate the aircraft 
location. Moreover, a plot of the aircraft pathway can indicate an in-flight structural failure by 
taking into consideration the accident sequence. This analysis includes correlation of changes 
in heading, airspeed and altitude with changes in aircraft performance and aerodynamics. A 
plot of radar data can be upgraded by including the data relating to witness statements, weather 
data, and air-to-ground transmission data to the plot. For mid-air collisions, the radar data may 
locate the collision in space and, along with examination of the wreckage, determine the actual 
collision geometry.  
Finally, the recorded digital data from FDR and ATC radar can be used by a simulator 
to replicate the route the accident aircraft flew. This is an important tool for analysing the 
accident sequence in order to determine the events contributing to the accident and this 
significantly enhances the investigation results. 
 
2.2.6 Operation and Maintenance Investigation 
Operation investigation within an aircraft accident investigation aims to examine all facts 
relating to flight operation and crew activities during the accident including assessing the 
crew’s qualifications. In addition, the maintenance investigation strives to determine the 
aircraft condition during the flight followed by inspecting the circumstances associated with 
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weather, air traffic control and the airport. This portion of the investigation involves less 
intuition and is mainly focused on a number of regulatory requirements that have to be met by 
the operator and owner of the aircraft.  
 
2.2.6.1 Operation Examination  
The operation investigators begin the investigation by searching for any documents that may 
have been in the aircraft at the time of the accident.  The documents that might be in the 
cockpit include: licenses and medical certificates of the pilots, pilot’s log books, charts, maps, 
flight manuals, weather briefings, and flight plans. Recovering the above perishable documents 
is the initial action undertaken by the operation investigators which can provide valuable 
information with respect to understanding the causes of the accident.  
When pilots and their qualifications are examined, the investigation considers several 
factors including:  
 
- Pilot qualifications and experience - Pilot training and 
- Pilot flying experience - Competency. 
 
In terms of pilot qualification and experience, pilot licenses and certifications are 
examined. By doing so, investigators determine whether the pilot was qualified to operate the 
given aircraft on the critical flight. Moreover, investigators inspect the pilot’s current medical 
certificate and also check if the pilot was in compliance with any medical waivers.  
There are several other sources that can assist in finding further information about a 
pilot’s flying experience. Investigators can obtain this information by inspecting the pilot’s log 
books or other records. For example, flight experience may be part of his training records, i.e. 
some aviation operators keep separate records of their pilots' experience. Another source of 
pilot flight experience can be the pilot's employment application. In evaluating experience, 
investigators assess the pilot proficiency for the critical flight. In this regard, a pilot may be 
technical current in an aircraft, but not proficient in it. Similarly, a pilot may be proficient in 
flying the aircraft, but not proficient in the particular phase of flight or circumstances in which 
the accident occurred. This part of the investigation is covered by examining the certification, 
violation records and medical information.  
Next, investigators examine the pilot’s records relating to his training. The investigators 
check the training records for compliance with both company and federal requirements 
followed by interviewing other pilots or instructors.  Finally, investigators assess the 
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competency of the pilot for the critical flight, which is most important within aircraft accident 
investigation.  
In addition, investigators examine the operations manual which describes company 
operational procedures. This document is usually approved by a regulatory governmental 
agency and it is an obligatory document for aircraft that operate as a commercial or air 
transport aircraft. Within this part of the investigation, further examination is carried out to 
determine whether the procedure undertaken was appropriate for the situation encountered.  
Operation examination also considers the aircraft load. There are two aspects to this 
question. First, investigators have enough resources to determine how the aircraft was 
supposed to be loaded, although how it was actually loaded can be something completely 
different. Information relating to the number of passengers, the amount of cargo, along with 
interviewing the people who performed the loading, can provide an appropriate value of actual 
weight of cargo and passengers. When considering aircraft loading, investigators examine 
gross weight and location of centre of gravity and their impact on aircraft control and stability. 
If these are the major causes of the accident then they usually happen during or shortly after 
takeoff. If the plane crashed during the cruise or approach phases then gross weight and 
location of centre of gravity probably did not contribute significantly to the accident. The 
actual gross weight and location of centre of gravity at the time of the accident can be 
determined by assuming the takeoff weight, which is balanced for fuel burned during the 
critical flight  
The flight path is another aspect of accident investigation. The aim of this examination 
is to determine if there were any deviations between the actual and planned track. Investigators 
compare the planned track with the actual track by using information obtained from flight 
record devices (ATC radar, air-to-ground communications) as well as information provided by 
inertial and GPS navigation system.  
In many accidents in the past, air-to-ground communications have explained the major 
circumstances that led to accidents. Here, investigators search for relevant information on the 
accident not only on the scheduled frequency, but also on other frequencies, and provide 
transcripts of them. Voice tapes are usually collected by investigators immediately after the 
accident and are transcribed by people with transcription skills. Information obtained by air-to-
ground (A/G) communication is closely associated with data from ATC radar data, the FDR 
and the CVR. Therefore, investigators correlate all the information available to the same 
timeline. Practise shows that usually there is a spread of several seconds among the same 
events recorded by different devices. The time signal on the A/G tape is likely to be the most 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND 52
accurate, whereas the CVR time line is probably the least accurate. However, information on a 
cockpit microphone is recorded on both the CVR and A/G tape that allows mutual correlation. 
Microphone keying also allows correlation with the FDR system.  
Finally, based on all information available, investigators develop a history of the flight 
from the earliest event of significance to the flight to the time of accident. This actually 
presents a sequence of pertinent events that preceded the accident and is a basis for further 
investigation.  
 
2.2.6.2 Maintenance Examination 
Another investigative team examines the aircraft conditions prior to the accident by looking 
into the required and performed inspection, major modification, maintenance or repair and 
airworthiness directive compliance. In general, this information can be sourced from the 
aircraft log books. 
 
 
Figure 21: Exterior safety inspection [8]. 
 
In terms of requirements, investigators determine if the aircraft complied with the all-
over airworthiness directives that are obtained from the manufacturer. Since the maintenance 
records do not always contain day-to-day maintenance activities, investigators usually first 
conclude who was actually maintaining the aircraft. In this way all maintenance and repairs 
operations are available to the investigators.  
Concerning this area of investigation, the FAA agency (Federal Aviation 
Administration in the United States) has established two computer files that are accessible and 
potentially valuable to the aircraft accident investigation [184]. These files refer to 
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Accident/Incident and Service Difficulty Report data bases. It is a great example of usage of 
the gained knowledge through investigation to prevent future accidents.  
The above indicates that operation and maintenance investigation is a well known 
process without any questionable issues. By simply using the information available, 
investigators assess pilot competency and determine whether the aircraft was properly 
operating. This part of the investigation also includes analysis of airfield, air traffic control and 
weather conditions, and these are discussed below.  
 
2.2.7 Airfield, Air Traffic Control and Weather Examination 
Investigation of airfield, air traffic control and weather conditions represent the last portion of 
the human-aircraft-environment investigation concept. When conducting airfield examinations, 
investigators first collect published information about the airfield at the time of the accident 
including diagrams, approach and departure charts, instructions to pilots and aerial 
photographs. 
In addition, investigators collect the records of airfield certifications and inspections 
that usually are conducted by a state regulatory agency. Moreover, investigators inspect the 
airfield operations manual that describes the airport and its operation. The airfield operation 
manual may contain useful information important to the investigation, particularly if the 
accident occurred in the landing or taxiing phase. Among them the most significant items are: 
airfield limitations, emergency plan including coping with a number of accidents and incidents, 
airport self inspection program, snow and ice control plan, hazardous materials.  In terms of 
airfields, Annex 14 to the ICAO Convention has specified the airport standards that have been 
universally adopted by ICAO members. 
If an accident occurs on or near an airport, then the investigation evaluates the disaster 
response and rescue issues. Although the results of this examination will most likely not 
contribute to the determining of the circumstances of the accident, they may affect the final 
recommendations. Within this portion of the investigation, investigators assess if the disaster 
response and rescue were adequate for the accident in question. This is mainly conducted by 
checking and ensuring that the recommended standards were adopted including issues related 
to notification, time of response, adequacy of the response plan and procedure.   
In addition, investigators determine the action undertaken by the air traffic control 
services and evaluate their adequacy. Since most of this information is recorded, investigators 
examine audio and video tapes including some of the following information: transcripts of 
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recorded voice transmissions, report of aircraft accident, controller statements, flight plan, 
ATC radar data and many others. 
Although statistics show that weather is a significantly less causal factor to an accident 
than human and aircraft factors, adverse weather conditions may affect the aircraft flight and 
precede human errors or omission and finally cause a malfunction of aircraft systems. 
Therefore, within an aircraft accident investigation, the weather conditions and their influence 
on aircraft flight are examined in detail.  
Providing information about the weather at any location is not a difficult task. There is 
a seemingly endless supply of weather information such as surface weather observations, 
weather radar data, satellite data, barograph records, rainfall records, severe weather reports, 
pilot reports, ATC radar data, wind data, area forecasts, and weather briefing records. In 
addition, weather information can be provided by witnesses, although the major sources are 
national weather services and the airline meteorological office. 
After collecting all of the available data and establishing the weather at the time of the 
accident, investigators assess its affect on the airplane. This analysis includes considering 
severe weather phenomena such as turbulence, hail, icing, windshear and other adverse 
weather conditions. 
 
2.2.8 Human Factors  
There is a general expert opinion that human factors are involved somehow in every aircraft 
accident. Therefore, within every single aircraft accident investigation, the analysis of human 
factors and their contribution to the accident is very important. Thus, there are three major 
questions relating to human factors that need to be answered in almost any investigation. The 
first question is related to identification of human factors that were involved in the accident, 
then questions to determine accident survivability and finally establishing cause of the injuries 
and fatalities.  
There are a number of sources for obtaining information relating to contribution of 
human factors to the accident. Among them the most significant are the wreckage scene, 
survivor and witness statements, human remains and post mortem results. In addition, valuable 
information can also be obtained from family member statements, personal history, and 
medical histories. Investigation of human factors in an aircraft accident investigation is usually 
conducted by medical personnel or individuals with specialised training in human performance 
areas. 
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In an accident with fatalities the investigators first deal with the human remains. This 
analysis includes identification of occupants and determination of the cause of death. 
Identification of human remains is one of the investigation requirements and its conduct 
sometimes is a long and demanding process. This includes several forensic techniques 
including fingerprints and footprints, dental records, physical attributes, body marks and scars, 
and DNA method.  
 
 
 
Figure 22: Automated fingerprint identification. 
 
Alternatively, if there are survivors, the investigation is focused on their medical and 
psychological treatment including the cause of injuries. Nevertheless, within an investigation 
most concerns are related to the flight crew with respect to their physical condition before and 
at the time of the accident. Investigators examine the crew’s actions and identify the 
contributing factors that led to the accident. Findings derived from examination of human 
factors usually present one of the most important parts of the final report. 
 
2.2.8.1 Human Factors Examination 
The investigation will probably start with a physical examination of the survivor(s). This 
includes present state of health and assessment of any injuries as well as toxicological tests. 
This part of the investigation is coordinated and organised to ensure that all information 
possible is collected.  
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Crew member investigation focuses on their activities during the previous 72 hours 
including food, rest, sleep, duty time, and physical condition. Additionally, the investigator 
collects information related to stress, stability, recreation, family and financial status followed 
by an inspection of the individual's flying history. This includes prior accidents and incidents, 
career progression, peer evaluations, relationships with other crew members and so forth. The 
investigators also inspect the individual's general medical history, particularly any 
prescriptions, glasses or contact lenses and medical waivers.  
If any of the aircraft occupants died at the time of the accident an autopsy is performed. 
It may provide some information that may assist in determining the causes or factors 
contributing to the accident (this will depend on the nature of the accident and the condition of 
the remains). Firstly, the autopsy is focused on determining if the accident was survivable. That 
is to say, the autopsy strives to determine if the person died at impact or due to some post-
impact problem such as fire, asphyxiation, drowning and so on. Secondly, by carrying out the 
physical examination and toxicological tests of the remains, information about the physical 
condition of the individual can be obtained. Likewise, the presence of alcohol or drugs in the 
blood or bodily fluids can be also identified. Additionally, this analysis can provide evidence 
of fatigue and other diseases that may have impacted on the accident sequence. 
Next, in a multi-crewed cockpit, it is important to know who was actually operating the 
aircraft. Determination of the location and injury features can provide answers to this question. 
Furthermore, the examination of the remains can determine if there was a toxic environment 
present prior to impact. For instance, if smoke is present in the lungs this can be sufficient 
evidence of an in-flight fire accident. Next, in the case where there is an in-flight explosion, the 
autopsy can easily recognise the blast injuries and identify fragments of the explosive device.  
Human factors that may have an impact on aircraft accident occurrence can be divided 
into two major groups. They are psychological and physiological human factors, although they 
sometimes overlap. 
Psychological factors are a very difficult area to investigate. This is because, first, it is 
very difficult to provide any positive evidence of crew member actions during the accident. 
Second, it is very difficult to prove a particular crew action, although there could be a lot of 
supporting evidence for it. However, an aircraft accident investigation considers factors being 
present in accidents and assesses their contribution to accidents. In this regard, there are a 
number of conditions or situations that could apply to a particular accident and are usually 
subject to further classification and cluster analysis. 
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Investigators dealing with this part of the investigation are faced with a number of 
issues that are a matter of identification and proof. Thus, investigators within an aircraft 
accident investigation commonly evaluate the influence of psychological factors in order to 
determine whether:  
 
- The crew should have been able to cope with the critical situation, 
- The crew failed to respond properly to the critical environmental conditions, 
- The crew failed to perceive the potential threat of an accident due to overconfidence or 
under motivation. 
 
On the other hand, the physiological factors such as drugs, alcohol, nutrition, food 
poisoning, carbon monoxide poisoning and sudden incapacitation are a little easier to 
investigate. This is because they usually leave some evidence behind and by applying 
advanced chemical techniques the presence of these factors can be proven. Thus, while breath 
analysers are used for alcohol detection in the breath, which is closely related to the blood 
alcohol level, drugs are usually screened by immunoassay methods, gas chromatography or 
liquid chromatography and confirmed by using mass spectrometry. Liquid chromatography is 
the preferred technique for analysis of toxic substances and food poisoning, but still 
confirmation is done by coupling chromatographic methods to mass spectrometry. Analysis of 
carbon monoxide is routinely done by classical colorimetric tests.  
 
 
Figure 23: Analysis of blood sample for blood-alcohol concentration. 
 
(A chromatogram of blood alcohol measurement) 
 
Reports of human factors investigations sometimes are written separate to the main 
accident report, although some authors argue about this approach. 
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2.2.9 Aircraft Accident Reports 
The product of any aircraft accident investigation is a report incorporating all facts and 
circumstances associated with the accident. Reports are generally narrative following the facts-
analysis-conclusions format that is suggested in Annex-13 to the ICAO Convention. The 
material presented in an aircraft accident investigation report is divided into four major 
sections: factual information, analysis, conclusions and recommendations.  
Following the narrative format of explaining the accident, the first part of the report 
shows the factual information about the accident. This includes information relating to 
conditions associated with the accident and its consequences such as injuries to persons, 
damage to aircraft, flight recorders, personnel information, aircraft information, meteorological 
information, wreckage and impact information, medical and pathological information, fire and 
survival aspects.  
The second portion of a safety report presents the analysis undertaken within the 
investigation and introduces the relevant information to the determination of causes of the 
accident. This section considers the impact of operational factors, maintenance and material 
factors, and human factors. Next, the report reveals a list of findings and causes that 
significantly contributed to the accident occurrence.  
In the fourth part of the report the safety recommendations are introduced. They, as sole 
objectives of an investigation, are derived from the analysis carried out and conclusions drawn 
with the purpose of accident prevention. Commonly, in a safety report there is a list of 
appendices that provide other important information for better understanding of the report. 
Thus, in this part of the report a number of maps, photographs, diagrams, flight data recorder 
readout, and communication transcripts can be found.  
Apart from the narrative reports that are released and accessible to the public, there are 
also data reports that are commonly issued on each accident. These are designed to facilitate 
the data collection of a number of accidents and they present an important tool for investigating 
accidents (particularly with similar circumstances) and conducting research as well. 
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 Chapter 
 3 
 
Take nothing for granted; do not jump to conclusions; follow every possible clue to 
the extent of usefulness  . . . Apply the principle that there is no limit to the amount 
of effort justified to prevent the recurrence of one aircraft accident or the loss of 
one life. 
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION MANUAL OF THE U.S. AIR FORCES 
 
Literature Review 
 
This chapter provides a summary of some of the current research and literature relevant to this 
work. In particular, research techniques and methods used by aircraft accident investigators are 
examined, as well as fields where their application and contribution to an investigation is the 
most effective.  
There are many sources of information on aircraft accident investigation in both printed 
and electronic forms. There are several journals, conferences and magazines devoted to the 
subject of aircraft safety including aircraft accident and incident investigation. However, the 
ICAO and national investigating agencies such as ATSB, NTSB, and AAIR produce most of 
the research studies relevant to aircraft accident and incident investigation issues. Most of this 
information is available online so that keeping up-to-date with investigation news is 
significantly easier than it once was. 
Since aircraft accident investigation covers a variety of topics, the articles discussed are 
categorised into the following sections:  
 
- Most wanted improvements in aviation issued by the NTSB, 
- References having the greatest impact on this research, 
- Articles using statistics as a research tool, 
- Articles devoted to analysing human, aircraft and weather induced causal factors. 
 
These articles create a concise picture about the current level of knowledge on aircraft 
accident investigation and have provided some conclusions that have had a significant impact 
on proceeding with this work.  
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3.1 Improvements in Aviation recommended by the NTSB 
With more planes and more accidents, along with their clear attitude of preventing future 
accidents by a thorough and independent investigation, the United States and the NTSB can be 
regarded as the world leader in crash investigations. Based on investigation outcomes, the 
NTSB issues special reports or study reports that incorporate the findings of a number of prior 
accident investigations. In accordance with these findings, along with sustained efforts towards 
air traffic safety enhancement, the NTSB has introduced the following six most wanted 
improvements [150]. 
 
1. Reducing the danger of flying in icy conditions by analysing both aircraft design and 
icy condition approval methods.  
 
2. Design changes to eliminate the danger of flammable fuel and air vapors in all transport 
category aircraft. 
 
3. Improving runway safety by enacting procedures such as giving immediate warnings of 
probable collisions or incursions directly to flight crews, and providing landing distance 
assessment with an adequate safety margin for every landing. 
 
4. Upgrading data recorders with current technologies and installing video recorders in 
cockpits to give investigators more information to potentially work with.  
 
5. Setting work hour limits for flight crew and air traffic controllers in order to reduce the 
rate of accidents and incidents caused by human fatigue.  
 
6. Better crew resource management via additional crew resource management training. 
 
Furthermore, the NTSB has issued a number of safety alerts and actions in order to 
improve air traffic safety such as alerts related both to aircraft ground icing and to 
thunderstorms [150]. 
To achieve its goals the NTSB uses both traditional investigation techniques and an 
alternate research methods approach in its technical accident investigations to help determine 
the failure process of systems [130]. A traditional investigation may be employed if the 
complete failure process can be identified with sufficient accuracy primarily through 
observation, examination of evidence and/or via full-scale demonstrations, whereas the 
alternate approach uses research, testing, and analysis targeted to specific areas of insufficient 
or inadequate information.  
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Moreover, the NTSB stresses the importance of collecting and classifying any evidence 
derived. Thus, NTSB staff members are evaluating two new investigation approaches, with one 
designed to address interacting system elements and the other to document the evidence 
gathering process [169]. The first approach employs accident fault trees, qualitative models 
depicting the events, conditions, and/or actions that are considered during an investigation as 
being potential contributors to the accident. The second approach focuses on Investigation 
Organizer, a Web-based tool developed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) Ames Research Centre. 
Additionally, the NTSB aviation accident database now is available on the NTSB web 
site [156]. It contains highly classified and downloadable datasets of more than 140,000 
aviation accidents and incidents. The computerised findings are identified in a sequence of 
events as occurrences, phases, causes, factors, and events. 
 
3.2 Works Most Relevant to the Research 
In the course of conducting this work a number of books, reports, papers, and other articles 
were consulted and the most relevant to this research are listed in the References. Among 
these, ‘Aircraft Accident Investigation’ by Wood & Sweginnis [184] and ‘Serious Accident 
and Human Factors’ by Miyagi [142], had the greatest impact on the course of the research. 
These references have both indicated some prospective research methods suitable for the 
comprehensive analysis of aircraft accident investigation and also suggest possible techniques 
for accomplishing it. 
Wood and Sweginnis [184] in particular provide a thorough review of the philosophy, 
thinking, methods and associated implications that are applied within an accident (and 
incident) investigation. The authors combine over fifty years of practical experience in aircraft 
accident investigation, and both authors are pilots, engineers and certified safety professionals. 
Wood and Sweginnis begin their book by discussing the investigation procedures 
required by the NTSB and the ICAO. In addition, the basics of field investigation as well as 
laboratory examinations are highlighted across all aspects of aircraft accident investigation. 
Thus, the book deals with the examination of wreckage distribution, structural failures, power 
plants, aircraft systems, aircraft recorders and many others areas relevant to an investigation. 
The book also provides information on investigation management and report writing that is 
useful both for investigators and researchers.   
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Overall, Wood and Sweginnis seem quite positive about the benefits of investigation. 
For example, they point out that ‘you can take a lot of pride’ in the contribution of 
investigations to enhancement of air traffic safety. Nevertheless, the authors retain their 
objectivity and address a number of controversial issues associated within the business of 
investigation and these issues have had a great impact on this research work. Using a thought-
provoking writing style, they raise many contentious issues such as whether investigators have 
appropriate and sufficient skills to handle accident investigations and if reports of completed 
investigations are always accurate and professional.  
This book was one of the essential sources for creating the comprehensive 
questionnaire within the Delphi enquiry discussed in Chapter 4 and 6 of this work. 
In ‘Serious Accidents and Human Factors’, Miyagi [137] analytically investigates 
incident reports and reveals the critical information hidden therein for the purpose of 
preventing future accidents. The central issue of this book is the Incident Reports Analysing 
System (IRAS). In particular it offers a broad understanding of the accident causation chain, 
events contributing to that chain, and reveals a method for identifying those causal factors. 
Miyagi applies an analytical technique – multi dimensional analysis of incident reports 
(MAIR) using a particular model (Quantification Method III) to a collection of accounts of 
major accidents drawn mainly from the aviation industry. 
Miyagi addresses the importance of results of technical analysis of events in accidents 
that have already occurred and is focused primarily on breaking the chain of events and human 
errors leading to accidents. The goal of her book is to seek out the conditions (the background 
causal factors) and determine why the individuals made errors, thus gaining an objective 
understanding of the conditions from a comprehensive perspective so as to contribute to future 
accident prevention. 
Miyagi also demonstrates a method of quantifying qualitative factors which contribute 
to the occurrence of an unsafe event, and this helps clarify the relevant interrelationships. She 
also introduces a statistical method for the multidimensional analysis of contributing factors 
and positions analytical results in a multidimensional Euclidean space. Thus, factors that occur 
simultaneously have a strong mutual correlation and are distributed close together, and vice 
versa (an example is shown in Appendix C). 
This reference thus contains, amongst other things, a possible technique on how to deal 
with the large amount of stored data required within this research work. 
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3.3 Other Works Relevant to the Research 
Below, several representative examples of current published works pertinent to aircraft 
accident investigation are examined with respect to the relevancy of the techniques used and 
their technical merits. According to their content and the research methods used, they are 
divided and discussed within several broad categories. Most of the articles have been published 
by the ATSB which is responsible both for aircraft accident investigations, and maintaining 
and improving transport safety in Australia.11 
 
3.3.1 Statistics as a Research Tool 
Aircraft accident statistics are frequently used by aviation experts when presenting both 
aviation safety and accident prevention information, owing to their inherent power. They show 
the overall picture of many danger factors to air safety and may indicate areas of potentially 
significant improvement. 
Research report [68] enhances public awareness of aviation safety in Australia by 
providing a readily accessible analysis of the aviation sector with a strong focus on safety 
trends. Furthermore, safety data collection and processing systems highlight successes in 
mitigating operational errors and can therefore lead to more insightful conclusions about safety 
[99].12 Moreover, ‘access the information you need to reduce the number of accidents and 
incidents while insuring higher levels of safety’, says the International Air Transport 
Association [113]. 
In addition, the NTSB [155] addresses the importance of statistics during accident 
investigation, safety studies and special investigations and states that the Board’s ability to 
study important safety issues is often affected by poor data quality. The goal of the report is to 
establish data quality standards, identify information gaps, encourage improvements in these 
areas and ensure compatibility among the safety data systems. 
In order to improve the procedure for collecting aviation accident data, safety report 
[158] includes a survey conducted on a sample of registered aircraft owners. Based on the 
                                                 
11 Australia has an excellent air transport safety record, particularly with respect to maintenance safety 
deficiencies issues and the control of continuing airworthiness of aircraft [24]. Major Australian airlines have long 
been regarded as being among the world's safest, and there have been no fatalities involving an Australian high 
capacity jet aircraft. 
 
12 Legal guidance developed by ICAO is designed to prevent the inappropriate use of information collected solely 
for the purpose of improving aviation safety. 
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answers given, a number of positive conclusions were drawn in relation to current procedure 
for collecting and reporting accident data.  
Dodd [97] in his article states that the most comprehensive sources of aviation safety 
data are the ICAO Accident/Incident Data Reporting (ADREP) system and Bird Strike 
Information System (IBIS), the IATA Safety Trend Evaluation, Analysis and Data Exchange 
System (STEADES) and the archive of the LOSA Collaborative (ARCHIE), which contains 
data collected from numerous airlines worldwide. The author adds that all of these sources are 
designed to address different aspects of flight safety, and each has differing strengths and 
weaknesses. This article concludes with the suggestion that by integrating safety data from 
different sources and applying a risk model, a better estimate of the rate at which flights are 
subject to threats can be derived,  and thus reduce the risk to a reasonable level. 
Finally, NASA’s Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS), the confidential reporting 
system widely used by the aviation community to identify potential safety hazards, is now also 
available online.  
In addition, several articles which consider the statistics based on past air accident 
investigations are presented below. Report [39] presents data concerning Australian aviation 
activities, the aviation industry, aviation accidents and incidents, and also highlights broad 
trends and developments in aviation safety. 
Research papers [30, 60] examine fatal Australian civil aviation accidents 1990-2005 
and 1991-2000 respectively, and both cover fatal accident numbers and rates by aircraft type 
and operational grouping, the timing of accidents, injury levels, pilot demographics and fatal 
accident types. The ATSB aviation database was searched to identify all fatal accidents 
involving civil aviation aircraft operating in Australian airspace in the considered periods. The 
findings show that both commercial and non-commercial operations experienced a significant 
decrease in the number of fatal accidents. 
Similarly, research paper [43] examines the number and rate of fatal accidents in 
Australia and specifically Far North Queensland involving aircraft with a maximum takeoff 
weight of 11,000 kg or less between 1990 and 2005. Furthermore, article [46] compares fatal 
accident and fatality rates in Australia with those of other Western countries including the 
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and New Zealand between 1994 and 2004. 
Overall, the findings showed that Australia’s rates were mostly similar to the corresponding 
rates of the other countries examined. 
Paper [33] reviews midair collisions in Australia between 1961 and 2003. The 
objectives of the review were to identify common characteristics and contributing factors, 
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assess whether there had been a change in midair collision rates in recent years and to compare 
the characteristics and rates of midair collisions with those of other countries. 
The ATSB in its research study [53] analyses the characteristics of wire-strike 
occurrences using accident and incident data collected by the ATSB. The findings document 
the clear danger to pilots flying at low level in the vicinity of power-lines and the need to be 
proactive in reducing such risks. In addition, paper [29] reviews and analyses data related to 
runway incursions in Australia that may result in accidents with catastrophic consequences. 
Occupant survivability of accidents for air carrier operations in the U.S. is analysed in 
report [153]. It also examines cause of death information for serious accidents. The report 
emphasises that there are two ways to prevent fatalities in air traffic: by preventing accidents, 
and by protecting aircraft passengers in accidents that do occur. 
In terms of causes of aircraft electrical failures, a survey of data on aircraft electronic 
and electrical component failure was conducted to identify problematic components [105]. 
This article concludes that problems with interconnections are major contributors to aircraft 
electrical equipment failures, and environmental factors, especially corrosion, are significant 
contributors to connector problems. 
Report [125] describes the results of an independent analysis of the primary and 
contributory causes of aviation accidents in Canada between 1996 and 2003. The results 
suggest that the majority of these accidents were attributed to human error. This paper 
addresses the controversy over such a systemic view of failure saying that it is difficult to 
identify precisely which factors play a significant role in the latent causes of an accident or 
incident.  
In addition, report [160] reveals several recurring safety issues for EMS (emergency 
medical services operations): less stringent requirements for operations conducted without 
patients on board, a lack of aviation flight risk evaluation programs, a lack of consistent and 
comprehensive flight dispatch procedures and no requirement to use available technology such 
as terrain awareness and warning systems (TAWS) to enhance EMS flight safety. 
There are a number of other, similar, studies and discussion papers using statistics that 
explore some of the main issues associated with the development of comparative safety 
measures across air traffic worldwide [41]. 
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3.3.1.1 Detection of Patterns within Accidents as a Tool for Enhancement of Air Safety 
One major tool in the battle against an overall increase in aircraft accidents is the use of 
accident analysis to detect patterns within accidents and to identify areas where improvements 
are required [172]. Every accident site is always different but there are always some 
similarities [140], and for a large number of accidents these similarities are alarming [101].  
Aviation expert Greg Feith, in considering the accident which occurred on 2 August 
2005 [84] when Air France 358 skidded off the runway after a difficult landing at Toronto 
airport during a raging thunderstorm, says DÉJÀ VU. He explains that even just the initial 
information about the Air France accident reminded him of a similar American Airlines 
accident in 1999 in Little Rock, Arkansas. Moreover, in 2005 there were 37 other overruns 
worldwide and the causes of all these accidents were remarkably similar to the Arkansas 
accident.  
Next, in analysing the Helios Airways crash which occurred on 14 August 2005 on a 
mountain north of Maathon and Varnavas, Greece, safety expert Kame O’nil [88, 119] decided 
to investigate the previous depressurisation accidents onboard Boeing 737’s. He made the 
alarming discovery that this accident was not an isolated case mainly by focusing on the main 
and back-up wiring of cockpit instruments rather than on blaming the crew.13 
Another example is the Concorde accident which occurred on 25 July 2000 in Paris, 
when investigators discovered that flat tyre on a Concorde was a common event. They 
identified over 50 cases of burst tyres during takeoffs and landings over the previous 25 years. 
One of the worst incidents involving Concorde was in Washington in 1979. 
Commonly, accident investigation agencies worldwide regularly disseminate 
information on current accidents that have significant similarities with previous accidents. 
Below are several such examples published by the AAIB: 
 
- AAIB in the special report [1] explains that the incident which occurred on 11 
November 2005 at Midhurst was caused by contamination within the Horizontal 
Stabiliser Trim Control Unit (HSTCU) of a Bombardier CL600 where the two channels 
of trim command are physically close with no mechanical back-up. A similar 
occurrence had been previously recorded with a different HSTCU on this aircraft [1]. 
 
                                                 
13 Later on, the AIAB recommended to Boeing that the main and back-up wire should be reinforced and separated 
across the all Boeing 737s in service.[88] 
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- During a landing at Aberdeen on 22 June 2006 in a Dornier 328, the co-pilot was 
unable to release the latches on the power levers and the aircraft overran the runway by 
over 300 metres. This occurrence has similarities to a fatal overrun accident at Genoa in 
1999 [3]. 
 
- On 25 November 2005 an Airbus A319-131 lost both the commander’s and co-pilot’s 
primary flight and navigation displays (PFD and ND) and the ECAM (Electronic 
Aircraft Centralised Monitor) upper display. This was the sixth such event reported [4]. 
 
- In the accident which occurred on 16 February 2006 at Nottingham Airport, a propeller 
blade detached during a touch-and-go landing of a Socata TB10. The resulting 
imbalance caused both the crankshaft to fracture (allowing the propeller to be released) 
and the engine to partly separate from the structure [5]. Metallurgical examination 
indicated the presence of fatigue in the propeller hub. The location and nature of the 
fatigue was similar to that described in an existing Service Bulletin.  
 
- On 26 February 2007 at Heathrow Airport while taxiing a fire occurred on a Boeing 
777-222 in the Main Equipment Centre located beneath the flight deck and forward 
vestibule. The manufacturer had investigated 11 in-service reports of similar power 
panel events on B777 aircraft [6]. 
 
A typical demonstration of air accident patterns as a tool for enhancing air safety is the 
Warwick Air Accident Database (WAAD) which has been established specifically to facilitate 
the accident analysis process [172].  The WAAD contains details of over 2700 major accidents 
over a 21-year period. Being online, WAAD can be accessed from anywhere in the world and 
is available free of charge to anyone working or researching in this area. One of the strengths 
of the database lies in its range of powerful search facilities that permit accidents to be selected 
to match any combination of a wide range of characteristics. 
 
3.3.2 Human Factors 
According to current statistics, human factors have accounted for approximately 50-60% of 
aircraft accidents worldwide [164, 174, 182]. While crew factors are of great importance 
within human errors, most accidents have their origins in systematic or organisational failings 
[17]. Even the results of the first safety investigation of an unmanned aircraft accident 
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conducted by the NTSB indicates that the major probable cause of the accident was human 
error in the form of the pilot’s failure to use the checklist procedure [162].  
Understanding the human contribution to accidents is an important component of 
reducing aviation accidents [70, 72]. The articles presented below show the research 
approaches and tools recently used by aviation experts in achieving this goal. Surprisingly, a 
lot of studies devoted to human factors analysis have been done by the application of survey 
methods. Studies using the survey method examine all areas of the airline operations, including 
cabin safety, flight operations, maintenance, airspace management, regulation and surveillance. 
For instance, survey [21] shows that overall in 1996-97 the safety condition of the aviation 
industry was good and indicated the areas where there was room for improvement.  
Five thousand commercial pilots throughout Australia were surveyed in 2003 by ATSB 
in order to provide information concerning common errors that pilots perceived to be most 
detrimental to flight safety [31, 40, 152]. The survey asked pilots about their safety experiences 
during the previous year and to report the most serious error they had made or seen during that 
time. They were also asked to describe the main factors contributing to the error and how the 
situation had been resolved, if applicable. Similarly, [32] investigates the safety climate factors 
of Australian aviation as perceived by five thousand commercial pilots throughout Australia. 
Another example is article [42], which presents the results of a survey conducted on 
3500 Australian pilots with an RNAV/GNSS (area navigation global navigation satellite 
system approach) endorsement. The respondents were asked to rank their perceived workload, 
situational awareness, chart interpretability and safety on a number of different approach types. 
The questionnaire then asked pilots to outline the specific aspects of the RNAV (GNSS) 
approach that affected these assessments.  
Next, thirty-two senior managers from Safety Departments and Flight Operations 
Divisions were interviewed in order to examine the factors perceived to facilitate a safety 
culture and institutional resilience within airlines [47]. Findings single out the importance of 
leadership roles undertaken by the board, senior management, chief pilots, and safety 
departments and the influence of both formal and informal performance management systems. 
Strategies are then presented which support the presence or absence of safety cultures within 
the airline industry and thus impact on the ability to assess institutional resilience. Similarly, 
study [59] discusses organisational factors impacting on an airline’s safety outcome that are 
subject to influence by managers in their flight operations divisions. Particular attention is 
given to evidence of the concept known as ‘institutional resilience’. The study used both 
qualitative data (interviews) and quantitative data (audits). The audits were conducted by 
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means of a questionnaire sent to one senior manager in each airline. The study identifies three 
areas suitable for further research.  These are: further development of reactive and proactive 
measures, following an application of a suitable checklist and development of a process to 
improve the reporting rate of flight crew error. 
Paper [18] shows the results of a survey distributed to all licensed aircraft maintenance 
engineers in Australia. This survey was the first such study undertaken world-wide. The ATSB 
considers that the issues identified in the survey are not specific to Australia and would be of 
use to safety agencies around the world. The issues found included: the need for refresher 
training for aircraft maintenance engineers, the need to remove barriers which discourage 
aircraft maintenance engineers from reporting incidents, the need for fatigue management 
programs, human factors training for management and engineers, and minimising the 
simultaneous disturbance of multiple or parallel systems such as both engines on twin-engine 
aircraft. 
In addition, report [17] uses face-to-face interviews to ask maintenance technicians to 
report examples of maintenance incidents which they had experienced first-hand. The report 
concludes with suggesting safety actions intended to both reduce the frequency of human error 
and maintenance incidents and to reduce the consequences of any such errors which do occur. 
A three round survey was conducted to show how the New Zealand aviation industry 
was managing fatigue by considering the advantages and disadvantages of different fatigue 
management strategies and also the barriers that companies faced in managing fatigue [58]. 
The findings suggest that fatigue is not particularly well understood or managed by many 
operators. 
Research study [57] examines the evacuation commands used by cabin crew in 
managing passengers during evacuations. The outcomes of this study came from conducting a 
best practice forum and survey as well as experimental work with members of the public 
participating as passengers. The results indicated that participants generally had little 
understanding of why they might be required to take certain actions in emergency situations. 
Moreover, NTSB’s findings about a number of accidents that involved emergency evacuation 
of commercial airplanes are illustrated in safety report [154]. In this report the NTSB 
investigated 46 evacuations of 2,651 passengers and, based on information collected from the 
passengers, the flight attendants, the flight crew, the airlines and the aircraft rescue and 
firefighting units, the Safety Board found the following safety issues to be relevant to the 
study: certification issues related to airplane evacuation, the effectiveness of evacuation 
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equipment, the adequacy of air carrier and ARFF guidance, procedures related to evacuations 
and communication issues related to evacuations. 
A recent ICAO initiative promotes global approaches to SMS (Safety Management 
System) implementation [106]. With an emphasis on achieving worldwide standardisation, the 
organisation’s initial efforts to foster safety management have focused on the development of 
new regulatory provisions, publishing guidance material and creating a special training 
program. Compliance with ICAO standards and recommended practices is a cornerstone of 
international civil aviation safety. An SMS standard for use by aircraft operators of all types 
and sizes was issued by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in late June 2006 [12].  
In addition, report [28] aims to both identify aspects of best-practice and explore the 
curriculum foundations of error management training. The study highlights three important 
new directions for error management training: 1) Focusing more on cognitive skill 
development and the affective domain; 2) Integrating technical and non-technical skill 
development; 3) Increasing the experiential components of error management training. 
On the other hand, study [20] stresses that the methods, which proactively monitor 
airline safety, may be useful in preventing air safety occurrences. This study outlines a new 
proactive safety method for the airline industry, called INDICATE (Identifying Needed 
Defences in the Civil Aviation Transport Environment). The paper explains that INDICATE is 
an airline self-management safety tool, which encourages regular passenger transport operators 
to critically evaluate and continually improve the strength of their safety system. 
Research report [54] uses a flight simulation-based study to examine different visual 
strategies that pilots could use to time the flare. For this trial non-pilots and student pilots were 
required to judge the appropriate time to make contact with the ground or an idealised time to 
initiate the flare. Results show that pilot performance was generally superior to non-pilot 
performance. 
Spatial disorientation is a very common factor contributing to aviation accident and 
incidents. Spatial disorientation (SD) is likely to be encountered by all pilots during the course 
of a lifetime’s flying, irrespective of if they are experienced professionals or inexperienced 
amateurs [63, 111, 93]. The reports offer a comprehensive explanation of the various types of 
SD in the aviation environment and suggest strategies for managing the risk associated with 
SD-based events.  Report [111] provides an informative overview of the three basic types of 
SD and the circumstances under which disorientation might be more likely. Furthermore, this 
report also encourages pilots who have experienced SD episodes to share their experiences 
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with their aviation colleagues, either informally, or through magazines, journals and web-based 
forums.  
Report [70] provides a systematic analysis of the types of human errors occurring in 
Australian civil aviation accidents and compares these results against a larger sample of 
accidents which had occurred in the United States. The report shows that while the types of 
accidents and flying operations varied slightly between Australia and the U.S., the pattern of 
unsafe acts within each type of flying operation was remarkably similar. The report concludes 
that the greatest gains in reducing aviation accidents could be achieved by reducing skill-based 
errors. 
On the same topic, paper [62] discusses why individuals and organisations involved in 
the design, manufacture, maintenance and management of aircraft operations make errors that 
either lead to or have the potential to lead to aircraft accidents. 
Pilot performance, based on a sample of general aviation pilots, is examined in [55] 
during a simulated flight. The observations of pilot performance revealed perceived behaviour 
that did not correlate with the pilots’ level of qualification. The article concludes that there is a 
significant level of variability in the performance of pilots who conducted the simulated 
approach, particularly during the final stage of the flight when the demands on them were most 
acute and when the impact of fatigue was most likely to occur. 
Study [61] examines the characteristics of pilot distraction and explores the range of 
distraction sources that have contributed to aviation safety occurrences. It was done by an 
examination of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s aviation occurrence database with 
respect to cases in which distraction has contributed to aviation accidents and incidents. The 
results showed that distraction affected all operational groups and occurred during all phases of 
flight. Many sources of pilot distraction were associated with equipment malfunctions, 
problems with radio communication, passengers, and the weather.  
The purpose of research [71] was to investigate the type, nature and significance of in-
flight medical conditions and incapacitation events which occur in civil aviation. Within the 
report, results are obtained by conducting a search of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau’s 
accident and incident database for medical conditions and incapacitation events between 1 
January 1975 and 31 March 2006. Overall, the results of this study demonstrate that the risk of 
a pilot suffering from an in-flight medical condition or incapacitation event is low. 
Fatigue issues take a prominent place among other contributing factors to serious 
incidents and accidents and are the largest identifiable and preventable cause of accidents in 
transport operations (fatigue is believed to have contributed to between 15 and 20% of all 
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accidents) [167]. This paper outlines a systematic approach to examining the role of fatigue 
factors in an accident investigation. In addition, the aim of study [67] was both to provide 
objective data to inform fatigue risk-management processes by determining the quantity and 
quality of sleep obtained by airline pilots during transcontinental ‘back of clock’ operations, 
and to observe any changes to subjective fatigue and neurobehavioural performance during 
these sectors. Participants were required to undertake complete sleep and duty diaries 
providing detailed information about the quality and quantity of sleep. In report [152] operator 
fatigue is also discussed within the context of accidents which occurred during the 1980s. This 
report stresses the need for research, education and revision to hours of service regulations.  
A search of the ATSB accident and incident database was conducted for medical 
conditions and injuries in passengers between 1975 and 2006 in order to determine the most 
common in-flight medical problems for passengers, and what proportion of these events result 
in an aircraft diversion that may affect air safety [44]. The results indicate that there is a low 
risk of passengers sustaining either an injury or a medical event as a consequence of travel on a 
civil aircraft that has been diverted.  
Paper [45] examines the application of auditory icons as warning signals in a civil 
aviation cockpit environment. This research combines results of two experiments: Experiment 
1 investigated effects of signal iconicity (iconic, abstract), whereas Experiment 2 investigated 
recognition speed and accuracy in response to four auditory iconic and four abstract warnings 
in an Advanced Aviation Training Device. These experiments suggest that there is potential for 
the use of auditory iconic warnings and bimodal warnings as the means not only to alert, but 
also inform pilots about the nature of a critical incident.  
Research study [55] discusses the effectiveness, passenger attitudes, and potential of 
further improvement of aircraft cabin safety communications in Australia. In addition, study 
[49] introduces a methodology for representing and analysing recorded voice data in 
investigations of aviation occurrences. The first part of this research includes a series of sample 
transcriptions and analyses of recorded voice data, whereas the remainder establishes a tool for 
using conversation analysis to inform and guide analysis of recorded voice data in 
investigations. Study [66] was designed to explore the relationship between excess or non-
standard words in readbacks and its effect on frequency congestion. This issue has also been 
considered from other aspects such as report [151] which examines the outages involving 
computer and related equipment in certain air route traffic control centres. 
Paper [51] examines the prevalence and nature of drug and alcohol-related accidents 
and incidents in Australian civil aviation. The search of the Australian Transport Safety 
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Bureau’s accident and incident database for all occurrences in which drugs or alcohol were 
recorded revealed 36 such events in the period between 1 January 1975 and 31 March 2006. 
The results show that the prevalence of drug and alcohol-related accidents and incidents in 
Australian civil aviation is very low, but that the related accident and fatality rates are high. In 
addition, report [34] documents the significant detrimental effects of alcohol on pilot 
performance both in the acute stages and for up to 48 hours after having the last alcoholic 
drink. Furthermore, study [35] examines the effects of cannabis on pilot performance including 
effects on behaviour, cognitive function and psychomotor performance. 
See-and-avoid concepts are an important issue among investigators, as discussed in 
[15]. In addition, article [183] points out that the issue of runway incursions has been identified 
as a serious threat to aviation safety. Thus, recent initiatives to enhance runway safety by 
European States include the implementation of the European Action Plan for the Prevention of 
Runway Incursions. In discussing the circumstances surrounding a runway incursion the author 
demonstrates that the prime contributing factor is a breakdown in communication between the 
ATC and the pilot or vehicle driver, rather than a loss of awareness by the pilot or vehicle 
drivers as commonly assumed before this survey. Therefore, the authors conclude that 
improving communication is a matter of priority, but in their opinion, difficult to accomplish. 
The action plan introduces more than 50 recommendations and, among others, they state that 
runway safety can truly be enhanced by learning from experience, enhancing the standard of 
ATC-pilot-vehicle driver communication and system improvements.  
Article [7] confirms the conclusion of the previous study. The author stresses that non-
adherence to established procedures by the flight crew, airport operator and ATS provider in 
terms of planning and managing runway maintenance is the cause of many serious incidents 
involving vehicles at work on an active runway. In addition study [120] introduces the practical 
tools and educational material assembled by ICAO that can assist with establishing runway 
safety initiatives emphasizing clear communication and planning measures. 
Paper [178] highlights the need for reviewing air traffic control (ATC) and 
administrative procedures at the aerodrome and in particular the use of certain ATC phrases 
that are open to misinterpretation by flight crews. 
  
3.3.3 Aircraft and Aircraft Systems  
The articles discussed below present some methods, tools, and research approaches used by 
aviation experts in analysing aircraft and their systems.  
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The impact of ageing aircraft on aviation safety is a common issue among aviation 
experts. Research study [69] examines the relationship between ageing aircraft and flight safety 
and reviews current and future directions for the management of ageing aircraft. Thus, the 
report concludes that ageing of an aircraft is a safety issue but with adequate maintenance, the 
potential consequences of ageing aircraft can be mitigated. Additionally, this study states that 
maintenance programs must act as a preventative measure to reduce the safety risk associated 
with ageing aircraft, but their success is dependent on the extent to which operators adhere to 
the programs. 
A questionnaire within a survey study was sent to Licenced Aircraft Maintenance 
Engineers in Australia in 2001 in order to identify safety issues in maintenance [23, 76]. 
Maintenance workers were asked to describe occurrences that had had the potential to threaten 
the safety of an aircraft and/or the safety of maintenance workers. Respondents gave details of 
six hundred and ten occurrence reports addressing two common unsafe occurrences. The most 
common form was one in which an aircraft system was activated in an unsafe manner, 
followed by the incomplete installation of components. 
Similarly, NTSB [159] discusses the concerns about certification of systems that had 
been examined by NTSB in several completed accident investigations (rudder actuator, center 
wing fuel tank, horizontal stabilizer, rudder system). This report discusses the concerns about 
certification raised in those investigations and identifies possible improvements to the FAA’s 
type certification of safety-critical systems.  
Engine maintenance is vital to safe aircraft operation because engine problems are very 
likely to cause a serious incident or accident. In terms of engine problems the NTSB’s view is 
that jet engines in use on today’s commercial airliners are generally quite reliable. However, 
one NTSB report [159] indicates that engine malfunctions or failures occasionally occur that 
require an engine to be shut down mid-flight. There are two types of engine failures. A 
‘contained’ engine failure is one in which components might separate inside the engine, but 
either remain within the engine case or exit the engine case through the tail pipe. This is a 
design feature of all engines and generally should not pose an immediate flight risk. An 
‘uncontained’ engine failure can be more serious because pieces from the engine exit the 
engine at high speeds, and thus pose a potential danger to aircraft structure and passenger 
safety.  
Due to a number of safety events including in-flight reciprocating engine shutdown, 
engine failure and forced landing, engine failure combined with in-flight fire and other events, 
ATSB in its paper [64] documents the factors that affect reciprocating engine reliability. The 
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study found that powertrain structural failure was not restricted to one engine model or 
component but rather the events that led to engine in-flight failure can be listed as follows: 
combustion chamber component melting, bearing break-up, and powertrain component fatigue 
cracking. The research report concludes that corrective actions are needed and they are affected 
by the complexity of reciprocating engine systems. In addition, article [38] analyses twin-
engine power loss accidents. Results show that ten of the eleven fatal accidents after a power 
loss in twin-engine aircraft were the result of an in-flight loss of control. In contrast, the 
majority of non-fatal accidents after a power loss were primarily the result of a forced landing 
due to degraded aircraft performance. 
Fuel-related safety events are another tangible air safety topic commonly discussed by 
aviation experts. For instance, study [26] investigates the overall frequency of factors 
contributing to fuel-related accidents between 1991 and 2000. This study shows that fuel 
exhaustion and fuel starvation accidents continued to be a problem in the Australian aviation 
industry, accounting for over 6 per cent of all accidents between 1991 and 2000. In addition, an 
ATSB based study indicates that fuel contamination was the cause of grounding a large 
number of piston-engine aircraft across Australia in early January 2000 [22]. This research 
revealed a number of factors related to manufacture, standards and procedures that can 
contribute to fuel contamination. 
Birds and other wildlife are an increasing problem for the aviation industry, as shown 
by the 7,000 wildlife strikes during 2005 alone in the United States [98]. Report [25] examines 
Australian bird-strike data between 1991 and 2001 and discusses the magnitude of some of the 
impact forces exerted during a bird-strike. The study shows that there was a significant 
increase in the rate of bird-strikes being recorded in Australia since 1992 (most notably 
between 1998 and 2001). The paper is focused on bird control and avoidance methods, 
especially the use of hand held laser devices and the use of the US-developed Avian Hazard 
Advisory System (AHAS), which allows aircraft to avoid high-risk bird-strike areas. 
Furthermore, Delbeer [98] indicates that there is a need to better educate pilots and air carrier 
personnel on reporting wildlife strikes and the actions that can be taken to reduce the 
probability of strikes. Paper [98] discusses many questions relevant to this issue but still 
concludes that additional research is needed to obtain a better understanding of behavioural 
reactions of birds to approaching aircraft as well as methods of enhancing the awareness of 
birds to these aircraft.  
With respect to examining bird-strikes, [55] points out that DNA identification of strike 
species is a reliable method for identifying the species involved in collisions. This is achieved 
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by extracting DNA samples from any remaining bird tissue and comparing it against unknown 
samples from the databanks of species classified as being high risk for performing strikes.  
Recorded voice data such as Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) or air traffic control tapes 
are an important source of evidence for accident investigation [37, 19]. Moreover, the Flight 
Data Recorder (FDR) is often the most critical source of data that can provide information 
about the sequence of events that led to an accident occurring. However, sometimes a 
parameter of interest may not be available or may have become corrupted. Kakar and Crider 
[126] present an example which shows how the NTSB can extract any necessary parameters, if 
required, using the Board’s simulation tool and the available FDR and radar data. In addition, 
[175] describes an example of the successful use of a vertical motion simulator (VMS) in 
support of an accident investigation conducted by NTSB in cooperation with NASA. 
Observation and tests were conducted by using the VMS as part of the investigation of the 
accident involving American Airlines Flight 587. 
In order to improve FDR and CVR outcomes, Gregor [109] presents a new method for 
performing timing correlations between flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder 
information. This method involves the use of the cross correlation function to ‘search’ the 
typically larger FDR data file for a best match to the event pattern present in the CVR data file. 
In addition, NTSB [163] introduces three-dimensional (3-D) graphics and animations to show 
how animation can be used to support complex aviation accident investigations. Problems 
encountered when attempting to derive empirical evidence for the benefits of 3D auditory cues 
in aircraft cockpits are described in [124]. 
Icing, as one of the biggest threats to air safety, is examined and discussed widely 
among aviation experts. For example Trunov [176] discusses the effect of a very thin layer of 
wing ice or frost on an aircraft’s aerodynamic performance and how it affects both the 
maximum coefficient of lift and the critical angle of attack. Despite this issue being well 
known, as the author states, accidents due to it still occur. The author concludes that human 
factors have an essential role in overcoming this problem. Additionally, airframe icing is 
discussed in [138] within the continuing series of pilot reports of weather encounters.  
Searching for missing parts is an important stage of many investigations, particularly in 
the case of in-flight disintegration. A ballistic trajectory analysis is described in [110] that 
assisted in the investigation of an accident which occurred on 25 May 2002 when a Boeing 
747-200 had an in-flight break-up and crashed into the ocean. The results of this analysis have 
been validated with ATC radar. 
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Another field of safety analysis is assessing the suitability of certain types of aircraft for 
a given operation. For instance ATSB in research study [65] considers the suitability of the 
R22 helicopter for mustering operations, with the importance of handling technique and 
especially good engine management being a major focus of the work.  
In addition, report [50] suggests that there is a high chance of surviving a pressurisation 
system failure if the failure is recognised and the corresponding emergency procedures are 
carried out immediately. Within this report, the type and nature of decompression events was 
documented, as well as the consequences of such events, especially hypoxia and pressure-
related medical effects. It was conducted by searching on the ATSB database for pressurisation 
failure events between 1 January 1975 and 31 March 2006. 
Finally, report [56] examines a large number of new composite materials which are 
being developed for cabins and external structures that have the potential to increase the fire 
resistance of an aircraft. This report assesses the fire hazard of current and next-generation 
polymer composites for an aircraft and identifies those materials with improved fire resistance. 
A database has been developed on the fire properties of a large number of polymer composite 
materials. The database ranks the composite materials in order from best to worst. In addition, 
a number of advanced structural composites with superior fire properties are identified. 
 
3.3.4 Weather Induced Factors  
Weather related general aviation accidents and incidents have become a global safety concern. 
Several articles that discuss the weather induced accidents are presented below. This review 
indicates that statistics are widely used as a tool for analysing weather related events.  
In terms of weather induced accidents and incidents, aviation expert Gregory Feith, 
[91] says that despite reliable aircrafts and extensive training, modern airlines and crews face 
enormous pressure. Intense industry competition demands that flight crew and ground staff are 
efficient and on schedule. He adds that every effort is made to ensure that nothing disrupts this 
fragile schedule, but there is one variable that no airline can control – the weather. Severe 
weather conditions can cause both delays and extreme danger to commercial jets. For example, 
flight recorders of the McDonnell Douglas MD-82 involved in an accident on 1 June 1999 
reveal the pilot’s statement that he hates flying at night when he does not know where he is 
[91] (this statement accurately summarises flights in severe weather conditions). Later on, with 
respect to this accident, the investigation discovered that flying during thunderstorms was 
widespread.  
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Visual Flight Rules (VFR) flight into Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) has 
attracted special attention because of the high rate of fatalities associated with them [173]. 
Consequently, aviation safety research professionals are attempting to explain the genesis and 
mechanisms of such accidents. The current results show that Spatial Disorientation training 
could prevent fatalities in such weather related accidents.  
In addition, report [157] aims to better understand the risk factors associated with 
accidents that occur in weather conditions characterized by IMC or poor visibility.  Within this 
report, a case control methodology is used which compared a group of accident flights to a 
matching group of non-accident flights to help identify patterns of variables that distinguished 
the two groups from each other. The final conclusions are results from a statistical comparison 
of accident and non-accident flights. It allows for the generalization of those findings to the 
wider population of GA pilots and flights that may be at risk of a weather-related accident.  
Study [48] analyses the level of statistical confidence that had been achieved with 
destination weather forecasts under various conditions. This work stresses the importance of 
managing available data which can affect flight safety. One of these sets of knowledge is 
confidence that the facilities at the destination will provide a qualitative service to give 
confidence of a safe landing. Paper [36] analyses the different behaviours that pilots exhibit in 
the face of adverse weather. The study compares three groups of pilots who differed in their 
response to adverse weather conditions encountered during their flight. The results are based 
on a set of 491 aviation accident and incident reports drawn from the Australian Transport 
Safety Bureau (ATSB) occurrence database. 
Keanon [128] addresses the importance of development and deployment of a wind 
shear detection system, explaining that wind shear-related accidents have caused more than 
1,400 fatalities worldwide since 1943. He adds that various warning systems deployed at the 
most vulnerable locations across the United States provide varying levels of protection against 
wind shear, with collocation of certain systems offering the most effective safety solution. 
In terms of volcanic ash, studies [103, 86] propose an improvement in the effectiveness 
of volcanic ash advisories by developing a centre with the capability for the early detection of 
volcanic activity via a satellite-based system. 
 
3.3.5 Discussion  
As stated earlier, the aim of this chapter is to present the current approaches and methods used 
by aviation experts in order to examine the issues related to aircraft accident investigation. 
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Since the goal of investigation is to improve air traffic, the review shows that a lot of relevant 
research studies are directly related to analysing air safety. Due to the variety of topics 
included in the air accidents and incidents there are a number of different studies focused on a 
particular field of the safety issue. However, despite this variety of topics, the research 
approaches and techniques used are overall quite similar. 
 An example of this similarity is the frequent use of statistical data by aviation experts. 
They use every opportunity to define the current situation in a particular area by considering 
the pertinent statistics of past accidents and the results of the consistent investigations carried 
out. Furthermore, the literature review shows that the survey method is a commonly used 
technique among experts in order to analyse a given area of investigation particularly when 
considering human factor issues. Finally, the recently published articles relevant to air traffic 
accidents and air safety itself have raised the importance of advanced classification of statistics 
and other kinds of stored data as a valuable tool for the enhancement of accident investigation 
outcomes and air traffic safety itself. 
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 Chapter 
 4 
 
Top Management is responsible for Safety ... Every accident, no matter how minor, 
is a failure of the organization. 
JEROME LEDERER, American aviation – safety pioneer (1902 -2004). 
 
Application of Expert Systems to Aircraft Accident Investigation 
 
An aircraft accident or incident is an undesirable event which usually involves the dynamic 
interplay of human, aircraft and environmental factors. In terms of dependencies, the aircraft is 
located between the human operating the aircraft and the environment in which the vehicle is 
moving. Familiarity with these three factors is necessary in order to both prevent an aircraft 
accident/incident and to assist in determining probable causes when accidents/incidents do 
occur. 
No one profession encapsulates all of the factors that can be involved in aircraft 
accident investigations. Hence, the modern aircraft industry has already consulted not only 
general engineering disciplines, but also other scientific fields such as psychology, medicine, 
and biomechanics in their efforts to improve air safety. Therefore, cutting edge aircraft design 
represents a complex interdisciplinary effort and continues to stand at the pinnacle of 
engineering design in contemporary civilization.  
Within the chain of interaction between human, aircraft and environmental factors, the 
crew, along with other personnel, can influence the likelihood of an accident by both how they 
perform their duties and how they react to an adverse situation. As such, an aircraft accident 
occurs when there is an unfavorable combination of these factors, leading to the loss of control 
and stability of the aircraft.  
Therefore, one important area of aircraft accident investigation is related to 
understanding the interrelationships among crew and other personnel, the aircraft, and the 
environment just before and during the accident. Hence, as stated before, ICAO has defined 
aircraft accident investigation as a process focused on the circumstances of the accident 
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including gathering, recording and analysing all available information, and then drawing  
conclusions to enable them to determine the causes of the accident [116].   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Relationships between human, environmental and aircraft factors. 
 
As an aircraft is a complex machine consisting of a number of interconnected systems, 
there are a number of different factors that may result in the loss of control and stability of an 
aircraft and potentially lead to an accident. These causal factors involve the malfunction of 
aircraft systems, exceeding exploitation limits and design faults. Similarly, there are a number 
of events associated with the human and environmental factors that may lead to an accident 
occurrence. In order to show the extent and complexity of the processes involved in aircraft 
accident investigation, a general classification of all possible causes of aircraft accidents is 
presented below [146]. 
 
 Aircraft causal factors: 
 
In this group of possible causes for accidents are: deficiencies in the design, 
manufacture, maintenance, operation, and operating environment of the aircraft or its systems, 
including inadequate overhaul or inspection, foreign object damage and the effects of failures 
of other aircraft systems. 
 
 Human causal factors: 
 
The human causal factors can be divided into three major groups: personnel errors and 
other crew factors, factors associated with air traffic management, and maintenance-related 
factors.  
The personnel errors comprise the following: inadequate preparation or supervision, 
poor judgment, poor execution, insufficient crew rest, carelessness, improper use of equipment, 
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alcohol and/or drug abuse, exceeding aircraft operating limitations, improper aircraft 
modification, failure to use proper safety precautions, slow response times during critical 
moments, inadequate procedures, and the failure to execute proper procedures.  
In addition, the human factors associated with air traffic management include: deficient 
regulations, incorrect directives or procedures, problems with air traffic control and runway 
facilities (such as navigational aids, communications systems, crash/fire/rescue equipment, 
runways, runway lighting, and taxiways), as well as personnel errors associated with the above.  
Maintenance-related causal factors are focused on improperly performed maintenance 
and inadequate maintenance procedures and plans. 
 
 Environmental causal factors: 
 
Environmental causal factors include events associated with: unexpected hazardous 
environmental conditions, failure to report hazardous conditions and inappropriate response to 
actual or forecasted hazardous conditions.  
 
If a typical aircraft accident investigation taskforce is examined then one would be able 
to identify a number of different specialists and experts from a variety of professions including 
technical investigators, legal authorities, and accredited representatives. In order to determine 
the causes of the accident, investigators must not only deal with the direct circumstances of the 
accident, but they also need to pursue comprehensive examinations of the scene of the 
accident, any wreckage and any witness information. Additionally, they are required to pursue 
recorded media analysis, component examinations, tests, and simulations. 
The possibilities mentioned above clearly illustrate the large number of potential factors 
which may contribute to an aircraft accident and confirm that an investigation thereof is an 
extremely complex matter in terms of factors, personnel, the scene and analysis. As a result, 
the following two questions are raised: 
 
 How can aircraft accident investigation be appropriately analysed?   
 
 
 What methods can be applied to further improve the aircraft accident investigation? 
 
Finding research tools for analysing aircraft accident investigation and demonstration 
of them was the major challenge of this research work. The proposed solution is elaborated on 
in the next part of this chapter. 
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4.1 Strategic Decisions and Forecasting – The Theory of Intuitive Methods 
In the past few decades there has been considerable growth in the development of scientific 
methodologies for investigating complex issues through establishing a set of priorities where 
significant improvement is possible and desired. The essence of these methodologies is to 
provide the optimal selection of these priorities based on the information available, the 
strategic objectives and the prediction of future considerations. The most difficult problem is 
predicting the future and understanding what improvements will be required. 
Intuition and an interdisciplinary approach have shown to be vital elements in 
developing contemporary methods for creating strategic decisions. A number of intuitive 
methods have been developed over the past few decades. One of the most successful among 
these methods is the Delphi technique. Initially, the Delphi technique was used mainly for 
forecasting, but nowadays it is also applied to creating group estimation to formulate a forecast 
or a set of priorities. The Delphi technique is used extensively in economics, engineering, 
medicine, and many other disciplines for the purposes of technological forecasting and creating 
a set of priorities. 
The Delphi technique is a formal procedure for carrying out research activities. In this 
technique, a working group designs a questionnaire which is sent to a larger respondent group. 
After the questionnaire is returned the working group summarises the results and develops a 
new questionnaire based on these results for the respondent group to answer. The respondent 
group is usually given at least one opportunity to re-evaluate their original answers based upon 
examination of the group response, although the process can be carried out as many times as 
required.    
This chapter proposes that the Delphi technique is a possible tool for analysing aircraft 
accidents. The ability to conduct a comprehensive survey without bringing the respondents 
together physically is a tremendous advantage of the Delphi exercise and one that appropriately 
reflects the modern age of highly developed technology, experts, specialisation, and the 
advantages of globalisation. Taking into account all of the above, this chapter will present the 
potential of the Delphi technique in helping to create a holistic approach to aircraft accident 
investigation and the possibility of creating credible scientific findings. 
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4.1.1 Intuitive Methods and their Features 
The basis of each methodology for creating a set of priorities for improvement of an issue 
involves the information available, the strategic objectives and prediction of the future of the 
issue. It is clear that determination of the future is the hardest problem and seeking scientific 
methodology in the area of forecasting since, without predicting the future of a system, it is not 
possible to draw optimal decisions for its growth. 
According to Dobrov [96], during the 1970’s there were more than 130 different 
methods for creating scientific decisions. He divided these methods into the three basic groups 
of research forecasts, program forecasts and organisational forecasts all of which applied to 
different fields of science. On the other hand, according to the procedure for creating strategic 
decisions, the methods can be divided into three classes: 
 
a) Trend interpolation methods. These methods provide a picture of the future condition of 
a system based on interpolation of the trends from the past. 
b) Methods of simulations. These methods include creating a model whereby the future 
behaviour of a system is simulated by applying variables with different values. 
c) Methods of convergent concordance. These are based on deliberating and creating a 
consensus of respondents being chosen to express their opinions on the issue.  
 
The first two methods are not applicable in each situation and they do not provide 
satisfactory outcomes for all systems with respect to creating set priorities. Thus, the need for 
further development of a system in accordance with the theory for optimal system 
management, has introduced the interdisciplinary approach and intuition as vital elements of 
contemporary methods known as intuitive methods. The word ‘intuitive’ literally means a 
directly gained sense which is not a result of experience and deliberation that actually excludes 
any options of their (intuitive methods) application. Yet in reality, intuitive methods used as a 
means for creating strategic decisions include qualitative analysis, well organised scientific 
opinions, as well as social aspects of the issue. 
In general, intuitive methods are less exact than quantitative methods with respect to 
mathematic formulation and the decision making process. However, experience of their 
application shows that their results are more credible, more comprehensive and closer to 
reality. As a result, they are significantly more adaptable than quantitative methods for 
considering complex systems [149]. Because of this, there have been a number of different 
types of intuitive methods developed so far. Among them the most successful are the 
following: 
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1. Forecasting by expert – individual.  
 
This method is based on the confidence and the capability of forecasting by a person 
who is an expert. The person chosen has knowledge in the field in which the forecast is carried 
out as well as skills in forecasting. However, when an expert is identified, there is a certain 
suspicion that his future prediction will not be credible. The suspicion is based on the fact that 
the structure and complexity of events and processes almost always overwhelms the 
knowledge and capacity of only one expert. 
 
2. Group forecasting – panel discussion, brainstorming. 
 
All variants of ‘brainstorming’ can be characterised as methods based on intuitive 
reflection that lead to the appearance of new ideas and reasonable concordance among experts. 
This method is based on the idea that the most appropriate solution for a particular system must 
emerge from an accumulation of many different solutions within a scientifically approved 
process, where experts create a consensus. By using a team of experts the drawbacks of 
decisions made by one expert are eliminated. However, new disadvantages appear which may 
reduce the reliability of forecasting. In this type of decision-making process there is direct 
communication between experts and it presents a creative contemplation of the issue by active 
exchange of ideas and opinions. A major characteristic of these methods (usually in the 
negative context), is the strong influence of authoritative persons that may stimulate a 
consensus among experts who do not support the proposed solutions. 
 
3. Group forecasting in which experts individually give their opinions.  
 
In this type of method for creating a set of priorities for improvement of an issue, 
experts convey their opinion individually regarding the issue concerned and after that the 
researcher deliberates the outcomes and provides feedback to the experts. After that the 
researcher calculates the mean of the expert opinions and when a consensus is reached, he 
defines the final conclusions. 
To date, the most developed intuitive methods are the following: the Delphi technique, 
Method of strategic games, Scenario, and Utopia method. Considering the Aircraft Accident 
Investigation as an issue to be developed, it has been deduced that the Delphi method (well 
known as the Delphi technique) is the most appropriate tool for creating a set of priorities 
regarding improvement of aircraft accident investigation. Therefore, the following part of this 
chapter is devoted to the Delphi technique, its definition and procedure, as well as its features. 
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4.1.2 The Delphi Method 
The Delphi method is named in deference to the legend of the Greek Delphi oracle [127] and 
presents one of the most useful methods for establishing a set of priorities to further develop 
and improve a complex system [136, 168]. The name of the method may be considered 
adequate, where instead of gods a team of experts is created whose opinions are the most 
competent for a given issue. 
The basis of the Delphi technique is through a systematic use of expert knowledge from 
different fields to determine the ongoing condition of the system considered, then to simulate 
its future in order to bring out decisions for its progress. The Delphi method includes the 
organised gathering of experts’ opinions and is based on assumptions looking onto a complex 
system essentially an interdisciplinary employment of science is required. Furthermore, the 
Delphi technique as a scientific tool for doing research introduces a combination of 
quantitative and judgmental processes. Namely, the Delphi exercise uses interviews and 
questionnaires to extract estimates or prognostication on a specific issue from a valid sample of 
experts.  
Moreover, the Delphi technique is often used to combine and refine the opinions of a 
heterogeneous group of experts in order to establish a judgment based on the information 
collectively available to the experts. Hence, the Delphi method provides an opportunity for 
experts to communicate their opinions and knowledge, to see how their evaluation of the issue 
aligns with others, and to change their opinions after reconsideration of the findings of the 
group’s work [83]. The work continues over a series of interactive rounds until consensus or 
stability is reached on the current issue, where all participants contribute to gaining knowledge.  
Delphi studies have the potential to provide valuable information and this mutual judgment-
opinion is used for further development of the issue. Thus, the basic steps of the Delphi method 
are: defining the problem, determining the type of expertise required, selecting a sample of 
experts, preparing and distributing a questionnaire to respondents, and analysing their 
responses in order to determine whether consensus among the experts has been reached. 
The Delphi technique was established and primarily used in the framework of a study 
undertaken by RAND Corporation to cater for the needs of the American air forces. According 
to Trocki [135], the basis of the Delphi technique was set up in the RAND Corporation and 
that the first characteristics of the method can be found in the article ‘Prediction for Social and 
Technological Events’ by Kaplan, Skogstad and Girshick, published at RAND Corporation in 
1949; these characteristics are related to statistical analysis of individual opinions. In addition, 
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a great contribution to the development of the Delphi technique, as well as to its popularisation, 
was from Dalkev and Helmer who in 1963 published the article ‘An Experimental Application 
of Delphi Method to the use of Experts’. From the United States, Delphi spread to Western 
Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Far East gaining extensive popularity across many scientific 
disciplines as a method of inquiry [102]. For instance, in Japan in 1969 the Science and 
Technology Agency applied the Delphi technique for forecasting the development of science 
and technology by the year 2000, surveying approximately 4,000 individuals. 
In the first period of its application, the Delphi technique was mainly used for 
forecasting future international situations and forecasting scientific-technological development. 
Nowadays, in practical terms, the Delphi technique is not only a method for forecasting, but 
also a method for the systematic gathering of opinions given by experts, which may be used to 
foresee developments in technology and other areas. Therefore, a more adequate name would 
be the ’method for creating group estimation’ [181]. Moreover, Dalkey [cited in 136] portrayed 
the modern Delphi method as a technique that restructures the group communication process to 
bring together expert opinions to ’formulate a prediction or set of priorities’. This is obviously 
one of the most appropriate definitions resulting from the widespread use of the Delphi method 
as not only a tool for prediction but also as a tool for creating strategic decisions. Hence, 
regardless of the primary application of the Delphi technique, today its usage is significantly 
extensive in the areas of economics, engineering, medicine, and science for technological 
forecasting and creating a set of priorities. As a result of this, within the theory for optimal 
system management, the Delphi technique has taken first place as the most important method 
among all methods available for preparing and creating strategic decisions with respect to 
future technological innovations, development and changes [141, 148]. 
The procedure of the Delphi technique allows for the consideration of very complicated 
and even controversial issues for which primarily there are different or opposing expert 
opinions for their further progress. This is because within the Delphi exercise there are no 
restrictions on the use of expert opinions with respect to any issues, regardless of their nature 
and origin. Dissension helps experts to focus their judgment in order to improve their approach 
to getting a collective consensus within a procedure where expert opinions may be divergent. 
The results from the implementation of the Delphi technique are not supposed to be 
valid eternally. They express expert opinion and estimates at current conditions which have to 
be periodically reviewed and developed. In the case of aircraft accident investigation, an issue 
to be considered could be fitted trend interpolation or analytical methods for additionally 
considering the Delphi outcomes. 
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4.1.2.1 The procedure of the Delphi Method 
The Delphi technique is formalised through the procedure of carrying out research activities. It 
is usually composed of four phases: organising the procedure, selection of experts, conducting 
the exercise and data analysis [134, 135]. Some experts suggest that there are in fact five 
phases within a Delphi exercise but that generally does not affect the essence of the method (as 
and it mainly depends on the technique by which the Delphi exercise is carried out). 
Alternatively Wdowiak [135] says that within the implementation of the Delphi technique 
there are three different levels: emergence of the research issue, identification of the experts’ 
opinions and data analysis. However, the procedure of the Delphi exercise is composed of the 
following steps: establishing the working group for coordination, identification of team of 
experts, creating and delivery of the questionnaire, completing the questionnaire, results 
analysis and attaining the concordance of the opinions of the experts. 
The duty of the working group for coordination is to introduce the research issue, then 
to carry out a survey procedure and finally to work out and present the final results. The 
working group is composed of experienced and skilled persons in the particular area and 
specialists for forecasting. The working group establishes a team of experts which are later 
surveyed. After that the working group creates a questionnaire composed of a list of questions 
or factors relevant to the issue to be considered, whereby the answers will contribute to 
establishing a set of priorities for further growth of the issue.  
Within the Delphi exercise all questions are asked in a way that answers must be given 
numerically (scale rate), although there is great freedom in choosing the type and scale size for 
ranking the factors.  
When the questionnaire has been finalised a sample of it is delivered to every single 
expert. The questionnaire contains all of the information needed with respect to the goal of the 
research, role of the expert and the way of giving the answers. After that, experts express their 
own opinion about every question individually. The Delphi procedure does not allow 
interaction among experts themselves. Forecasting and expression of opinions is completely 
given to experts; the working group only appropriately operates the data.  
The Delphi exercise is carried out in further rounds or iterations (Figure 25). When 
experts have given their answers supported with appropriate evidence, the questionnaires are 
delivered to the working group and the first round concludes. After that, the working group 
calculates the mean of the experts’ numerical answers for every question and identifies the 
CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 89
extreme answers. Respondents then give an explanation for their answers that deviated 
significantly from the group mean.  
After identifying areas of agreement and discord as items requiring clarification the 
working group prepares and distributes a second questionnaire. This questionnaire includes 
statistical and qualitative summaries of the group responses to the first questionnaire along 
with additional information or explanations requested by participants.  
Answers given from the second round are treated in the same way as answers after the 
first iteration. The means of the answers are calculated, extreme answers are identified, 
additional explanation from the experts is requested, and this information is represented to the 
experts. This poll process with feedback finishes at the moment when the working group 
evaluates that there is a reasonable consensus of experts’ answers with respect to every single 
question.  
The practice shows that after the third round of the Delphi exercise almost all answers 
needed are obtained. The final report offers a summary of the goals, the process, and results of 
the Delphi exercise. The working group, along with other interested parties, may use these 
results in various ways, including improvement of systems, long-range strategic planning and 
forecasting. The whole process of the Delphi method is distinguished by three main 
characteristics [165]:  
 
- Anonymity 
 
Within the Delphi exercise there is no communication among respondents. The 
interaction between members of the expert team is precluded and therefore absolutely 
independent answers (opinions) are assured. The opinions of the experts in a Delphi exercise 
are presented in statistical form as an average so that the anonymity of the answers is assured 
until the end of the procedure. 
 
 
- Presence of an iterative process and feedback and  
- Conclusions present a collective experts’ opinion 
 
The Delphi procedure is repeated several times and through the feedback all 
respondents are informed with group results from the previous round. Thus, at each successive 
interrogation, the participants are given new and refined information in order to achieve a 
mutual consensus. This process of iterations continues until a satisfactory consensus of 
respondents’ opinions is achieved.  
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When a sufficient consensus appears, the procedure finishes and the final result 
presents collective answers for all questions individually. In the process of forecasting or 
creating a set of priorities for improvement of a given system the individual expert opinions do 
not occur at any stage of procedure. 
Apart from the main three features, other distinguishing features of the Delphi 
technique include team work and an interdisciplinary approach to the issue. Thus, as said 
above, decisions made through the Delphi exercise show the opinion of the team of experts, 
which is usually composed of specialists from different fields in science. Hence, each 
respondent has an important role in forming the group opinion which additionally could result 
in creating a set of priorities for improvement of the issue under consideration. 
 
4.1.2.2 Aircraft Accident Investigation and the Delphi Technique 
The Delphi method is considered to be one of the most truthful techniques of data derived from 
many sources [127]. Therefore the application of a Delphi exercise provides an opportunity to 
comprehensively analyse the aircraft accident investigation as all propositions for a successful 
Delphi exercise exist. Thus, the issue to be considered has been established as an aircraft 
accident investigation. The investigation presents a well known process of gathering, recording 
and analysing information and determining the causes for an accident. It is clear that the 
investigation is associated with air traffic safety and therefore enhancement of safety has to be 
included within the study. Furthermore, there is a lot of information available regarding aircraft 
accident occurrences as well as the investigation carried out, so that conclusions originating 
from statistics are known. Moreover, the strategic objectives of the investigation are clear, 
which in turn means a more efficient and economical process of obtaining the causes of 
accidents as well as enhancing air traffic safety. 
The question regarding the future condition is included within the Delphi technique, so 
there are no limitations on applying it and creating a set of priorities or strategic decisions for 
further development of aircraft accident investigation.  
It is clear that the prospective conclusions will reflect the whole procedure carried out 
in the Delphi exercise. Obviously the quality of the work done by this candidate in preparing 
the questionnaire and selecting the expert team will significantly impact on the credibility of 
the final results. It is most likely that a well-established working group and a well-prepared 
questionnaire will provide credible and accurate results. It is also clear that the Delphi method, 
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as for any other, has its drawbacks, but they are far outweighed by the advantages. Because of 
this, the Delphi conclusions in terms of improvement of aircraft accident investigation will 
contain some especially desirable features ensuring the quality of outcomes. 
 
4.1.2.3 Advantages of the Delphi Method – Providing Credible and Accurate Results  
The outcomes in terms of improvement of aircraft accident investigation obtained by applying 
the Delphi technique will be credible and accurate. This is because of the many advantages 
included within the Delphi procedure.  
 
1. The Delphi conclusions result from an organised and systematic employment of the 
scientific experts’ opinions, because within the Delphi exercise a systematic approach to the 
issue is considered which enables usage of an interdisciplinary approach with a tendency 
towards a trans-disciplinary approach. 
 
2. The Delphi outcomes are objective and ensure that the forecast will occur or will 
enhance the quality of the issue. This is because the Delphi procedure is based on a 
scientifically approved procedure ensuring the success of the issue. 
 
3. The Delphi results must be credible due to the fact that procedures include using the 
scientific opinion of many respondents whose combined knowledge is almost always greater 
than the knowledge of the individuals. 
 
4. The Delphi outcomes must be credible and accurate because the issue is regarded 
from many aspects. Thus, the respondent team is usually composed of experts with different 
specialisations that guarantee comprehensive analysis of the issue.  
 
5. The final collective opinion incorporates not only qualitative but also quantitative 
parameters of the survey technique which is most relevant for creating a set of priorities. So, 
the group opinion always results from an organised and systematic concordance of individual 
opinions. 
 
6. The final experts’ opinion is attained through the use of iterations together with 
feedback which guarantees qualitative outcomes.  
 
7. The credibility of the results is high because of the anonymity of team members and 
individual answers. In this way the application of the Delphi survey removes any 
disadvantages that may occur such as: 
a. Opinion of an authoritative expert, 
b. Opinion of expert with oratorical skills, 
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c. Opinion gained by experts having the skill to impose their views on other experts, 
d. Imposition of the grouped (herd) opinion. 
 
8. The final findings result from a fast and efficient procedure which is able to 
recognise the most important factors leading to growth of the issue considered. When the 
questionnaire is well prepared and the team is composed of knowledgeable specialists, the 
working group needs a short time to establish a consensus of expert opinions. 
 
9. Credible results can also be obtained in uncertain cases within aviation issues, where 
there is a lack of objective or significant data. Credibility is maintained even when other formal 
methods cannot be applied or the creation of a model is impossible. The Delphi technique can 
also analyse phenomena that are mainly from a qualitative nature and cannot be converted into 
quantitative form for further consideration. 
 
10. The Delphi outcomes are obtained by applying a very convenient procedure with 
respect to expenditure for its undertaking. In terms of factors such as costs and the number of 
working hours required for participation and processing the results, the Delphi technique is 
more favourable than other techniques.  
 
4.1.2.4 Disadvantages of the Delphi Method 
Although the application of the Delphi technique for considering aircraft accident investigation 
is strongly supported by this candidate, it does not mean that it is an ideal method. Therefore, 
within a Delphi exercise, the working group must cope with several challenges in order to 
retain the credibility of the outcomes. Among those, the most severe drawbacks are the 
following: 
 
A. Possibility of subjectivity and elitism while undertaking the Delphi exercise.  
 
A concern that is often raised about the credibility of Delphi outcomes is that experts 
may give responses that reflect their personal interests and therefore their answers may be 
biased. Therefore, the Delphi exercise in essence has the potential to be subjective and elite. In 
terms of subjectivity, it is clear that it exists almost in each qualitative analysis undertaken by a 
researcher. However, for Delphi itself, there is the risk of elitism or subjectivity within an 
expert group (class, elite or ideology) that must be overcome by the selection of an appropriate 
team of respondents. 
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B. Positive approach to the issue considered.  
 
The working group has to deal with a positive attitude commonly taken by experts on 
the future of an issue. This arises from the social aspect and it occurs when experts suppose a 
positive development on an issue, not taking into account the structure and nature of all factors 
affecting the issue. 
 
C. Outcomes focusing strictly on the aim of the research.  
 
Another negative aspect of the Delphi technique is the fact that respondents almost 
always fill out the questionnaire directly according to the questions and they do not take into 
consideration the whole process of the development of certain phenomena. Thus, very 
important aspects of the issue may fail which will lead to less credible outcomes. The working 
group can retain credibility by providing a well prepared questionnaire together with all 
information needed for undertaking a correct survey.  
 
D. A cumbersome procedure.  
 
The Delphi method as an exercise for committing a systematic and broad analysis of an 
issue includes a number of influential factors of a different nature which may fail to separate 
the more important factors from the less important ones.  However, a good decision or forecast 
can be obtained if questions are worked out thoroughly and posed properly, that once again 
emphasises the great importance of the coordination role of the working group. In addition, 
asking the experts the same questions several times may affect the quality of the answers, 
particularly when there is a delay between two successive iterations and when the environment 
can have an impact on their opinion. This may happen because of the lack of the experts’ 
competency in posing diverse questions or through inappropriate question wording. 
It should be noted that the above mentioned drawbacks also occur in other survey 
techniques and sometimes there are even more severe implications. Nevertheless, within the 
prospective Delphi study for creating a set of priorities for improvement of aircraft accident 
investigation, this candidate must seek the most appropriate way to create the questionnaire 
and select the team of experts to overcome the above mentioned drawbacks. The researcher, in 
order to retain the credibility of the findings must also eliminate the organisational problems 
that may appear during the Delphi exercise.  
 
 
CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 95
4.1.2.5 Organisational Problems within the Delphi Exercise 
In the actual practice of carrying out the Delphi technique there are several potential 
organisational problems which may appear during the course of a Delphi procedure. The 
predicaments related to the organisation of the Delphi exercise are the following.  
 
a) Obstacles related to establishing the expert team 
 
In the framework of this issue are the obstacles associated with: 
 
- Selection of scientific fields or occupations that will be consulted,  
- Selection of experts of already chosen areas, 
- Size of the expert team, the number of experts. 
 
Typically, the question remains of how to choose a ‘good’ respondent group. The 
selection of respondents is a real and significant problem, but it is not a problem unique to 
Delphi. The selection of the expert team depends on the nature of the issue to be considered 
and conclusions that should be drawn. There is an opinion that because of the correlation of all 
elements in the society, each issue considered must be viewed from many different aspects and 
only then will the results be the most accurate and close to the reality [149]. Alternatively, 
including a number of different fields of science i.e. engaging a large number of experts, may 
have negative consequences on the efficiency of the Delphi exercise. In addition, the 
participation of certain occupations during the decision making process can considerably 
upgrade the final decision, whereas contributions of other professions may be negligible, or 
even negative. Therefore, the process of the selection of occupations should include only the 
most important ones that will contribute to creating the optimal decisions.  
Next, the selection of the experts individually, in the framework of previously selected 
scientific areas, sometimes may cause organisational obstacles. Thus, that selection of a 
reliable and efficient expert team includes not only individuals with scientific knowledge, but 
also experts who possess skills to identify proper alternatives i.e. experts who will contribute 
the most to the creation of accurate strategic decisions. In terms of knowledge, the selection is 
committed to reputation, because knowledge of a person is expressed by achievement in 
his/her own profession, whereas inspection of forecasting skills is a more complicated task. In 
general, a person can be considered to have skills for forecasting if a large percentage of 
his/her forecasts have been fulfilled. 
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Another organisational problem is the size of the expert team that generally is not 
known in advance. In terms of the size of the respondent team, it is clear that homogeneity in 
participants governs the size of the sample, and 10 to 15 respondents can be sufficient if the 
group is homogeneous. Generally, there is an opinion that a larger number of experts will 
provide better outcomes, but including experts from many different fields often does not mean 
that the results are more credible; it is likely that greater numbers will reflect on the time 
required to undertake the exercise and may worsen the quality of the outcomes.  
However, it is certain that selection of qualitative specialists is much more of an 
important issue than the size of the expert team. Thus, the working group (researcher) must 
select knowledgeable respondents in the subject area, who have a good performance record, 
time to participate, and a rational approach to problem solving. 
 
b) Lack of information, unclear questions  
 
The Delphi supposes providing maximum favourable conditions to completely utilise 
the knowledge and experience of the experts chosen. Therefore, the working group should 
eliminate the existence of ambiguous questions which may create possible confusion among 
respondents. Additionally, the working group, creating the questionnaire, aims to avoid posing 
questions that may suggest or include part of the answers which then may create confusion and 
uncertainty among the experts. In this regard, the working group has a responsibility to provide 
the best conditions in which experts can convey their opinion about the issue. 
 
c) Partial competency of experts  
 
The next predicament that may occur is partial competency of experts. It is common 
that the competency of some experts may not be adequate to answer certain questions in the 
questionnaire and that should be appropriately indicated. It is clear that selection of the 
respondents is one of the most important tasks within a Delphi study and is the best way to 
overcome this problem.  
 
d) Unjustifiably long process of Delphi exercise 
 
During the Delphi exercise experts should be given enough time for individual 
reflection and creation of personal statements whereas the feedback provided by the working 
group must be sent to the experts as quickly as possible. For many reasons, the time for 
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undertaking the Delphi exercise can be prolonged, particularly between two successive rounds. 
However, it can be eliminated by the active role of the working group. 
 
e) Quality of the answers created and partial suppleness of experts 
 
The objective of the Delphi study is in the framework of several rounds to be realised 
through deliberate and spontaneous consensus among members of the expert team and through 
argumentative explanations for all answers that considerably deflect from the group mean. At 
this stage of the survey some of the respondents may correct their opinions from the previous 
round, not upon arguments, but with the aim of attaining group consensus, although they are 
aware of the correctness of their answers. It is clear that inflexibility of experts weakens the 
group’s opinion and the final outcomes. On the other hand, such a phenomenon in some cases 
may even be useful, because experts sometimes may lean towards conservatism without the 
presence of any arguments. Therefore, the goal of the working group is to provide favourable 
conditions and communication with the experts so that their answers are always based on 
individual reflection, personal attitudes and convictions, i.e. opinions based on facts. 
 
f) Instability of the members of the expert team 
 
The Delphi method may allow some of the respondents during the exercise to leave the 
survey which may affect the final outcomes. On the other hand, this characteristic may be 
considered advantageous because the procedure of strategic decision-making does not depend 
on any one given expert. 
 
g) Not changing the mean 
 
Practice shows that, in some cases, during the Delphi exercise the value of the mean 
does not change or the shift is negligible. However, the experience of the Delphi study so far 
shows that convergence of responses is more common than divergence over a number of 
rounds. 
 
h) Organisational complexity of the procedure 
 
Although a Delphi exercise does not allow any direct interactions among respondents 
there are complex relations between the working group and the experts. Managing the whole 
process of the Delphi technique is a very important task that must be done properly by the 
working group (researcher). 
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It is quite clear that in any application it is impossible to eliminate all problems 
associated with the Delphi method. There is no ‘best’ or ‘unique’ method which underlies any 
scientific procedure or theory, although there are procedures that provide more credible results 
than others and they are of special interest to researchers. Thus, it is most likely that a well-
established working group and a well-prepared questionnaire within a Delphi study for 
considering aircraft accident investigation will not allow the above mentioned problems and 
predicaments to significantly affect the credibility of the final results. 
 
4.1.2.6 Mathematical Models - Criteria of Objectivity 
The main objective of the Delphi technique is attaining a restraint of 50% interval of 
confidence in which all expert opinions are located. This task is achieved by a confrontation of 
the experts’ opinions by employment of feedback within the multistage Delphi procedure. 
It is common for the calculation of the experts’ opinions, which are given numerically, 
to be carried out by the working group (or researcher) in two phases, as follows:  
 
- Determination of experts’ competency, 
- Determination of the coefficient of concordance of expert opinions, i.e. the coefficient 
of the concordance Ck. 
 
1. Determination of experts’ competency 
 
Below is presented the mathematical model of the Spearman Rho (ρi) rank correlation 
coefficient test (Spearman estimator) as a criterion which is used to calculate the experts’ 
competencies. This procedure allows a greater impact on the final Delphi results for the 
answers originating from respondents with greater competency.  
First of all, according to the procedure, all data from the questionnaire is entered in a 
matrix |aij|m x n by order m x n, where ‘m’ is the number of experts and ‘n’ is the number of 
questions/factors to be considered, whereas ‘aij’ is the answer of jth question given by ith expert. 
The matrix created is the basis for the whole procedure and analysis. 
Working out the Spearman Rho (ρi) rank correlation coefficient depends on the way 
experts give their opinions about the factors to be considered. There are two possibilities: 
 
a) When experts allocate different ranks for all factors, the Spearmen Rho (ρi) rank 
correlation coefficient is calculated according to equations 1, 2 and 3, shown below 
[139]: 
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b) When experts give the same ranks for k - questions (same answer for different factors), 
the Spearmen Rho (ρi) rank correlation coefficient is calculated in accordance with 
equations 4, 5 and 6 [139]. 
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tk – number of same answers (ranks) to different questions (factors) given by ith expert,  
uk – number of same answers to different questions referring to the expert group opinion,  
Hi - number of groups with same answers for ith ranking,  
HI – number of groups with same answers including all expert answers. 
 
The Spearmen Rho (ρi) rank correlation coefficient yields values between 0-1 and a 
higher value means the greater the competence of the expert. A direct parameter expressing the 
expert competence is the weight coefficient δi, which is worked out according to the equations 
7, 8, and 9 [135]:  
ii ba ρδ +=  … (7) 
 
a, b – coefficients that are calculated according to the equations (8 and 9):  
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The expert with the highest Spearmen Rho (ρi) coefficient obtains the value of the 
weight coefficient δi = 2, whereas the expert with lowest Spearmen Rho (ρi) coefficient has 
δi=1. Other experts are given the value of the weight coefficient δi between 1 and 2. After that 
the expert numerical answers are multiplied by the weight coefficients δi worked out and the 
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original matrix of expert opinions |aij|mxn is converted into |δiaij|mxn. The matrix |δiaij|mxn is used 
when the experts’ competency is included in the final results of the Delphi exercise. 
 
2. Determination of concordance of expert opinions 
 
Determination of the expert consensus is attained through calculation of the coefficient 
of concordance Ck. There are several equations providing determination of the Ck, and they 
include the following cases [139]: 
 
a) When experts give different opinions (answers) for all questions, and their competence 
is not taken into account. 
 
)(
)1(12
32
1 1 1 1
2
nnm
a
n
a
C
n
j
m
i
m
i
n
j
ijij
k −
−
=
∑ ∑ ∑∑
= = = =   … (10) 
 
b) When experts give different opinions for all questions and their competence is taken 
into account. 
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c) When experts give the same opinions for several different questions, and competence is 
not taken into account. 
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d) When experts give the same opinions for several questions and competence is taken 
into account. 
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Ti – parameter for same ranks (answers) of different factors (questions) given by ith expert, 
Hi – number of groups with same ranks given by ith expert, 
tk – number of same opinions in the k-group given by ith expert. 
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What case will occur depends mainly on the nature of the issue to be considered. The 
coefficient of concordance Ck receives values between 0 and 1 and the value closer to 1 means 
that expert concordance is greater. 
Coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation coefficient 
are statistical functions and their non-randomness have to be tested by applying appropriate 
statistical tests [170]. The coefficient of concordance Ck is tested against 2χ  criterion and 
therefore, first of all, the value of 2χ  according to the expression 15 is calculated. The variable 
2χ  is complied with 2χ  distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom. 
 
)1(2 −= nmCkχ  … (15) 
 
After that, the value 2Tχ  is read out using the table of 2χ  distribution for 95 or 99% 
interval of confidence and n-1 degrees of freedom. This value presents the basis for testing the 
non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck. 
If the calculated value of 2χ  is greater than the table value of 2Tχ  then the hypothesis 
for randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck is rejected, leading to acceptance of the 
hypothesis that non-randomness of expert concordance is correct. On the other hand when 2χ  
is smaller than 2Tχ  then the hypothesis for randomness of Ck cannot be rejected and the 
procedure for making a decision must be repeated. 
The dispersion of expert opinions for every single question associated with an interval 
of confidence are calculated according to equations 16 and 17 [135]. 
 
∑
=
−=
m
i
ejijj aam 1
2)(1σ   … (16) 
 
jejejjej uaaua σσ +<<−   … (17) 
 
Coefficient ‘u’ depends on the probability of the final result and its values are given in 
the Table 1 below [135]: 
 
Table 1: Values of coefficient ‘u’ for calculating the distribution (σ). 
 
u )( jejejjej uaauaP σσ +<<<−
0.6745 0.5000 
1.0000 0.6827 
1.9600 0.9500 
2.0000 0.9545 
3.0000 0.9973 
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Testing the non-randomness of the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation coefficient is 
conducted by employment of the student’s criteria, which is compiled with t-distribution for   
n-2 degrees of freedom. Accordingly, the basis for checking the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank 
correlation coefficient is the table tT value, read out for 95 or 99% interval of confidence and n-
2 degrees of freedom. 
 
21
2
i
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nt ρρ −
−=   … (18) 
  
When the worked out value of │t│ is greater than value tT read out from the table for t-
distribution for n-2 degrees of freedom, then the hypothesis for non-correlation of ρi is rejected 
as incorrect against the hypothesis that there is correlation among ρi, which means ρi differs 
considerably from zero. When the calculated value │t│ is smaller then the read out value tT 
then the hypothesis for randomness of ρi cannot be rejected [80]. 
After reaching consensus among expert opinions, which is proven by statistical testing 
of the non-randomness of expert competency and opinions, the stage of drawing final 
conclusions can start. It includes identification of significant factors that have great impact on 
the issue considered, then presentation of findings and proposing further analysis and research. 
 
4.1.2.7 Discussion  
In the group of intuitive methods, the Delphi technique has become widely accepted in recent 
times by a broad range of institutions, government departments, and policy research 
organisations. Application of the Delphi exercise can be found in many different areas such as 
[83]: 
 
- Forecasting important events in science, technology, society and so on, 
- Exposing priorities of personal values, social goals, etc.,  
- Developing causal relationships in complex economic or social phenomena, 
- Evaluating possible budget allocations, 
- Exploring urban and regional planning options, 
- Examining the significance of historical events. 
 
The analytical technique is not essential within a Delphi exercise, but the subjective 
expert judgments on a collective basis are necessary. Thus, the quality of a Delphi study is 
based on the strength of its design, sample, and the process by which consensus is identified 
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[127]. At first glance the Delphi study seems so simple that many people have found it an easy 
thing to do. As a result of this, there have probably been more poorly completed Delphi 
exercises than successfully completed ones. 
Considering all the features previously mentioned, the conclusion emerges that the 
Delphi technique is an objective method for creating a set of priorities or a forecast. A 
meaningful property of the Delphi method is its broad approach to the issue of considering 
several influential factors, including respected interests and the positions of all interested 
parties. Furthermore, the Delphi technique does not restrict additional application of other 
methods for system optimisation to further increase its usefulness. The aim of the Delphi study 
is to eliminate drawbacks existing in other methods which use experts’ opinions. It is obvious 
that the method still has drawbacks, but the positive features far exceed the disadvantages. In 
addition, the findings provided by the Delphi technique can be improved, or modified, because 
they represent expert reflections at only a particular timeframe. Hence, additional methods can 
be applied that lead to comprehensive estimates and outcomes within the process of 
preparation of a set of priorities. 
To summarise, this candidate is certain that the rating-scale method well known as the 
Delphi technique is one of the most appropriate tools for analysing the aircraft accident 
investigation process, and therefore research activities for its application have been undertaken. 
However, despite all of the favourable features of the Delphi technique and its credibility, a 
literature search conducted on e-journals and e-books using combinations of the terms Delphi, 
aviation, aircraft accidents, and investigation has not retrieved any articles. Therefore, this 
presents a great opportunity to research new aspects of aircraft accidents within aviation safety 
issues that have not been explored so far. 
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 Chapter 
 5 
 
It is clear to us all that a tyre burst alone should never cause a loss of a public-
transport aircraft. 
SIR MALCOLM FIELD, Head of Britain’s Civil Aviation Authority,  
(Regarding the Concorde, 16 August 2000)  
 
Air Traffic Safety Analysis through Statistics 
 
Investigators have performed very useful tasks in the enhancement of air traffic safety by 
analysing air accidents in the past [145]. In order to help prevent future accidents, 
investigators, using statistics, strive to objectively understand the many factors associated with 
air safety discovered during prior investigations. For instance, the continuous growth of air 
traffic leads to extensive demands and competition between airlines worldwide, which in turn 
may significantly affect air traffic safety. Statistics can help in recognizing such trends. 
According to ICAO statistics are ‘a tool for understanding the past, explaining the 
present and planning for the future’ [116]. At their Chicago Convention in 1944, ICAO 
foresaw the importance of reliable and complete statistics on international air transport which 
led to the establishment of requirements included in a number of statutory provisions from this 
convention. Thus, when an aircraft accident occurs, the State conducting the investigation must 
send the final report to all relevant parties, including ICAO where the report is processed. As a 
result of this information-gathering, statistics have become a meaningful tool for understanding 
the causes of aircraft accidents and enhancing air traffic safety. 
There is a large volume of information relating to historical aircraft accident statistics. 
Many of these can be found in research studies, reports, books, bulletins, brochures, 
magazines, other scientific editions, and on the Internet. 
Despite statistics related to air accidents and their conclusions being ‘well known’ 
amongst aviation experts, this candidate has decided to delve into this area for the following 
reasons:  
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1. Statistical analysis belongs to the group of interpolation trend methods within the 
intuitive methods, recognised in the previous chapter as appropriate tools for analysing 
aircraft accident investigation.  
 
2. Statistics from different sources can differ for certain sampling periods. Conflicting 
information can be seen in the number of accidents, number of fatalities, causal factors, 
and other relevant information.14  
 
3. The relatively new approach to an air accident that has been widely adopted amongst 
aviation experts worldwide states that there is no such thing as a single cause aircraft 
accident. All accidents result from multiple causes that have major and contributing 
causal factors [184, 142]. Contributing factors often worsen the situation and in 
correlation with the major factors bring about accidents. This new approach has 
significantly helped in reducing the aircraft accident rate. However, determining 
whether a factor is cited as major or contributing can sometimes be difficult.15  
 
4. Determining the cause of an aircraft accident is often not straightforward and different 
conclusions can be drawn amongst different investigators.16 
 
5. Some experts argue that with such a disproportionately high percentage of accidents 
involving human error or omissions, the blame will often fall on the crew when there is 
an accident with no survivors [88]. 
 
 
                                                 
14 One of the possible explanations for this discrepancy is the manner in which incorporated data is commonly 
aggregated that leads to comparative errors in most data fields including: number of fatal accidents, fatalities, and 
accident classification [144]. 
 
15 For instance, crew error was cited as the cause of accident of a Boeing 737-400 which occurred on 8 January 
1989 near Kegworth, when after a no.1 engine faillure, the pilot mistakenly shut down engine no.2. The broken 
down engine had been in operation for only three months. Six months after this crash two more engines of Boeing 
737-400 suffered identical engine failure [107]. A conclusion has arisen that if the engine did not fail the accident 
would not have occurred. There are a number of similar accidents in aviation history. 
 
16 For instance, on 6 February 1958, the aircraft Airspeed AS 57 Ambassador crashed on takeoff at Munich airport 
in a snowstorm. The German investigation into the accident cited ice build-up on the wings as the cause, while an 
English investigation cited excessive drag from slush build-up on the runway [9]. 
In the case of the deadliest accident in aviation history (27 March 1977 on the island of Tenerife), when two 
Boeing 747 airliners collided on the runway killing 583 people, the Spanish report found that the accident was 
caused by the Dutch captain taking off without clearance, whereas the Dutch board said that there was simple 
misunderstanding with ATC.  
There are many other cases similar to these ones, when investigators from different agencies split their expert 
opinions. Moreover, there are cases when there is a serious disagreement with the report among experts of the 
same investigative team [101]. 
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Due to the above reasons, this candidate decided to look at aircraft accidents that 
occurred worldwide between 1950 and 2004. The main references used for obtaining data on 
aircraft accidents were [9, 10, 100]. These resources provide general information, database 
collections relating to aircraft safety and news, and reports of aircraft accidents.17  
After considering the data available from the resources chosen, a number of 
conclusions were drawn and some original findings relevant to air traffic safety are presented 
below. Some of the data presented is clearly stated, whereas other data, in particular 
information relating to the causes of accidents, was obtained by analysing the reports available 
in [9]. By doing so, this candidate had an opportunity to look deeply into the chain of events 
that led to these accidents and create ‘his own’ database of accident causes. Thus, taking the 
aviation experts’ ultimate goal of zero accidents, the candidate decided that the first event 
which occurred within the chain of events that had a significant impact on air safety was cited 
as the major cause for the accident.18 It is not a matter of a biased (author’s) view, but only the 
attitude in analysing the accidents and reducing the accident rate.  
The aim of this material is not to provide exact statistics on aircraft accidents between 
1950 and 2004. Rather, the aim is to illustrate the overall trends in aircraft accidents and to 
draw some broad conclusions. These conclusions are based on data analysis relating to the 
number of accidents and their distribution, number of casualties and causal factors available in 
[9, 10, 100]. 
 
5.1 Aircraft Accidents during the Period 1950 to 2004 
In the period from 1950 to 2004 1630 accidents were recorded worldwide. The first and most 
significant conclusion regarding this work is that on average the causes for 31% of accidents 
are not completely explained. Even in the period 2000-2004, in spite of advances in detection 
techniques, the percentage of aircraft accidents with unknown causes is still large, about 26% 
as shown in Figure 31 (page 114). 
The number of aircraft accidents that occurred worldwide during the period from 1950 
to 2004 fluctuated between 17 accidents in 1981 and 1984 as the safest years, 46 in 2001, 50 in 
1972 and 60 accidents in 1950 (Table 2). The distribution of the number of accidents is 
                                                 
17 All three websites are recommended as credible sources for conducting research [166]. 
 
18 For instance, if all engines of an aircraft failed and the pilot did not manage to cope with this situation, the 
engine failure will be cited as the major cause for this accident. 
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depicted in Figure 26, which shows certain peaks in 1950 and at the beginning of the 1970’s. 
In the period around 2000, there was also an increase in the number of aircraft accidents.19 
 
Table 2: Number of aircraft accidents that occurred worldwide between 1950 and 2004. 
 
 ‘1 ‘2 ‘3 ‘4 ‘5 ‘6 ‘7 ‘8 ‘9 ‘10 Total 
1950’s 60/32* 21 27 23 21 23 25 28 30 37 327 
1960’s 28 36 29 19 25 24 27 29 29 33 279 
1970’s 28 50 43 30 23 31 26 24 32 20 307 
1980’s 17 26 21 17 27 23 27 35 38 26 257 
1990’s 31 24 26 31 32 29 31 30 44 40 318 
2000’s 46 43 25 28 Total 1630 142 
 
* This cell shows the number of aircraft accidents which occurred in 1950 and 1951. 
 
 
Figure 26: Number of aircraft accidents that occurred worldwide between 1950 and 2004. 
 
The number of aircraft accidents is commonly associated with data about air traffic 
intensity. Since the intensity of air traffic has been rising continuously over the past few 
decades, it is of particular interest to present the distribution of the number of accidents versus 
the number of flights.  
Figure 27 illustrates the distribution of the number of departures and the number of 
fatal accidents per million departures (rate 1) in the period 1970-2004. It can be seen that in the 
recorded period there was a constant climb in the number of departures from 6 million in 1970 
to around 22.2 million in 2004, whereas the rate fell considerably from 11.5 in 1970 to around 
0.9 in 2004. In addition, Figure 28 shows the correlation between the number of departures and 
                                                 
19 Military aircraft accidents are excluded. 
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number of fatalities per million departures (rate 2). It reveals that there was a reduction in the 
rate 2 from around 264 in 1970 to 23 fatalities per million departures in 2004. 
The data from Figures 27 and 28 poses the question of the shape that the given trends 
will continue in the following years and decades. It is anticipated, due to the ongoing processes 
of globalisation and growth of the aviation business that the number of flights will continue to 
increase, whereas the number of accidents per million departures will continue to fall. In this 
regard Wood and Sweginnis [184] state that due to the growth of aviation, the total number of 
aircraft accidents in the future will increase. They also add that although there are more 
accidents we are getting safer due to the decreasing rate at which the accidents occur. 
However, if the aim is to reduce the number of fatalities due to aircraft accidents in absolute 
terms, the decrease in the number of fatalities per departure (rate 2) must remain strong to out 
perform the steady increase in the number of flights. 
 
Figure 27, 28: Correlation between rates 1 and 2 and number of departures. 
 
Rate 1 - the average number of fatal accidents per million departures 
Rate 2 - the average number of fatalities per million departures 
 
Next are the statistics regarding the time and place of accident occurrences. Overall, the 
data reveals that aircraft accidents can happen at any time of the year and anywhere in the 
world. Accidents occurred regularly throughout the year and there was only a slight difference 
between the number of accidents in summer and winter months. Thus, from 1950 to 2004 on 
average the smallest number of accidents occurred in the months April, May and July with 
participation of 6.7 %, whereas most accidents happened in January with 9.8 % and December 
with 11%.  
CHAPTER 5: AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY ANALYSIS THROUGH STATISTICS 109
 
Table 3: Monthly distributions of aircraft accidents that occurred between 1950 and 2004. 
 
 Jan 
(%) 
Feb 
(%) 
Mar 
(%) 
Apr 
(%) 
May 
(%) 
Jun 
(%) 
Jul 
(%) 
Aug 
(%) 
Sep 
(%) 
Oct 
(%) 
Nov 
(%) 
Dec 
(%) 
1950-60 10.7 8.3 10.4 10.1 7.6 7.6 4.6 7.0 7.3 7.0 8.3 11.0 
’60-70  7.5 10.0 12.5 7.5 5.7 5.4 9.7 7.2 10.8 3.9 10.4 9.3 
‘70-80 12.1 6.2 9.8 5.9 6.2 7.5 4.6 8.5 11.7 7.2 8.5 12.1 
‘80-90 9.3 9.3 7.0 3.9 6.2 8.9 7.8 9.3 9.7 9.3 7.4 11.7 
‘90-00 6.9 11.3 7.9 6.3 5.0 6.0 11.6 8.5 9.4 6.6 8.8 11.6 
‘00-04 14.1 7.0 7.0 4.9 12.0 2.8 7.0 9.2 4.9 8.5 12.7 9.9 
1950–2004 9.8 8.8 9.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.5 8.2 9.3 6.9 9.0 11.0 
 
In terms of distribution of aircraft accidents with respect to the seasons of the year, 22% 
of the accidents occurred in spring, 23% in summer, 25% in fall and the remainder, 30%, in 
winter, which means that the seasons do not significantly affect the likelihood of aircraft 
accident occurrence. This data should be regarded as a rough approximation, because the effect 
of the same seasons differs in different countries in the world. 
 
 
Figure 29: Distribution of aircraft accident by decades according to the place of accident. 
 
In terms of the place of occurrence, most of the accidents in the period 1950-2004 
occurred in Asian countries (around 30%), followed by countries in the North American 
continent, Europe, South America, Africa and lastly Australia & Oceania with rates of 24%, 
17%, 16%, 10%, and 1 %, respectively (Figure 29). The remaining 2% of the aircraft accidents 
occurred over international waters. 
In the 1950’s most accidents occurred in the North American continent, with around 30 
% of the total number of accidents (fatal accident rate and number of fatalities rate are not 
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included in this analysis). In contrast, the statistics show that presently most accidents occur in 
Asia. Furthermore, according to Figure 29, there was a significant increase in the number of 
accidents which occurred on the African continent from 7% in 1970’s to 20% in 2004. This is 
probably due to the growth of air traffic in these areas. 
Over the period 1950 – 2004, 280 accidents or 17 % occurred in the U.S., followed by 
Russia (including the former USSR) with 142 accidents or 9% of the total number of accidents 
(fatal accident rate and number of fatalities rate are not included in this analysis as well). 
Further behind these countries are Colombia, Brazil and India. However, for all countries over 
the recorded period there was a downward trend in the number of aircraft accidents. 
 
Table 4: Top five countries where most aircraft accidents occurred over the period 1950-2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 Total 
USA 79 58 41 35 47 20 280 
Russia 8 20 49 35 19 11 142 
Colombia 12 12 16 13 15 8 76 
Brazil 22 12 7 10 8 6 65 
India 17 9 7 6 6 0 45 
 
5.2 Number of Casualties Involved in Aircraft Accidents 
During the period from 1950 to 2004, 1630 accidents occurred worldwide. Those 1630 
accidents involved 89,817 occupants and 64,377 of them suffered fatal injuries, which means 
on average 39.5 people per accident or 72% of the total number of occupants died (Table 5). 
Most passengers in aircraft accidents died in 1985 when this number reached a peak of 2,392. 
After that 1972 and 1973 were the next series of the worst years, in which 2,391 and 2,123 
occupants were killed, respectively. In contrast, in 2004 and 1955 there were just 517 and 495 
fatalities. 
Table 5 depicts the distribution of the number and the rate of passengers who died in 
accidents by decades. The rate during the whole period is very high and it fluctuates between 
55% and 84%. For instance the rate started at 84 % in the 1950’s followed by a drop to 55% 
until the 1990’s when it again climbed and reached a value of 70 % in the period 2001-2004. 
 
Table 5: Casualties in aircraft accidents in the period 1950-2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 1950-2004 
Killed 8,228 11,797 16,104 12,322 11,992 3,934 64,377 
Pass. & crew 9,822 13,896 20,308 18,194 21,981 5,616 89,817 
% killed 83.77% 84.89% 79.30% 67.73% 54.56% 70.05% 71.68% 
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In order to obtain a clear picture of the accidents versus mortality rate, Figure 30 
portrays a distribution of the aircraft accidents which occurred during the period from 1950 to 
2004 with mortality rates of 0% and 100% as well as rates of 25, 50 and 75%. 
 
Figure 30: Distribution of the rate of killed passengers in aircraft accidents. 
 
In the 1950's the rate of accidents without casualties started at around 5% and remained 
stable until the 1980's when it rose gradually, and in the period 2000-2004 it reached a peak of 
20%. On the other hand, the rate of the accidents in which all passengers suffered fatal injuries 
fluctuated between 70% in the 1960's and 1950% in the period from 2001-2004. The rate of 
accidents, in which by 25, 50 and 75% of occupants died, fluctuated between 5% and 20% in 
the period 1950 - 2004. 
In terms of aircraft involved in the accidents (Table 6), the highest ratio of events 
versus number of flights has the Aerospatiale Concorde with 12.5 occurrences per 1 million 
flights. Next are the McDonnell Douglas MD, Embraer 110 Bandeirante and Fokker F-28 with 
5.71, 3.73, 2.35 events per 1 million flights, respectively. The smallest ratio has the Saab 340 
with 0.33 events per million flights followed by the McDonnell Douglas MD-80 with 0.45 and 
Boeing 767 with 0.46 events per million flights. 
Table 7 points out the average age of aircraft involved in accidents in the period 1950-
2004 by decades. For these statistics there was a significant lack of information particularly in 
the period before 1980. According to the data available, the average age of aircraft involved in 
the accidents was 13 years. In the period 2000-2004 (when the information regarding the age is 
CHAPTER 5: AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY ANALYSIS THROUGH STATISTICS 112
known) the average age was 19.  This suggests that the actual age of the aircraft involved in the 
accidents 1950-2004 is higher than the worked out age of 13 years.  
 
Table 6: Aircraft involved in accidents20. 
 
Model Events No. Flights 
Aerospatiale Concorde 1 0.08 Million 
Airbus A300 9 8.0 Million 
Airbus A310  5 2.7 Million 
Airbus A319/320/321 4 6.0 Million 
Boeing 727 46 70.0 Million 
Boeing 737 47 76.0 Million 
Boeing 747 24 14.8 Million 
Boeing 757 4 7.2 Million 
Boeing 767 3 6.5 Million 
British Aerospace BAe 146 4 4.5 Million 
Embraer 110 Bandeirante 28 7.5 Million 
Embraer 120 Brasilia  5 7.0 Million 
Fokker F-28 20 8.5 Million 
Fokker F-70/F-100 3 4.5 Million 
Lockheed L-1011 Tristar 5 5.5 Million 
McDonnell Douglas DC-9 42 55.5 Million 
McDonnell Douglas DC-10 15 7.6 Million 
McDonnell Douglas MD-80 9 20 Million 
McDonnell Douglas MD 4 0.7 Million 
Saab 340 3 9.0 Million 
 
 
Table 7: Average age of aircraft involved in accidents 1950-2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 1950-2004 
Average Age 4.58 2.33 6.81 11.78 15.33 18.62 12.76 
 
The statistics above are stated directly from the sources chosen or obtained by simple 
calculation. The following part of this chapter, relating to causes of accidents, has been 
calculated through analysing the brief accident reports available in [9] (one of the brief reports 
available is shown in Appendix D).  
  
5.3 Causes of Aircraft Accidents during the Period 1950 to 2004  
As mentioned previously the reports of accidents between 1950 – 2004 in [9] were read and 
analysed by the candidate rather than only considering the conclusions already derived and 
present within the aviation safety field. By doing so the candidate managed to gain 
fundamental knowledge about the circumstances and chains of events that led to those 
                                                 
20 The safest airline in the world is QANTAS, which has never had an accident [140]. 
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accidents which was very important in proceeding with this research work. Table 8 illustrates 
the accident statistics by phase of flight when the initial problems occurred and which led to 
accidents. Thus, on average 32% of aircraft accidents occurred in the approach-and-landing 
phase, which is composed of the initial approach, final approach and landing phase. After that 
are the cruise and takeoff phases in which 26% and 18% of causal events happened and led to 
accidents.  
 
Table 8: Distribution of accident causes according to the flight phase. 
 
Take Off Cruise Approach and Landing Collision Runway No Information 
17.7 % 26 % 31.9 % 3.6 % 1.7 % 19 % 
 
Table 8 shows that for 19% of the accidents there is no reliable information about the 
time when the accident occurred. The data from Table 8 also points out that an actual collision 
accounted for about 4% of accidents, whereas nearly 2% of accidents happened on the runway 
either before takeoff or during landing.  
The approach-and-landing phase can be additionally considered with respect to its 
components of initial approach, final approach and landing phase. This analysis shows that 
around 40% of aircraft accidents occurred in the landing phase, 38% in the initial approach, 
and 22% occurred in the final approach phase (Table 9). Analysing this data by decades shows 
that these trends are stable and fluctuated at relatively small intervals. 
 
Table 9: Distribution of accidents in sub phases within approach & landing phase. 
 
 Initial Approach Approach Landing 
Ratio (%) 38.3 % 21.5 % 40.2 % 
 
Table 10 shows the distribution of aircraft accidents 1950-2004 by decades that 
occurred on the runway, either before takeoff or during landing. The data illustrates that since 
1970 the ratio of these accidents has stabilized between 2 and 4%. 
 
Table 10: Accidents occurring on the runway before takeoff or during landing. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 
Ratio (%) 0 0.4 3.1 2.8 2.2 2.1 
 
In addition, the data regarding the causes of aircraft accidents that occurred during the 
period 1950-2004 was sourced with respect to human error, mechanical failures and 
environmental causal factors. Since an aircraft accident is usually a result of a sequence of 
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undesirable events, when analysing an aircraft accident one must consider both major and 
contributing factors. As said earlier, major factors are mainly responsible for the accident, 
whereas contributing factors aggravate the situation and along with the major factors cause the 
accidents. 
An analysis of brief reports available in [9] has led to several conclusions regarding the 
distribution of human, aircraft and environmental causal factors. The results are presented in 
Figures 31-34.  
First of all, the conclusion emerges that the causes for 31% of the aircraft accidents that 
happened in the period 1950-2004 are not completely determined, i.e. are unknown. This is a 
very high rate and obviously needs further consideration. On the other hand, the contribution of 
human, aircraft and weather as major causal factors were on average 32%, 25%, and 12 %, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 31: Causes for aircraft accidents 1950-2004 (by decades). 
 
Figure 31 presents the distribution of the causal factors that brought about aircraft 
accidents in the period from 1950 to 2004. It is clear that the rates fluctuated slightly except the 
trend of the accidents for which the causes are unknown. During the recorded period there was 
a downwards trend in the number of accidents with unknown causes, but the rate of 26% in 
2004 is still high. Furthermore, human causal factors varied from 26% in the 1950’s to 38% in 
the 1980’s, whereas the causes associated with the technical condition of the aircraft were the 
major causal factor in 19% of the cases in the 1950’s, going up to 31% in the period 2000-
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2004. With respect to the weather, the rate fluctuated between 9% in the 1950’s and 15% in the 
1990’s, an average of 12% over the whole period.  
When this data is compared with prevalent statistics of aircraft accidents, slight 
differences can be noticed. For instance, human error as a major cause varied between 31% in 
the 1970s and 40% in the 1990s according to [164]. This indicates that the approach used by 
the candidate in determining the major cause of accidents (as stated above: the major cause is 
the first significant event within the chain of events leading to the accident) increases the 
importance of the technological level and the condition of aircraft.21 
In terms of contributing factors, human error was a strong contributing factor in an 
average of 7.7% of the accidents. Additionally, the weather was a strong contributing factor in 
4% of the accidents whereas mechanical problems were significant in only 1.3% of the cases.  
Table 11 shows the distribution of contributing factors during the period 1950-2004. In 
the recorded period there was a dramatic increase in the involvement of the weather as a 
contributing factor from 2.3% in the 1970’s to 10.6% in the period 2000-2004. The rate of 
contribution of human error remained steady within the interval 6-10%, whereas the impact of 
mechanical failure as a contributing factor during the whole period was very low. 
 
Table 11: Distribution of contributing causal factors. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 
Human Factors 7.0% 6.1% 6.8% 8.9% 9.7% 7.0% 
Aircraft Causal 
Factors 1.2% 2.2% 0.7% 1.9% 1.3% 0.0% 
Environmental 
Factors 2.8% 2.5% 2.3% 4.7% 5.0% 10.6% 
 
In order to provide more tangible data regarding the causes of aircraft accidents the 
major causal factors were broken down further into sub-factors. In the case where the aircraft 
was the major causal factor for an accident (Figure 32), the most common sub-factor was 
engine problems with 32%, followed by mechanical problems, fatigue, fire occurrences, and 
icing with 13%, 11%, 10% and 8%, respectively. In addition, causes relating to gear failures 
accounted for 6% of the accidents, and load and lighting 4% each. Over the period, other 
events such as bird strike, fuel leak, falsely indicated conditions, instrument failure and many 
                                                 
21  In many reports can be seen the rates between 50% and 60% (even more) of human errors as major causes for 
accidents [16, 95, 108, 132]. These figures refer to accidents where a cause could be identified and excluded 
accidents where a cause could not be determined. The statistics presented in this chapter include accidents where a 
cause could not be identified. 
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others (often associated with emergency landing attempts), were causes for 13% of the 
accidents. 
In addition, Table 12 illustrates the distribution of sub-factors which account for the 
aircraft as a major causal factor for accidents by decades. Overall the distribution of sub-factors 
as stable, except the fatigue-cases and accidents associated with gear/tyre malfunction. Over 
the period 1950-2004, there was a significant decline in the percentage of fatigue-accidents, but 
a remarkable rise in the number of accidents due to gear/tyre malfunction. 
 
Figure 32: Aircraft causal factors for accidents during the period 1950 to 2004. 
 
Table 12: Aircraft sub-factors leading to accidents during the period 1950 to 2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 1950-2004 
Engine 38.7% 28.1% 32.5% 30.3% 31.9% 35.6% 32.7% 
Landing Gear 1.6% 5.3% 9.1% 3.0% 5.5% 11.1% 5.8% 
Mech. Problems 1.6% 19.3% 11.7% 10.6% 19.8% 8.9% 12.6% 
Fire 11.3% 8.8% 11.7% 10.6% 7.7% 11.1% 10.1% 
Fatigue 27.4% 8.8% 10.4% 12.1% 4.4% 4.4% 11.1% 
Load 1.6% 7.0% 2.6% 4.5% 5.5% 2.2% 4.0% 
Icing 8.1% 5.3% 5.2% 10.6% 11.0% 2.2% 7.5% 
Lightning 3.2% 8.8% 2.6% 3.0% 2.2% 2.2% 3.5% 
Other 6.5% 8.8% 14.3% 15.2% 12.1% 22.2% 12.8% 
 
As stated above, human factors were the main cause for 32% of aircraft accidents 
which occurred between 1950 and 2004 (Figure 31), and 67% of these accidents were caused 
by crew errors.  
Contribution of crew error within human factors was 57% in the 1980’s and reached a 
peak of 74% in the 1950’s and 1990’s. In contrast, a significantly lower number of accidents in 
the recorded period were caused by traffic control error, which accounted for around 15%. 
 
CHAPTER 5: AIR TRAFFIC SAFETY ANALYSIS THROUGH STATISTICS 117
Table 13: Human sub-factors leading to accidents during the period 1950 to 2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 1950-2004 
Crew 73.8% 69.7% 61.6% 57.1% 73.8% 65.9% 66.8% 
ATC 14.3% 15.7% 17.0% 18.4% 14.6% 7.3% 15.4% 
Crime 8.3% 13.5% 13.4% 14.3% 8.7% 22.0% 12.5% 
Shot down 3.6% 1.1% 8.0% 10.2% 2.9% 4.9% 5.3% 
 
 
Figure 33: Distribution of the human sub-causal factors by decades. 
 
A high percentage of accidents during the period 1950-2004 occurred due to criminal 
activities. This percentage fluctuated between 8% in the 1950’s to 14% in the 1980’s or on 
average 12.5%. Here there are also a surprisingly high percentage of accidents associated with 
intentional military fire (shot down events) and therefore they are presented separately. Those 
events were common in the 1970’s and 1980’s when they reached a peak of 10%, whereas in 
the other decades they accounted for between 1 and 4% (Table 13).  
Severe weather conditions as major causal factors were broken down into several sub-
factors and their distribution over the period is shown in Table 14. The weather sub-factors 
include: turbulence, thunderstorm, runway ice/snow, poor weather (general), strong wind, and 
intensive rain. While the impact of the sub factors over the decades varied, the category ‘poor 
weather’ remained as a main sub factor; it is responsible for 36% of those accidents, followed 
by the severe storm and thunderstorm conditions accounting for 28% of accidents, and so forth. 
The statistics reveal that the number of accidents caused by strong turbulence decreased during 
the recorded period, so that from 1990 there were no such registered accidents.  
 
Table 14: Severe weather conditions as major causal factors for accidents 1950 – 2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 1950-2004 
Turbulence 10.0% 12.5% 12.1% 6.9% 0.0% 0.0% 7.1% 
Thunderstorm 36.7% 40.0% 24.2% 27.6% 19.1% 15.8% 27.8% 
Icing 10.0% 0.0% 0.0% 13.8% 4.3% 5.3% 5.1% 
Poor weather 36.7% 40.0% 42.4% 17.2% 29.8% 63.2% 36.4% 
Wind 6.7% 5.0% 21.2% 20.7% 8.5% 10.5% 11.6% 
Rain 0.0% 2.5% 0.0% 13.8% 38.3% 5.3% 12.1% 
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Figure 34: Distribution of the weather sub-causal factors 1950-2004. 
 
5.4 Significant Examples of Aircraft Accidents that occurred during the period 
1950 to 2004 
Listed below are several of the most significant and deadliest accidents in aviation history that 
had the greatest impact on air traffic, and aviation in general. This data is presented in order to 
emphasise again the existing risks in air traffic and raise the awareness of the continued efforts 
in preventing future reoccurrences. 
 
1. 3 March 1953 at Karachi, Pakistan, the aircraft de Havilland DH-106 Comet crashed on 
takeoff due to excessive nose-high attitude, which resulted in a stall. This was the first 
crash of a commercial jet transport aircraft.  
 
2. 22 May 1962 at Unionville, Missouri, USA. The Boeing 707-124 crashed due to a 
bomb explosion at 39,000 feet. This was the first known bombing of a commercial jet 
airliner. 
 
3. 27 March 1977 in Tenerife, Spain. The aircraft Boeing 747-121 collided with a Boeing 
747-206B on the runway while backtracking the runway for departure. With a total of 
583 killed, this accident remains the deadliest accident in aviation history. 
 
4. 12 August 1985 on Mt. Osutaka, Japan. A Boeing 747SR-46 suffered an explosive 
decompression while climbing through 23,000 feet. The crew was attempting to return 
to Tokyo when the aircraft clipped a mountain ridge, flew across a valley, and impacted 
a second mountain approximately 400 feet from the summit. This accident remains the 
deadliest single-airplane accident in aviation history. 
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5. 11 September 2001. A Boeing 757-222 on a flight from Newark, New Jersey to San 
Francisco, California, crashed shortly after being hijacked. It was the fourth and final 
aircraft to crash in a series of coordinated terrorist hijackings on September 11.22 
 
 
In terms of distribution of the deadliest aircraft accidents over the period 1950-2004, 5 
out of 100 deadliest accidents occurred in the period 1950-60, followed by 5, 28, 26, 28 and 8 
accidents in the next decades 1960-70, 1971-80, 1981-90, 1991-2000 and 2000-2004, 
respectively, as shown in Table 15. 
 
Table 15: Distribution of the 100 deadliest aircraft accidents over the period 1950-2004. 
 
 1950-60 1961-70 1971-80 1981-90 1991-00 2001-04 
100 deadliest 
accidents 5 5 28 26 28 8 
 
In addition, there were several accidents that had a significant impact on the accident 
investigation process and were results of uncommon chains of events including strange human 
errors, omissions, or aircraft malfunctions. These include: opening of the rear cargo door 
(08/05/2003), ignoring the takeoff warning horn for the entire 37-seconds takeoff roll 
(31/08/1999), mistaken determination of engine failure that led to inappropriate operating 
(13/12/1994), pilot accidentally entering 270 instead of 027 deg (03/09/1989), accidentally shot 
down by a missile (03/07/1988), forgetting to lower the landing gear (10/07/1988), blocking 
the main door during the emergency landing (02/06/1983), inadequately entered aerospace 
followed by shooting down (01/09/1983), mistakenly shooting down the engine (11/10/1983), 
false warning (06/06/1982), accidentally lowering the flaps during cruise (29/08/1979), 
malfunctioning altimeter (08/11/1963),  and so forth.  
 
5.5 Statistics - Concluding Remarks 
Several conclusions have been drawn from the statistics presented in this chapter as follows:  
 
- Besides the specific improvements in the area of air traffic safety, the fact that in the 
period 1950-2004 1630 accidents occurred worldwide resulting in 64,377 passengers 
killed is a matter of concern (Table 2 and Table 5).  
 
- Although the rate of the number of accidents and the number of fatalities per million 
departures decreased significantly in the recorded period, in the future, due to the 
                                                 
22 After 11 September 2001 all aspects of air traffic safety have come under review. 
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growth of air traffic, the number of accidents, victims and material damage resulting 
from the accidents is likely to remain stable or slightly decrease (Figure 26 and 27). 
Some experts state that because of the expansion of air traffic, the number of accidents 
in the future will increase. This will be the case if the rate of accidents cannot out 
perform the increase in air travel. 
 
- The likelihood of an aircraft accident is not affected by the time of year or the place of 
the occurrence. 
 
- Statistical data shows that 72% of the total number of occupants died in aircraft 
accidents over the period 1950-2004 (84%, 85%, 80%, 68%, 55%, 70% from 1950 to 
2004 resolved per decade respectively), which requires action to increase the 
survivability of accidents (Table 5). 
 
- In terms of an aircraft accident, the impact of the human-aircraft-environment causal 
factors is complex. Weather conditions are in many cases strong contributing factors in 
aircraft accidents but the cause of the accident may be sometimes listed as human error. 
 
- The causes for 31% of aircraft accidents that occurred between 1950 and 2004 are 
unknown (Figure 31). 
 
Overall, the analysis of the historical statistics of accidents between 1950 and 2004 had 
a significant impact on proceeding with this work. In particular, they emphasised the 
importance of the following points: 
 
- Existence of sustained risks to air traffic of repeated human errors, omissions, or 
aircraft malfunctions, 
 
- Need for continued efforts in preventing future reoccurrences, and  
 
- Uniform collecting and storing of data of air traffic safety occurrence worldwide.  
 
Therefore, in order to continue to improve aircraft safety as well as mitigate severe 
accident consequences, it is clear that we must learn from aircraft accidents and implement 
measures to avoid reoccurrences. Consequently, it is certain that statistics and advanced 
computer tools for collecting and analysing data could contribute to an improvement in aircraft 
accident investigation and air traffic safety itself. 
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 Chapter 
 6 
 
The cost of solving the Comet mystery must be reckoned neither in money nor in 
manpower. 
SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL  
 
Application of the Delphi Method to Aircraft Accident 
Investigation  
 
6.1 Preparation and Application of the Delphi Enquiry 
Based on the arguments given in the previous chapters, a Delphi exercise has been conducted 
in order to examine the aircraft accident investigation. During the entire course of this research, 
this candidate has followed a general definition of the Delphi technique as being a complex 
combination of intuition and logic which is formalised through the procedure of carrying out 
research activities. This is important in order to retain the credibility of the final conclusions 
and to keep the benefits of intuition and logic intact. The research was conducted between 
April and June 2007, although the preparation for implementing the research started months 
beforehand. 
Initially, this candidate, along with other members of the working group, created six 
groups of factors (in total 98 factors) which may affect the outcome of aircraft accident 
investigation processes. The working group consisted of the candidate as well as a few aviation 
experts and a Delphi technique expert. Each factor group contained a collection of important 
elements from one particular aspect of the investigation so that all six groups comprehensively 
considered the entire process of aircraft accident investigation. These six groups were 
incorporated into a questionnaire that asked respondents to rank factors within each group in 
order of importance [Appendix A: The Delphi Questionnaire]. For this purpose within every 
group of factors a question(s) was asked in which the respondents provided the ranking of 
those factors. The questionnaire contained a series of guidelines to help complete the survey 
properly and was composed of the following six groups of factors: 
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 Group I 
1. Principle of technical – tactical liberty of conducting the investigation and principle of adequacy 
2. Principle of methodical approach and planning 
3. Principle of critical approach of the procedure 
4. Principle of operational approach 
5. Principle of profundity and persistence 
6. Principle of objectivity 
7. Principle of solitary governance of investigation 
8. Principle of coordination and cooperation 
9. Principle of economical procedure 
10. Principle of secrecy 
 
For the first group of factors the question posed was (Q1) ‘How much are the below 
mentioned principles met within an aircraft accident investigation?’ upon which experts 
ranked the factors. Experts expressed their opinions numerically ranking the factors from 1 to 
10, ranging between definitely unfeasible and definitely feasible, respectively. In this instance a 
rank 10 means that this particular principle is met completely, whereas a lower rank indicates 
that this principle is met partially within an aircraft accident investigation. 
 
 Group II 
11 When did the accident happen? 
12 Where did the accident happen? 
13 How did the accident happen? 
14 How has the plane been maintained? 
15 Who were the occupants of the aircraft? 
16 Why did the accident happen? 
17 What may have prevented the accident? 
 
The second group of factors was associated with the question (Q2) ‘What are the odds 
of determining the answers of the questions below within an aircraft accident investigation?’ 
upon which experts ranked these factors. The ranks available were from 1 to 10, ranging 
between definitely unfeasible and definitely feasible, respectively.  
 
 Group III 
18 Managing the investigation (Plan, Report, Monitor)  
19 Notification and arriving at the scene of the accident 
20 Examination of the scene of the accident 
21 Wreckage analysis  
22 Finding and interviewing the witnesses 
23 Investigation of Air Traffic Control records & Radar Data 
24 Laboratory examination 
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25 Reconstruction 
26 Report writing (Structure & Quality) 
27 Data management 
 
For the third group of factors three questions were posed (Q3, Q4, and Q5) upon which 
experts ranked the factors from three different aspects. The associated questions were: ‘In 
reference to obtaining a better investigation outcome, how important is [the given item] within 
the process of aircraft accident investigation?’, then ‘How complex is [the given item] within 
the investigation process as to the requirement of special skills and technique by the 
examination team?’, and ‘Is there potential for further improvement of [the given item] within 
the aircraft accident investigation by applying the new methods and contemporary 
technology?’.  
The rankings available to these questions were from 1 to 10 (unimportant – very 
important), from 1 to 10 (not at all – very complicated), and from 1 to 5 (small - large), 
respectively.  
 
 Group IV 
28 Operations, The Flight Path 
29 Cockpit 
30 Engine and accessories  
31 Mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic systems 
32 Landing gear systems and brake systems 
33 Deicing and anti-icing systems 
34 Fuel (quality and amount) 
35 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) 
36 Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) 
37 Cockpit Sound Recorder (CSR) 
38 Flight Data Recorder (FDR) 
39 Aircraft loading 
40 Hydroplaning  
41 In-flight explosion 
42 In-flight failure (Structural failure–fatigue) 
43 In-flight fire  
44 Lightning 
45 Mid-air collision 
46 Crime activities  
47 Weather conditions 
48 Downwash and wing tip vortex hazards 
49 Microburst, wind gust, wind shear 
50 Stability and control of an airplane 
51 Human error or omission 
52 Psychological factors (fatigue, illusion, etc) 
53 Design inadequacy 
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This group of factors was associated with two questions (Q6, Q7) as follow: ‘How 
complex is the examination of [the given item] as to the requirement of special skills and 
technique by the examination team?’, and ‘Is there potential for further improvement of 
examination of [the given item] within the aircraft accident investigation by applying new 
methods and contemporary technology?’ .  The ranks available for these questions were from 1 
to 10 (not at all – very complicated) and from 1 to 5, (small - large), respectively. 
 
 Group V 
54 Engine malfunction 
55 Brake systems malfunction 
56 Landing gear systems malfunction 
57 Icing 
58 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) 
59 Inappropriate fuel 
60 Inappropriate aircraft loading  
61 Hydroplaning  
62 Downwash and wing tip vortex 
63 Severe weather conditions 
64 Microburst, wind gust, wind shear 
65 Lightning 
66 In-flight explosion 
67 In-flight failure (Structural failure)  
68 In-flight fire  
69 Crime activities 
70 Human error or omission  
71 Psychological factors 
72 Stability problems and lost the control of the airplane 
73 Design inadequacy 
74 Mid air collision 
 
For the fifth group of factors the question asked was (Q8) ‘What are the odds of 
proving within the process of an aircraft accident investigation that [the given item] is one of 
the major causes for an accident?’ upon which experts ranked the factors. Experts ranked the 
factors from 1 to 10, ranking from definitely unreliable to certain, respectively.  
 
 Group VI 
75 The process of investigation meets the procedures regarding the quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC) 
76 It is justifiable waiting for a couple of months before releasing the accident investigation report 
77 Reports of investigation carried out are always accurate and well done 
78 Investigators have appropriate and sufficient skills to handle aircraft accident investigation 
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79 The excellent knowledge of theory compared to an average one significantly improves the investigation outcomes 
80 The contamination of the scene of the accident is a serious problem within the process of aircraft accident investigations 
81 The presence of landmarks on the scene of the accident provides sufficient information for carrying out accurate mathematical calculations 
82 It is likely at times inconsistent material is sent for lab analysis 
83 Investigators should believe witnesses of aircraft accident 
84 The cockpit recorders (FDR, CVR, CDR) record sufficient parameters 
85 We never have a real accident with enough readable data 
86 The severe aircraft manoeuvre can be revealed during the investigation 
87 The aircraft is equipped with appropriate accessories, which provides ice protection during the whole flight 
88 The stall is a serious hazard for the aircraft 
89 The downwash and wing tip vortex is a serious hazard for the aircraft 
90 Investigators have enough resources available to find out the weather conditions during the accident 
91 Human factors have been involved somehow in every single aircraft accident that has ever occurred 
92 It is possible to answer the question if the pilot should have been able to cope with the critical situation 
93 There are always problems with airfield papers analysis (documentation) 
94 The handbook is well composed material 
95 There is a great possibility for increasing the survivability of an aircraft accident 
96 Determining the cause of the accidents is a very tough task if there is not data recorded 
97 The process of investigation as a whole can be improved significantly, by applying new methods and advanced technology 
98 The experience of the land traffic accident investigation can contribute to considerable increase in air traffic safety 
 
For the last group of factors the question posed was (Q9) ‘Do you agree with the 
statements below?’ Experts ranked the factors from 1 to 10, ranging between strong 
disagreement and strong agreement, respectively.  
It can be seen that there are the same or similar factors included in several of the groups 
created. It was carried out in this manner in order to facilitate the survey process as well as 
provide comprehensive outcomes of this research. In terms of ranking, one should clarify that 
respondents, if considered, were allowed to rank more factors with the same ranks. 
The next stage of the Delphi procedure was selection of respondents and that was done 
while the questionnaire was being created. Thus, taking all circumstances and features of the 
Delphi procedure into account, it was decided that 10 respondents would provide sufficient 
response for drawing credible conclusions. Respondents were chosen experts, members of 
aircraft accident investigation teams, who were recommended by their colleagues as very 
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knowledgeable and experienced investigators. On the respondent list were investigators from 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), Defense Science Technology Organisation 
(DSTO), QANTAS (the national airline of Australia), and other international services.  
The Delphi survey started with the well known ‘zero’ round in order to provide 
feedback about the quality of the questionnaire in terms of its structure and content. In the 
‘zero’ round some experts were surveyed, who responded that the questionnaire was composed 
of clearly defined questions (factors) and that every factor included was important for the 
purpose of this research, which is improvement of the process of aircraft accident investigation. 
Those respondents also suggested a few changes to the questionnaire (which were accepted by 
the candidate), most of which related to the wording of the questions. After finishing the ‘zero’ 
round, the questionnaire was sent to the respondents and the first round of the Delphi survey 
started. The experts confirmed receiving the questionnaire and within the scheduled deadline 
they returned the questionnaire completed. Meanwhile some experts asked for more 
information which was provided immediately by the working group and that resulted in 
finishing the first round very quickly.  
In accordance with the Delphi procedure, after the questionnaires were returned, this 
candidate summarised the responses and, based on the results, developed a new questionnaire 
for the respondent group. The respondents were asked to re-evaluate their original answers 
based on examination of the group response from the first round so that they accordingly could 
have changed their original answers from the first round. In compliance with the procedure of 
checking the expert opinions and asking for argumentative explanations of answers that 
differed significantly from the group average opinion, the whole Delphi procedure finished in 
two rounds. After the second round, there was an impression that the experts quite clearly 
ranked the factors in the first and second round so that the additional third round would not 
have enhanced the Delphi results. 
When the survey procedure was completed and expert responses were available, the 
candidate began to analyse the data.  The data analysis included determining the expert group 
opinion about every single factor on the questionnaire and working out the expert competency 
and the coefficient of concordance of expert opinions. All calculations were conducted on an 
Excel spreadsheet and the results obtained are presented in the following part of this chapter. 
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6.2 Data Analysis of the Delphi Exercise Application 
As mentioned, the Delphi survey was completed in two rounds. Experts provided their 
opinions for every single factor in the first round, and through the feedback in the second round 
they upgraded their original answers. The final opinions, which present numerical answers or 
ranks, were transferred into Excel tables created for this purpose. After that, according to 
equations 1-14, the average group ranks were calculated for every single factor, followed by 
determining the coefficient of competency and coefficient of concordance. The final results, 
including ranking the 98 factors with respect to the 9 questions posed, are presented below. 
 
Question 1 
 
With respect to the question ‘How much are the below mentioned principles met within an 
aircraft accident investigation?’ the experts provided the following group opinion.  
 
       Table 16: Expert group opinion with respect to question 1. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
1. 
Principle of technical – tactical liberty of 
conducting the investigation and principle of 
adequacy 
6 9 7.9 1.0 
2. Principle of methodical approach and planning 6 9 7.7 0.9 
3. Principle of critical approach of the procedure 7 9 8.3 0.8 
4. Principle of operational approach 5 10 7.4 1.6 
5. Principle of profundity and persistence 7 9 7.9 0.8 
6. Principle of objectivity 8 10 8.7 0.8 
7. Principle of solitary governance of investigation 7 10 8.3 1.1 
8. Principle of coordination and cooperation 6 9 7.6 1.1 
9. Principle of economical procedure 5 9 6.8 1.2 
10. Principle of secrecy 6 9 7.3 1.2 
         
      Table 17: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.56 0.85 0.88 0.77 0.92 0.81 0.89 0.90 0.74 0.85
δι 1.00 1.81 1.89 1.59 2.00 1.69 1.90 1.93 1.49 1.81
Ck (ρι) 0.315          
Ck (δι) 0.324          
χ2 28.31          
χ2 (table) 21.67          
ti (test)  2.32 8.95 11.44 5.44 17.73 6.68 11.91 12.94 4.63 8.95
tT (table) 2.31          
 
The non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) 
rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s criteria (t-distribution). 
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According to equation 15, the value of 2χ  was calculated, which is complied with 2χ  
distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom. From Table 17 it can be seen that the calculated 2χ  
is greater than the table value of 2Tχ   read out for 99% interval of confidence. As a result of 
this, the hypothesis for randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck is rejected and that 
leads to acceptance of the hypothesis that non-randomness of expert concordance is correct. 
In addition, the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation coefficient was checked by 
employment of the student’s criteria (t-distribution), which is complied with t-distribution for 
n-2 degrees of freedom (equation 18). All values calculated are greater than the table value of 
t-distribution for n-2 degrees of freedom chosen for 95% interval of confidence. As a result of 
this, the hypothesis of non-correlation of ρi is rejected as incorrect against the hypothesis that 
there is correlation among ρi that means that ρi differs considerably from zero. 
After reaching consensus among expert opinions, which was proved by statistically 
testing the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation 
coefficient, the drawing of conclusions related to the answers of question 1 could have started. 
Hence, using the data from Table 16, Figure 35 was created.  
 
 
Figure 35: Expert group opinion on the general principles within aircraft accident investigation. 
 
Figure 35 points out that all principles from Table 16 are met considerably within an 
aircraft accident investigation. In particular the process of investigation satisfies the criteria 
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with respect to the principle of objectivity, the principle of critical approach of the procedure 
and the principle of solitary governance of investigation, which are the factors 6, 3, 7 highly 
ranked with 8.7, 8.3, and 8.3 respectively.  
On the other hand, the principle of economical procedure, which is factor 9, has a rank 
of only 6.8, which clearly indicates that it is not met completely within an aircraft accident 
investigation. In addition the principle of operational approach (4) was ranked 7.4 and 
associated with a high dispersion of 1.6. The results also reveal that within an investigation the 
principles of secrecy, coordination and cooperation as well as methodical approach and 
planning (factors 10, 8, 2), which were ranked 7.3, 7.6, and 7.7 respectively, are not entirely 
met.  
The ultimate objective in an aircraft accident investigation is meeting absolutely all 
principles that will provide the best outcomes. In this regard the gap between the maximum 
rank available and the worked-out one can be viewed as potential for further improvement of 
investigation. However, this enquiry is very general and all conclusions have to be considered 
very carefully.  
Question 2 
 
This question considers the general investigation questions mentioned in the table below, 
which are posed in almost all types of investigation, regardless of the nature or character of 
accident/incident. Thus, with respect to the question ‘What are the odds of determining the 
answers of the questions below within an aircraft accident investigation?’ the experts provided 
the following group opinion. 
 
Table 18: Expert group opinion with respect to question 2. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
11 When did the accident happen? 8 10 9.1 0.54 
12 Where did the accident happen? 9 10 9.3 0.46 
13 How did the accident happen? 5 7 6.3 0.78 
14 How has the plane been maintained? 7 10 8.2 1.08 
15 Who were the occupants of the aircraft? 8 10 9.1 0.70 
16 Why did the accident happen? 5 8 6.8 0.98 
17 What may have prevented the accident? 6 9 7.2 0.98 
 
 
Table 19: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.67 0.89 0.88 0.75 0.93 0.77 0.81 0.94 0.90 0.90 
δι 1.00 1.81 1.79 1.29 1.95 1.36 1.51 2.00 1.83 1.83 
Ck (ρι) 0.685          
Ck (δι) 0.706          
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χ2 41.10          
χ2 (tab) 16.81          
ti (test)  2.72 9.64 9.10 3.82 15.40 4.17 5.24 19.06 10.27 10.27 
ti (tab - 95%) 2.57          
 
The non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) 
rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s criteria (t-distribution). 
The worked out values of 2χ  and ti are greater than the corresponding read out ones of 2Tχ  
and tT leading to acceptance of hypotheses of non-randomness of expert concordance and 
hypotheses that there is correlation among experts opinions (ρi). After that Figure 36 was 
created to express the data from Table 18. 
Figure 36 illustrates that an investigation of aircraft accident occurrence will most 
likely reveal the answers to questions regarding where/when the accident happened and the 
identity of the occupants of the aircraft which refer to factors 12, 11 and 15 ranked with 9.3, 
9.1, and 9.1, respectively. 
 
Figure 36: Expert group opinion concerning the possibility of answering the general investigation 
questions. 
 
As expected, the experts ranked significantly lower factors 13, 16, and 17 with ranks of 
6.3, 6.8, and 7.2, respectively. This means that within an investigation the most difficult task is 
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determining the answers of questions how/why the accident happened and what may have 
prevented the accident.  
The relatively low ranks of those factors indicate that despite the global efforts of the 
investigative agencies to improve air safety through independent investigation, it is evident that 
the investigation is not a perfect procedure. Moreover, the results of question 2 suggest that 
investigation enhancement can be achieved by improving the stages directly related to 
determination of causes of the accident. 
In terms of aircraft maintenance, experts ranked factor 14 with rank 8.2, which means 
that investigators do not have a big problem discovering the maintenance history of an aircraft 
involved in an accident. 
Question 3 
 
Questions 3, 4, and 5 refer to the factors 18-27 and examine them from different aspects within 
the framework of an investigation, which provides comprehensive outcomes about their 
condition. As a result of this, with respect to the question ‘In reference to obtaining a better 
investigation outcome, how important is [the given item] within the process of aircraft accident 
investigation?’ the experts provided the group opinion presented in Table 20 and Figure 37. 
 
Table 20: Expert group opinion with respect to question 3. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
18 Managing the investigation (Plan, 
Report, Monitor)  
7 10 8.6 1.02 
19 Notification and arriving at the scene of the accident 8 10 8.6 0.80 
20 Examination of the scene of the accident 9 10 9.3 0.46 
21 Wreckage analysis  9 10 9.5 0.50 
22 Finding and interviewing the witnesses 7 9 8.2 0.87 
23 Investigation of Air Traffic Control records & Radar Data 8 10 8.8 0.87 
24 Laboratory examination 8 9 8.7 0.46 
25 Reconstruction 7 9 7.9 0.70 
26 Report writing (Structure & Quality) 7 9 8.2 0.75 
27 Data management 7 10 8.5 1.12 
 
   Table 21: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.75 0.93 0.75 0.91 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.92 0.77 0.87 
δι 1.01 2.00 1.00 1.90 1.66 1.78 1.77 1.96 1.14 1.66 
Ck (ρι) 0.347          
Ck (δι) 0.357          
χ2 31.19          
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χ2 (tab) 21.67          
ti (test)  4.84 19.95 4.81 15.65 10.09 12.30 11.96 17.85 5.48 10.04
ti (tab - 95%) 2.31          
 
According to the Delphi procedure, the non-randomness of the coefficient of 
concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 
2χ  and student’s criteria (t-distribution). Hence the calculated value of 2χ  was greater than 
the table value of 2Tχ  read out for 99% interval of confidence, as well as worked out values of ti  
compare to the table value of t-distribution. This means that there was a consensus among 
expert opinions and the drawing of conclusions related to answers of question 3 could have 
started. 
Figure 37 shows that experts highly ranked factors 18-27 with respect to their 
importance within an investigation. That is to say in the framework of an aircraft investigation 
process, experts said that all factors from the list are very important. Yet, experts emphasised 
the importance of wreckage analysis (21)23 and examination of the scene of accident (20) 
allocating them ranks of 9.5 and 9.3 respectively. As less ranked factors within the list 
provided was the reconstruction of an aircraft accident (25) with a still high rank of 7.9, 
followed by the report writing (26) and finding and interviewing the witnesses (22) ranked 
with 8.2 each. 
 
Figure 37: Expert group opinion concerning the importance of the stages of an aircraft accident 
investigation. 
                                                 
23 These numbers refer to the factors given in Table 20 
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The analysis of Figure 37 points out that in terms of better investigation outcomes all 
factors from the list above are important. Moreover it underlines the importance of direct 
examination of wreckage and scene of the accident, which were also emphasised through the 
answers of question 2. 
Question 4 
 
As stated earlier, question 4 treated the same factors from 18 to 27, only in respect to 
complexity.  The question 4 asked: ‘How complex is [the given item] within the investigation 
process as to the requirement of special skills and technique by the examination team?’ The 
experts provided the group opinion shown in Table 22. 
 
Table 22: Expert group opinion with respect to question 4. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
18 Managing the investigation (Plan, Report, Monitor) 5 9 7.2 1.33 
19 Notification and arriving at the scene of the accident 2 7 4.8 1.66 
20 Examination of the scene of the accident 6 9 7.7 1.10 
21 Wreckage analysis  7 9 8.3 0.78 
22 Finding and interviewing the witnesses 5 8 6.5 1.02 
23 Investigation of Air Traffic Control records & Radar Data 5 8 7 1.18 
24 Laboratory examination 7 9 8.1 0.70 
25 Reconstruction 8 10 8.9 0.70 
26 Report writing (Structure & Quality) 4 8 6.4 1.50 
27 Data management 6 8 7 0.89 
 
   Table 23: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.94 0.85 0.76 0.86 0.91 0.86 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.89 
δι 1.89 1.43 1.00 1.48 1.73 1.50 1.94 2.00 1.88 1.65 
Ck (ρι) 0.572          
Ck (δι) 0.585          
χ2 51.49          
χ2 (tab) 21.67          
ti (test)  23.52 8.36 4.99 9.10 14.79 9.35 28.90 39.95 23.30 12.40
ti (tab - 95%) 2.31          
 
The non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) 
rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s criteria (t-distribution). 
The worked out values of 2χ  and ti are greater than the corresponding values read out from 
the tables of 2χ  and t-distribution, which means that the hypothesis that non-randomness of 
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expert concordance is correct, as well as hypothesis of correlation among expert opinions. 
These results show that the results from Table 22 are scientifically accepted and conclusions 
can be drawn. 
If experts said that all factors from 18 to 27 are very important within an investigation 
in reference to obtaining better outcomes, they ranked their complexity significantly different. 
Thus, in the expert group opinion the most complicated phases of an investigation are 
reconstruction (25), wreckage analysis (21), and laboratory examination (24), ranked with 
8.9, 8.3, and 8.1, respectively. On the other hand the notification and arriving at the scene of 
accident (19), as expected, was ranked as less complicated with a rank of 4.8 followed by 
report writing (26) and finding and interviewing the witnesses (22) with ranks of 6.4 and 
6.5, respectively. Other factors on the list were ranked 7.  
 
Figure 38: Expert group opinion on the complexity of the phases of an aircraft accident investigation. 
 
In terms of ranking factors 18, 19 and 26, (managing the investigation, notification 
and arriving at the scene of the accident and report writing) Table 22 shows that dispersion 
of those answers has relatively high values of 1.33, 1.66, and 1.5, respectively. This refers to 
the need for further consideration of these factors with respect to the associated question. 
Experts ranked these factors (individually) very stable in the first and second round providing 
supportive arguments for these answers. Based on these results and also the fact of non-
randomness of expert concordance and competency, this candidate concluded the survey 
procedure after the second round. 
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Question 5 
 
In the first period, the Delphi technique mainly was used for forecasting future 
international situations and forecasting the scientific-technological development. Therefore by 
taking advantage of this feature, question 5 asked experts to express their opinion about the 
potential of further improvement of the investigation viewed across factors 18-27. Thus, with 
respect to the question ‘Is there potential for further improvement of [the given item] within the 
aircraft accident investigation by applying the new methods and contemporary technology?’, 
the experts provided the group opinion presented below.  
 
Table 24: Expert group opinion with respect to question 5. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
18 Managing the investigation (Plan, 
Report, Monitor)  
3 4.5 3.8 0.56 
19 Notification and arriving at the scene of the accident 2 4 2.9 0.70 
20 Examination of the scene of the accident 2.5 4 3.3 0.51 
21 Wreckage analysis  3 4.5 3.8 0.56 
22 Finding and interviewing the witnesses 1.5 3 2.6 0.61 
23 Investigation of Air Traffic Control records & Radar Data 2.5 4 3.2 0.56 
24 Laboratory examination 3 4 3.4 0.49 
25 Reconstruction 2.5 4 3.4 0.54 
26 Report writing (Structure & Quality) 2 4 3 0.77 
27 Data management 3 4 3.6 0.44 
 
Table 25: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.758 0.842 0.724 0.849 0.833 0.636 0.879 0.872 0.815 0.683
δι 1.50 1.85 1.36 1.88 1.81 1.00 2.00 1.97 1.74 1.19 
Ck (ρι) 0.292          
Ck (δι) 0.325          
χ2 26.30          
χ2 (tab) 21.67          
ti (test)  5.05 8.18 4.30 8.62 7.70 3.03 10.96 10.29 6.88 3.62 
ti (tab 95%) 2.31          
 
As shown, the non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen 
Rho (ρ) rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s criteria (t-
distribution). The worked out values of 2χ  and ti are greater than the values read out from the 
tables of 2χ  and t-distribution, which means that the hypothesis of non-randomness of expert 
concordance, as well as hypothesis of correlation among expert opinions are correct. As a 
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result of this Figure 39 was created, which points out the distribution of expert opinions related 
to question 5.  
Figure 39 illustrates that experts ranked all factors higher than 2.5, which is 50% of the 
rank span available. In other words this means that experts consider that all factors from 18 to 
27 have the potential of further significant improvement by applying contemporary technology. 
In this regard, experts ranked the managing of investigation (18), wreckage analysis (21) and 
data management (27) with very high ranks of 3.8, 3.8, and 3.6, respectively, followed by 
laboratory examination (24) and reconstruction (25) with ranks of 3.4 each. As expected, 
the factors finding and interviewing the witnesses (22) and notification and arriving at the 
scene of accident (19) were ranked the lowest, although considered high at 2.6 and 2.9, 
respectively. 
 
Figure 39: Expert group opinion concerning the potential for improvement of the stages of an aircraft 
accident investigation. 
 
Answers to questions 3, 4 and 5 provide useful information about the investigation 
phases presented individually in Figures 37-39 and Tables 20-25. As those answers are related 
to the same factors 18-27, they can also be plotted in a 3-D space with respect to importance 
(x-axis), complexity (y-axis) and improvement (z-axis).  Figure 40 and additionally Figure 41 
provide a much better outlook of the data from questions 3, 4 and 5.  
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Overall, Figure 40 indicates that all factors 18-27 are located in the space with high 
ranks of the x, y, and z axis. In order to provide a better location of those ranks, those results 
were additionally resolved into three planes (‘xy’, ‘xz’, and ‘yz’ elevation) shown in Figure 41.  
Figure 41 clearly illustrates the position of the expert group opinions of questions 3, 4, 
and 5, related to the factors 18-27. It can be seen that the most dominant position among all 
factors has the factor wreckage analysis (21), with the coordinates/ranks of (9.5, 8.3, and 3.8) 
followed by laboratory examination (24) and reconstruction (25), also with high ranks of 
(8.7, 8.1, 3.4) and (7.9, 8.9, 3.4), respectively.  
Moreover, Figure 41 shows that the factors managing the investigation (18), data 
management (27), and examination of the scene of the accident (20) also have high 
rankings, but are a little lower than the above mentioned factors 21, 24, 25. We can also see 
that the factors notification and arriving at the scene of the accident (19), finding and 
interviewing the witnesses (22), and report (26) were ranked the lowest among all factors 
with (8.6, 4.8, 2.9), (8.2, 6.5, 2.5), (8.2, 6.4, 3), respectively. 
The results of question 3, 4, 5, as a whole, point out that in order to obtain significant 
enhancement of the aircraft accident investigation process, interested parties must focus their 
efforts towards development of the three general factors of wreckage analysis (21), 
laboratory examination (24) and reconstruction (25). 
 
 
Figure 40: A ranking of the various parts of an aircraft accident investigation in 3-D space based on 
their importance, complexity and potential for improvement. 
(Expert group opinion with respect to questions 3, 4 and 5) 
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Question 6 
 
The next three questions 6, 7 and 8 are focused on the process of examination of wreckage and 
aircraft systems including examination of human and weather related factors within an aircraft 
accident investigation. Thus, with respect to the question ‘How complex is the examination of 
[the given item] as to the requirement of special skills and technique by the examination team?’ 
the experts provided the following group opinion. 
  
Table 26: Expert group opinion with respect to question 6. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
28 Operations, The Flight Path 7 9 7.9 0.83 
29 Cockpit 7 10 8.4 1.20 
30 Engine and accessories  7 10 8.3 1.10 
31 Mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic systems 7 10 8.4 1.11 
32 Landing gear systems and brake systems 4 8 6.3 1.49 
33 Deicing and anti-icing systems 4 9 6.7 1.85 
34 Fuel (quality and amount) 3 9 6.3 2.19 
35 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) 5 9 7 1.61 
36 Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) 7 9 7.9 0.83 
37 Cockpit Sound Recorder (CSR) 7 9 8.1 0.70 
38 Flight Data Recorder (FDR) 7 9 8.1 0.70 
39 Aircraft loading 3 9 6.4 2.20 
40 Hydroplaning  6 9 7.5 1.20 
41 In-flight explosion 8 10 9.2 0.75 
42 In-flight failure (Structural failure–fatigue) 8 10 9 0.89 
43 In-flight fire  6 10 8.2 1.54 
44 Lightning 5 9 7.6 1.50 
45 Mid-air collision 3 9 7.2 2.18 
46 Crime activities  6 9 7.7 1.10 
47 Weather conditions 7 9 7.8 0.75 
48 Downwash and wing tip vortex hazards 7 9 8 0.77 
49 Microburst, wind gust, wind shear 7 9 8 0.77 
50 Stability and control of an airplane 7 10 8.1 1.22 
51 Human error or omission 8 9 8.8 0.40 
52 Psychological factors (fatigue, illusion, etc) 8 10 8.9 0.70 
53 Design inadequacy 8 10 8.6 0.66 
 
Table 27: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.95 0.85 0.93 0.85 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.96 
δι 1.85 1.00 1.65 1.00 1.82 1.52 2.00 1.84 1.63 1.86 
Ck (ρι) 0.486          
Ck (δι) 0.535          
χ2 121.56          
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χ2 (tab) 44.31          
ti (test)  51.88 15.35 33.68 15.41 48.15 27.38 85.13 50.38 32.54 53.66
ti (tab 95%) 2.06          
 
The calculations derived according to equations 15 confirm the credibility of ranks 
provided by experts, which means that the value of 2χ  is greater than the table value of 2Tχ  
read out for 99% interval of confidence and n-1 degree of freedom. Similarly the values of ti 
were greater than the table value of t-distribution for n-2 degrees of freedom chosen for 95% 
interval of confidence. After reaching consensus among expert opinions, which was proven by 
statistical testing the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation 
coefficient, Figure 42 was created.  
 
Figure 42: Expert group opinion concerning the complexity of examination within an investigation. 
 
According to Figure 42, examination of all factors 28-53 is complex and requires 
specialised skills by the examination team. Experts allocated maximum ranks to the factors in-
flight explosion (41), in-flight failure (42), psychological human factors (52), human error 
and omission (51), and design inadequacy (53), with ranks of 9.2, 9, 8.9, 8.8, and 8.6, 
respectively. 
Other factors such as landing gear systems and brake systems (32), fuel (34), and 
aircraft loading (39) were considered as less complex among all factors from the list, with 
ranks of 6.3, 6.3, and 6.4, respectively. The ranks of other factors range between 6.3 and 9.2.  
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From Table 26 it can be seen that there are high values of dispersion σ for the factors 
landing gear and brake systems (32), de-icing and anti-icing systems (33), fuel (34), 
aircraft loading (39), in-flight fire (43), lightning (44), and mid-air collision (45). This 
indicates that there is a considerable difference in expert opinions for these factors which 
deserve further attention. Considering this situation, this candidate, along with the other 
members of the working group, deduced that experts did not alter their original answers 
significantly from the first and second round providing supportive arguments for these 
rankings. Yet, the positive tests of non-randomness of expert concordance and competency for 
all questions was a satisfactory argument for this candidate in these circumstances to accept 
those rankings as final. It should be clarified that the current extreme answers did not 
significantly affect the mean of answers presented in Table 26. 
 
Question 7 
 
Table 28 presents the expert group answers to the question ‘Is there potential for 
further improvement of examination of [the given item] within the aircraft accident 
investigation by applying new methods and contemporary technology?’ related to the factors 
from 28 to 53.  
 
Table 28: Expert group opinion with respect to question 7. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
28 Operations, The Flight Path 3 4 3.4 0.49 
29 Cockpit 2 4 3.25 0.68 
30 Engine and accessories  2 4 3.3 0.78 
31 Mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic systems 2.5 4 3.7 0.55 
32 Landing gear systems and brake systems 2 4 2.9 0.83 
33 Deicing and anti-icing systems 2 4 2.9 0.83 
34 Fuel (quality and amount) 1 3.5 2.2 0.95 
35 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) 2 4 3 0.63 
36 Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) 3 5 3.9 0.70 
37 Cockpit Sound Recorder (CSR) 2.5 5 3.8 0.81 
38 Flight Data Recorder (FDR) 3 5 3.8 0.75 
39 Aircraft loading 2.5 4.5 3.3 0.71 
40 Hydroplaning  2 4 3.1 0.83 
41 In-flight explosion 2.5 5 3.8 0.95 
42 In-flight failure (Structural failure–fatigue) 2.5 5 3.7 0.87 
43 In-flight fire  3 5 3.5 0.67 
44 Lightning 2 4 3 0.59 
45 Mid-air collision 2 4 3.2 0.75 
46 Crime activities  2.5 5 3.6 0.89 
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47 Weather conditions 2.5 4.5 3.6 0.62 
48 Downwash and wing tip vortex hazards 3 5 3.6 0.80 
49 Microburst, wind gust, wind shear 3 4 3.4 0.49 
50 Stability and control of an airplane 2 4.5 3.3 0.78 
51 Human error or omission 2.5 5 3.9 0.85 
52 Psychological factors (fatigue, illusion, etc) 3 5 4 0.77 
53 Design inadequacy 3 4.5 3.45 0.57 
 
 
 Table 29: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.85 0.93 0.90 0.91 0.95 0.88 0.96 0.95 0.90 0.91 
δι 1.00 1.72 1.46 1.59 1.94 1.30 2.00 1.94 1.46 1.56 
Ck (ρι) 0.286          
Ck (δι) 0.322          
χ2 71.60          
χ2 (tab) 44.31          
ti (test)  14.56 32.13 22.61 26.45 48.76 18.97 56.40 48.91 22.50 25.54
ti (tab 95%) 2.06          
 
As stated earlier, the non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the 
Spearmen Rho (ρ) rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s 
criteria (t-distribution). The worked out values of 2χ  and ti are greater than the corresponding 
read out ones of 2Tχ  and tT leading to acceptance of a hypothesis of non-randomness of expert 
concordance, and the hypothesis that there is correlation among expert opinion (ρi). 
Accordingly Figure 43 was created. 
Figure 43 presents the expert opinions on the potential for further improvement in the 
examination of the factors 28-53. Overall, experts ranked all factors (except the factor fuel 
examination) greater than 2.5, which is 50% of the rank span available. In contrast to Table 26 
(refer to question 6), here all factors were ranked very stable by the experts thus creating small 
values of dispersion σ.  
The maximum ranks of 4, 3.9, 3.9, 3.8, 3.8, 3.8, and 3.7 were allocated to the 
examination of the following factors: psychological factors (52), human error or omission 
(51), cockpit voice recorder (36), flight data recorder (38), in–flight explosion (41), 
cockpit sound recorder (37), in-flight failure (42), respectively. 
In contrast, experts ranked the factors fuel (34), landing gear and brake systems (32), 
de-icing and anti-icing systems (33), foreign object damage (35), and lightning (44) with 
significantly lower ranks of 2.2, 2.9, 2.9, 3, and 3, respectively. 
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Figure 43: Expert group opinion concerning the potential for improvement of examination within an 
investigation. 
 
In addition, Figure 44 combines the answers from questions 6 and 7 referring to factors 
28-53. Figure 44 illustrates the mutual correlation of complexity (‘complexity’) and potential 
for improvement of examination (‘improvement’) of factors 28-53, plotted in ‘xy’ area, where 
‘x’ axis is ‘complexity’ and ‘y’ axis is ‘improvement’. 
 
Figure 44: Complexity and potential for improvement of examination of the given factors within an 
aircraft accident investigation. 
(Expert group opinion with respect to questions 6 and 7) 
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According to the location of factors in Figure 44, two different groups of factors with 
different features have been created. The first group is located in the upper right corner of the 
chart and those factors have both high ranks of ‘complexity’ and ‘improvement’, whereas the 
second group is composed of factors with significantly smaller values of ‘complexity’ and 
slightly lower ranks of ‘improvement’. Hence, in the first group are located most of factors 28-
53 and among them the most distinguished are the following ones: in-flight explosion (41), in-
flight failure 42, psychological factors (52), and human error or omission (51) with 
coordinates/ranks of (9.2, 3.8), (9, 3.7), (8.9, 4), (8.8, 3.9), respectively. 
The second group is composed of the factors: fuel (34), landing gear systems and 
brake systems (32), de-icing and anti-icing systems (33), foreign object damage (35), mid-
air collision (45), aircraft loading (39), ranked as follows: (6.3, 2.2), (6.3, 2.9), (6.7, 2.9), 
(7.2, 3), (6.4, 3.3), respectively.  
The presented distribution from Figure 44 may indicate the prospective direction of 
improvement in the process of aircraft accident investigation. This analysis refers to factors 
with the highest ranks such as in-flight explosion (41), in-flight failure (42), psychological 
factors (52), and human error or omission (51). 
 
Question 8 
 
The next question ‘What are the odds of proving within the process of an aircraft accident 
investigation that [the given item] is one of the major causes for an accident?’, which may 
appear similar to question 6 (How complex is the examination of [the given item]…), 
considered the factors 54-74 from another, different aspect. The aim of this question was to 
provide more information about the examination of wreckage and aircraft systems, as well as 
examination of human and environmental factors. The group expert opinion is presented in 
Table 30 below.  
 
Table 30: Expert group opinion with respect to question 8. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
54 Engine malfunction 7 10 8.1 1.14 
55 Brake systems malfunction 8 9 8.5 0.50 
56 Landing gear systems malfunction 8 10 8.9 0.83 
57 Icing 4 8 5.9 1.45 
58 Foreign Object Damage (FOD) 6 8 7.3 0.78 
59 Inappropriate fuel 6 10 7.6 1.43 
60 Inappropriate aircraft loading  5 8 6.6 1.20 
61 Hydroplaning  6 8 6.9 0.70 
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62 Downwash and wing tip vortex 3 7 5.3 1.42 
63 Severe weather conditions 6 9 7.4 1.02 
64 Microburst, wind gust, wind shear 6 8 7.1 0.83 
65 Lightning 6 9 7.2 1.17 
66 In-flight explosion 7 9 7.8 0.75 
67 In-flight failure (Structural failure)  7 10 8.3 1.10 
68 In-flight fire  7 10 8.1 1.14 
69 Crime activities 5 7 6.1 0.54 
70 Human error or omission  6 8 6.6 0.80 
71 Psychological factors 4 7 5.4 0.80 
72 Stability problems and lost the control of the airplane 5 8 6.6 1.02 
73 Design inadequacy 6 8 6.8 0.87 
74 Mid air collision 9 10 9.2 0.40 
 
Table 31: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.94 0.93 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.96 
δι 1.45 1.19 1.00 1.27 1.87 1.34 1.84 2.00 1.32 1.89 
Ck (ρι) 0.581          
Ck (δι) 0.584          
χ2 116.26          
χ2 (tab) 37.57          
ti (test)  37.55 30.91 27.39 32.75 56.53 34.50 55.13 67.36 34.03 57.86
ti (tab 95%) 2.09          
 
The non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) 
rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s criteria (t-distribution). 
The worked out values of 2χ  and ti are greater than the corresponding values read out from 
the tables of 2χ  distribution and t-distribution, which means that the hypothesis of non-
randomness of expert concordance is correct, as well as hypothesis of correlation among expert 
opinions. These results show that the results from Table 30 are scientifically accepted and 
conclusions can be drawn. 
Figure 45 illustrates very tangible data revealing the items which are likely to be 
identified (determined) during an investigation as major causes of an accident, or otherwise, 
items that are very difficult to determine although they have a significant contribution to an 
accident occurrence. 
Thus, experts ranked the factors mid-air collision (74), landing gear systems 
malfunction (56), brake system malfunction (55), with very high ranks of 9.2, 8.9, and 8.5, 
respectively, which show that these events are most likely to be recognised during an 
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investigation and examined properly. After that follows a group of factors such as in flight 
failure (67), engine malfunction (54), in flight fire (68), still highly ranked with 8.3, 8.1, and 
8.1, respectively.  
In the lowest ranked group are the factors: downwash and wing tip vortex (62), 
psychological factors (71), and crime activities (69), with ranks of 5.3, 5.4, and 6.1, 
respectively. According to those results, examination of these factors is complex and to prove 
that those factors are a major cause for accident is a considerably difficult task. 
 
Figure 45: Expert group opinion concerning the likelihood of verifying the causes of accident. 
 
The ranks provided for questions 6, 7 and 8 can be combined and presented in a 3-D 
distribution format. Hence, in Figure 46 distribution of factors from 54 to 74 are shown (except 
55) in the 3-D coordinate system of ‘improvement’, ‘complexity’, and ‘proving’ as ‘x’, ’y’, ’z’ 
axes.  Figure 46 points out that all factors are located in the space with high values of x, y, and 
z coordinates/ranks. In order to provide a better outlook of factors, these results were plotted in 
three planes (‘xy’, ‘xz’, and ‘yz’ planes, respectively) shown in Figure 47. 
Figure 47 clearly illustrates the position of expert group opinions related to factors 54-
74. According to the location of these factors, several different groups of factors (with similar 
ranks) can be created as follows: 
 
- Complex factors that have potential for further improvement but are very difficult to be 
determined through analysis. In this group are the factors downwash and wing tip 
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vortex (62), psychological factors (71), crime activities (69) and human error or 
omission (70) ranked with (3.6, 8, 5.3), (4, 8.9, 5.4), (3.6, 7.7, 6.1), and (3.9, 8.8, 6.6) , 
respectively.  
 
- Complex factors with high ranks of improvement and proving. In this group are factors 
such as in-flight failure (67), in-flight explosion (66), in-flight fire (68), engine 
malfunction (54), with ranks (3.7, 9, 8.3), (3.8, 9.2, 7.8), (3.5, 8.2, 8.1) and (3.3, 8.3, 
8.1), respectively.  
 
- Factors with moderately high ranks of improvement, complexity and proving. In this 
group there are a number of factors such as foreign object damage (58), 
inappropriate aircraft loading (60), hydroplaning (61) and others with ranks of (3, 7, 
7.3), (3.3, 6.4, 6.6), (3.1, 7.5, 6.9), respectively.  
 
 
Figure 46: 3-D presentation of expert group opinion concerning the examination of aircraft, human and 
environmental causal factors. 
(Expert group opinion with respect to questions 6, 7 and 8) 
 
The above analysis shows that experts with their answers again indicate a general 
potential for significant improvement in aircraft accident investigation. Accordingly, a 
prospective improvement in investigation can be expected particularly in the examination of 
human factors followed by examination of aircraft systems. 
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Question 9 
 
The last group of factors presents a collection of statements for which experts expressed their 
agreement or disagreement. Thus, to the question ‘Do you agree with the statements below?’ 
experts provided the following group opinion: 
 
Table 32: Expert group opinion with respect to question 9. 
 
  Min Max Mean σ 
75 
The process of investigation meets the 
procedures regarding the quality assurance 
(QA) and quality control (QC) 
5 8 7.2 0.98 
76 It is justifiable waiting for a couple of months before releasing the accident investigation report 6 9 7.6 0.92 
77 Reports of investigation carried out are always accurate and well done 5 8 6.5 1.20 
78 Investigators have appropriate and sufficient skills to handle aircraft accident investigation 5 8 6.7 1.10 
79 
The excellent knowledge of theory compared to 
an average one significantly improves the 
investigation outcomes 
7 9 8.1 0.83 
80 
The contamination of the scene of the accident is 
a serious problem within the process of aircraft 
accident investigations 
5 9 7 1.41 
81 
The presence of landmarks on the scene of the 
accident provides sufficient information for 
carrying out accurate mathematical calculations 
5 7 5.9 0.70 
82 It is likely at times inconsistent material is sent for lab analysis 5 7 5.7 0.78 
83 Investigators should believe witnesses of aircraft accident 3 6 4.8 1.25 
84 The cockpit recorders (FDR, CVR, CDR) record sufficient parameters 2 8 5.5 2.11 
85 We never have a real accident with enough readable data 2 5 4.1 1.22 
86 The severe aircraft manoeuvres can be revealed during the investigation 4 9 6.9 1.70 
87 
The aircraft is equipped with appropriate 
accessories, which provides ice protection during 
the whole flight 
4 8 6 1.34 
88 The stall is a serious hazard for the aircraft 4 8 6 1.34 
89 The downwash and wing tip vortex is a serious hazard for the aircraft 6 9 7.2 0.87 
90 
Investigators have enough resources available to 
find out the weather conditions during the 
accident 
5 9 8 1.18 
91 
Human factors have been involved somehow in 
every single aircraft accident that has ever 
occurred 
4 8 7.2 1.25 
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92 
It is possible to answer the question if the pilot 
should have been able to cope with the critical 
situation 
5 8 6.3 1.10 
93 There are always problems with airfield papers analysis (documentation) 4 7 5.4 1.11 
94 The handbook is well composed material 5 8 6.2 1.08 
95 There is a great possibility for increasing the survivability of an aircraft accident 4 8 6.4 1.50 
96 Determining the cause of the accidents is a very tough task if there is not data recorded 3 8 6.2 1.89 
97 
The process of investigation as a whole can be 
improved significantly, by applying new 
methods and advanced technology 
5 9 7 1.34 
98 
The experience of the land traffic accident 
investigation can contribute to considerable 
increase in air traffic safety 
5 8 6.2 1.25 
 
Table 33: Testing the non-randomness of Ck and the Spearmen rank coefficient. 
 
ρι 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.94 0.96 0.94 0.97 0.95 0.93 0.95 
δι 1.76 1.67 1.72 1.42 1.87 1.40 2.00 1.48 1.00 1.63 
Ck (ρι) 0.427          
Ck (δι) 0.416          
χ2 98.29          
χ2 (tab) 41.64          
ti (test)  56.87 51.53 54.40 41.01 64.55 40.23 77.19 43.04 30.44 49.25
ti (tab 95%) 2.07          
 
The non-randomness of the coefficient of concordance Ck and the Spearmen Rho (ρ) 
rank correlation coefficient were tested by applying 2χ  and student’s criteria (t-distribution). 
The worked out values of 2χ  and ti are greater than the corresponding values read out from 
the tables of 2χ  distribution and t-distribution, which means that the hypothesis of non-
randomness of expert concordance is correct, as well as hypothesis of correlation among expert 
opinions. As a result of this Figure 48 was created, which shows the distribution of expert 
opinion related to question 9.  
The statements included in the questionnaire were carefully selected as an important 
part of this survey. However, the first impression is, experts did not allocate extremely high 
ranks to any of those statements so that most factors were moderately ranked between 6 and 7. 
Another remark is that dispersion of expert opinions on several questions reached 
exceedingly high values. Experts firmly kept their opinions after the second round of the 
survey so that the high values of dispersion could not have been reduced through the feedback. 
The results remain scientifically acceptable, since the statistical tests of expert competency and 
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concordance justify the non-randomness of expert opinions. According to the results, several 
groups of factors were created, which include: 
 
Figure 48: Expert group opinion concerning the statements 75-98. 
 
a) Highest ranks were allocated to the factors 79 and 90 with 8.1 and 8, respectively. 
Namely, experts said that excellent knowledge of theory can significantly improve the 
investigation outcomes (79) as well as determining that the weather condition during 
an accident is not a very tough task (90). 
 
b) Experts granted several factors with ranks between 7 and 8. These factors are (76), (91), 
(75), (89), (97) which state that: 
 
? Waiting for a couple of months before releasing the accident investigation report 
is justifiable (rank 7.6). 
? Human factors are involved somehow in every single aircraft accident (rank 7.2). 
? The process of investigation meets the high standards of quality assurance and 
quality control procedures (7.2). 
? The downwash and wing tip vortex are serious hazards for the aircraft (7.2). 
? The process of investigation as a whole can be improved significantly by 
applying new methods and advanced technology (7). 
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c) The lowest ranks were allocated to factors 83, 85, 84, 93, 82 that state: 
 
? Investigators should believe witnesses of aircraft accidents (rank 4.8). 
? We never have a real accident with enough readable data (4.1). 
? The cockpit recorders record sufficient parameters (5.5). 
? There are always problems with airfield papers analysis (5.4). 
? It is likely at times that inconsistent material is sent for lab analysis (5.7). 
 
In addition, experts ranked with 6.7 the statement that investigators have sufficient 
skills to conduct investigations (factor 78). Furthermore, they ranked factor 92 with 6.3, which 
states that during the examination it is possible to answer the question if the pilot was able to 
cope with a critical situation. Moreover, experts ranked the factor 96 with a rank of 6.2, which 
states that determining the cause of the accident is a very hard task if there is no sufficient data 
recorded. And lastly, one can address the rank of 6.2 of the factor 98, which states that the 
experience of the land traffic accident investigation can contribute to a considerable increase in 
air traffic safety. 
The last section of the Delphi questionnaire provided a space where respondents 
discussed another three issues that, along with other questions, reflect the entire procedure of 
aircraft accident investigation, as follows:  
 
 Potential hazards for investigators within the process of investigation, 
 The new definition and approach to aircraft accidents and investigations which has been 
widely accepted and which introduces more causes of an accident or assumes existing 
major and contributing factors, and, 
 Prospective actions that could significantly improve the process of investigation. 
 
Discussing the accident site safety precautions, investigators emphasise the risks of 
adverse terrain, adverse climatic conditions, biohazards, and airborne hazards. In particular, 
respondents state that the personnel involved in the recovery and examination of wreckage may 
be exposed to physical hazards including hazardous cargo, flammable or toxic materials, sharp or 
heavy objects, pressurised equipment and disease. Experts also addressed the risk of blood-borne 
pathogens including viruses, bacteria and parasites that are present in the blood, tissue of infected 
persons at an accident site, and, in particular, the hepatitis B and C virus and the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) that causes AIDS. Respondents assessed those risks in a 
considerable aircraft accident with ranks from 5 to 7 out of 10.  
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In terms of the new definition of an accident which introduces more causes of an 
accident, stated below is one of the respondents’ comments that incorporates the expert group 
opinion with respect to this question.  
 
‘The acceptance that multiple factors are involved in causing accidents has been 
a positive move in reducing the accident rate. Prior to the ‘multi-causal factor’ 
approach, it was common to focus on one particular factor and declare it as ‘the 
cause’.  This is a short-sighted approach as it ignores significant antecedent 
factors that led up to ‘the cause’. 
 In practice, we conclude that the accident occurred because of factor X, 
but that factors A, B, C, and D, allowed factor X to exist and hence we suggest 
remedial actions to deal with all factors, in the hope that adoption of the remedial 
actions will lead to a more robust system.’ 
 
Last, but not least, the respondents provided a list of actions that may significantly 
enhance the outcome of an aircraft accident investigation. The following items were addressed: 
advanced application of simulators, more cameras installed in aircraft, using massive accident 
files, using more external experts and so on. However, experts said that the most significant 
improvement in investigation will be achieved by:  
 
1. Creating and using the advance databases of an aircraft’s components, structure, and 
systems, so that pieces can be readily identified. 
 
2. Creating and using the advance databases for storing and analysing the data of aircraft 
accidents.  
 
3. Video camera recording of various functions and aircraft zones and data transmitted to 
the ground stations and continually recorded.  
 
Overall, by applying these actions (measures), experts ranked the prospective 
improvement in an aircraft accident investigation between 5 and 7 out of 10. 
 
To conclude, it is clear that the Delphi exercise has provided very valuable information 
with respect to the aircraft accident investigation. Expert opinions have considered the process of 
investigation from many different aspects defining its current state and areas where significant 
improvements could be made.  
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To summarise, the above conclusions have also emphasised that increasing the amount of 
expert knowledge and experience available within an investigation will significantly enhance the 
aircraft accident investigation. Consequently, in order to obtain a better investigation outcome, 
the Delphi conclusions finally address the need for creating a tool which:   
 
 Will include and contain specific knowledge and the analytical skills of a large number of 
experts, and  
 
 Communicate the impact of a huge number of causal factors on air traffic safety. 
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 Chapter 
 7 
 
The high level of safety achieved in scheduled airline operations lately should not 
obscure the fact that most of the accidents that occurred could have been 
prevented. This suggests that in many instances, the safety measures already in 
place may have been inadequate, circumvented or ignored. 
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, Accident Prevention Manual.  
 
Demonstration of Expert Systems to Aircraft Accident 
Investigation 
 
The Delphi enquiry results, along with a literature review and the results obtained by analysing 
global aircraft accident statistics, have addressed the importance of several points about air 
accident outcomes:  
 
- Every accident occurs as a result of a chain of errors, omissions, and/or malfunctions. 
- Although all aircraft accidents are different, there are certain common elements in 
accident causes, and there are a number of causes which frequently result in accidents. 
- Investigations by a lone investigator are difficult as some aspects of the 
accident/incident are beyond the knowledge or experience of one person. That is to say, 
investigation outcomes could be significantly improved by increasing the amount of 
expert knowledge available within an investigation. 
- Accident investigation could be facilitated if its distinguishing features could be quickly 
identified from large amounts of data in order to help predict possible causes of the 
accident. 
- Improving aircraft accident investigation could be achieved by creating and using 
advanced databases for storing and analysing the data of aircraft accidents. 
 
These points lead to the conclusion that applying tools using the specific knowledge 
and skills of a large number of aviation experts could potentially improve the aircraft accident 
investigation process and help communicate the impact of a huge number of causal factors on 
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air traffic safety. This in turn addresses the need for creating such a tool in the form of a 
computer program which can use stored expert knowledge coupled with an inference engine to 
process this knowledge and provide safety event analysis to users of the program.24 
To summarise, the current conclusions suggest that the application of an advanced Expert 
System could significantly enhance investigation outcomes. 
7.1 An Outline of Expert Systems 
The most common form of an expert system is an interactive computer program that examines 
data stored and provides a problem solution following a set of predefined rules. Thus, an expert 
system involves two principal components: a problem dependent set of data stored known as 
knowledge data and a problem independent program known as the inference engine. Interaction 
between the user and the inference engine is performed via the user interface which asks 
questions and supplies the user’s replies to the engine. Overall, an expert system uses knowledge 
in a form similar to human experts [147, 185]. 
In accordance with the theory of expert systems, there are two main problem-solving 
techniques when using inference rules: backwards and forward chaining. Forward chaining uses 
the data available and through an inference engine extracts more data until an optimal goal is 
reached. In contrast, backwards chaining starts with a list of goals or a hypothesis and works 
backwards to determine if there is data available to support the original statement.  
Within an expert system, the specific knowledge that it contains forms the basis of the 
problem solving procedure, and the specific technique is the only tool to accomplish this. Thus 
the possession of expert knowledge is vital for the successful application of expert systems.  
Expert systems are very successful in organisations that have an established level of 
experience and expertise available that cannot be easily transferred to other personnel. These 
systems are able to convey the intelligence and information derived from the experts to other 
personnel for problem-solving purposes. Within the application of expert systems, the amount of 
stored data is used to simulate the human reasoning process that experts pursue in analysing a 
problem and drawing conclusions.  
Users of the program usually see an expert system through an interactive dialog. The 
dialog is composed of a set of questions whereby through complex feedbacks, conclusions are 
drawn. Dialogs are created from the current information and the content of the knowledge base. 
The expert system enquiry does not stop if users are unable to answer a particular question. 
                                                 
24 This entirely refers to the definition of Expert Systems 
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In general, the knowledge basis of an expert system contains a large number of ‘if then’ 
type of clauses that gives the expert systems the ability to use them together to draw conclusions. 
The knowledge that is stored in the expert systems appears in the rulebase which is composed of 
four different types of objects [121, 185]: 
 
- Classes – these are questions asked of the user, 
- Parameters – A place: holder for a character string that is inserted into a class question, 
- Procedures, 
- Rule nodes – the procedure of expert systems is based on a tree structure that aims to 
simulate the rules or logic within human reasoning. The nodes of these trees are called 
rule nodes. 
 
The rulebase comprises many such trees. The top node of the tree is the goal node which 
contains the conclusion. The leaves of the tree are also referred to as rule nodes, which may be an 
evidence node, an external node, or a reference node. An evidence node asks a specific question 
of the user of the program who is instructed to answer ‘yes’, or ‘no’, as well as ‘maybe’ for 
certain questions.  
Among the many different approaches available to classifying a huge amount of data is 
the widely used method of classification by decision tree induction. It constructs a tree in which 
internal nodes are split as a result of yes/no decisions (Figure 49).  
 
 
 
Figure 49: Classification by decision tree induction. 
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Expert systems can be found within many areas, including accounting, medicine, process 
control, and financial services as they provide consistent answers for repetitive decisions, 
processes and tasks. However, the main disadvantage of expert systems is that they are not able 
to adapt as readily as human experts in unusual circumstances.  
An example of an expert system is the Artificial Intelligence game ‘Q20’, by Radica 
Games. The Q20 plays a guessing game where the user thinks of an item and answers 20 
questions about the item, after which Q20 attempts to guess what the item was. 
Below is a sample Q20 set of questions and answers provided by the user for the 
unknown item ‘Aeroplane’. The device allows the user of the game to choose one of the 
following answers to questions asked: ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘Sometimes’, and ‘Unknown’.  
 
Table 34: A list of 20 questions and answers provided by the user of the Q20 game  
with respect to the item ‘Aeroplane’. 
 
Questions Answers 
Q1. Animal? Vegetable? Mineral? Other? Other - Yes 
Q2. Does it have buttons? Yes 
Q3. Is it smaller than a loaf of bread? No 
Q4. Would you give it as a gift? No 
Q5. Do most people use this daily? No 
Q6. Do you find it in the sky? Yes 
Q7. Does it bring joy to people? Sometimes 
Q8. Does it use electricity? Yes 
Q9. Can you use it with your friends? No 
Q10. Can it protect you from the rain? Yes 
Q11. Can you buy it? Yes 
Q12. Is it multicoloured? Yes 
Q13. Does it provide protection? Yes 
Q14. Can it be used for recreation? Sometimes 
Q15. Does it break if dropped? Yes 
Q16. Is it colourful? Yes 
Q17. Is it dangerous? No 
Q18. Does it usually have four corners? No 
Q19. Does it make sound? Yes 
Q20. Is it made of metal? Yes 
 
After the twentieth question the Q20 device offers the answer ‘A Jet’ that fits the 
unknown item ‘Aeroplane’ (Figure 50).  
The interactive dialog and problem solving approach of the Q20 game was considered to 
be generally appropriate to the prospective application of expert systems to aircraft accident 
investigation, particularly in determining the probable causes of accidents. Thus, the user of the 
program will be asked a number of questions related to the condition of wreckage, accident site 
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and other circumstances relevant to an accident/incident event. According to the answers entered 
by the user, the program will narrow down the choices to the most probable major cause of this 
particular event.  
 
 
Figure 50: The answer ‘A Jet’ provided by the Q20 after the 20th question. 
 
As a result of this, the next stage of this research was to demonstrate the application of an 
expert system to aircraft accident investigation, which meant creating a computer program that 
would be able to facilitate the process of determining the causes of aircraft accidents. 
 
7.2 Expert Systems to Aircraft Accident Investigation – GP1020 
Using the positive practices of expert systems applications in many fields of science, the 
computer program GP1020, designed for assisting aircraft accident investigation, was created. 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Front page of the application GP1020. 
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The user of this program is asked several questions related to an accident/incident event 
(in simulated or real circumstances), based on which the program determines the most probable 
causes of this particular event. Depending on the user input, the number of questions before 
finishing the procedure can vary significantly.  
GP1020 includes two major features: 
 
- A forensic approach to the procedure of an aircraft accident investigation, such that the 
flow of information, procedures, and the rise of knowledge about the occurrence during a 
real investigation is followed by GP1020, and  
 
- Being a simple and efficient IT solution in determining the probable causes of an aircraft 
accident occurrence mainly based on stored expert knowledge. 
 
7.2.1 Forensic Approach to an Aircraft Accident/Incident Occurrence within GP1020 
The procedure of a GP1020 accident enquiry follows the steps of a real investigation of an 
accident/incident occurrence. That is to say, GP1020 intends, via answering its questions, 
virtually to convey the user of the program to an investigation scenario. 
GP1020 asks a broad range of questions relating to the factual information and analysis 
undertaken of a safety event. The user’s answers to the factual-information questions are 
expected to derive the data below that is usually covered in an accident report: 
 
- History of flight - Aerodrome information 
- Injuries to persons - Flight recorders 
- Damage to aircraft and other damages - Wreckage and impact information 
- Personal information - Medical and pathological information 
- Aircraft information - Fire 
- Meteorological information - Survival aspects 
- Aids to navigation - Organisational and management information 
- Communications - Human factors and crew resource 
management training, and so on. 
 
At the initial stages of data collection the GP1020 program intends to learn general 
information about an accident/incident event. This in turn expresses the stage of notification of 
the ‘Go Time’ of a safety occurrence and the phase of preparing for dispatching to an accident 
site. These questions are common for every accident investigation regardless of the event type 
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and its consequences and thus form the basis of the accident/incident determination process. In 
this list are questions relating to the following aspects of an accident/incident event: 
 
- Event type (accident, incident, occurrence) 
- Aircraft type and category (airplane, rotorcraft, glider, etc) 
- Aircraft (make, model) 
- Type of flying (scheduled air carrier, ferry, flight test, air taxi, etc) 
- Event local time 
- Event highest injury 
- Mid air (yes, no) 
- Aircraft missing (yes, no) 
- Witnesses (yes, no) 
- Condition of accident site and so on.  
 
In a real occurrence the investigators would be advised about other circumstances of the 
event that are important in a given stage of the investigation. Consequently, GP1020 will ask the 
user if the accident/incident occurred at an airport, at departure or destination city and other 
similar questions. 
The next set of questions moves the user (investigator) to the accident site. Thus, GP1020 
initially asks for the phase as well as specific phase of flight in which the accident/incident 
occurred. In addition, there are questions which intend to ascertain any problems experienced by 
aircraft reported to Air Traffic Control by crew or witnesses of the accident (lift, thrust, flight 
control problems and so on).  
After that the GP1020 program may ask whether the aircraft was flown in visual or 
instrument meteorological conditions and if the plane was fitted with an FDR or other recording 
devices. Questions about the aircraft load data and centre of gravity might also be asked.  
In a real incident/accident investigation, determining the weather conditions is generally 
an important issue. Similarly within GP1020 there are a number of questions relating to weather 
conditions such as visibility, sky condition, and the intensity of precipitation experienced during 
the accident.  
After collecting the general information of a safety event, investigators usually relocate to 
the accident site for the purpose of examining the wreckage and defining the landmarks of the 
scene of accident. Similarly, within GP1020 there is a set of questions relating to the following 
data: 
- Aircraft damage (none, minor, substantial, destroyed) 
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- Wreckage distribution 
- Witness location 
- Probable flight path 
- Approximate altitude on impact in relation to horizon 
- Stopping distance after principle impact 
- On ground collision (no, yes) 
- Collision with other obstacles on the ground 
- Obstacles struck before principle impact (wire, tree, building, fence, and so on) 
- Occurrence of fire or explosion occurred (nil, in flight, on ground)25. 
 
GP1020 includes a number of questions that aim to examine injuries to passengers and 
crew just as investigators do. This includes defining and determining the cause of injuries. Thus 
GP1020 will ask for information about the injury category, injury level, injured person count, 
crew injury level and so on. With fatalities the cause of death and toxicology test results are also 
examined. 
 
7.2.1.1 GP1020 Enquiry of Human, Aircraft, and Weather Induced Causal Factors 
After collecting all the general information needed about the critical flight and accident site, 
GP1020 focuses on determining the causes of the accident/incident event. Thus, using a number 
of questions, GP1020 examines the human, aircraft, and weather induced causal factors.  
With respect to human factors there are a set of questions exploring the following major 
aspects: 
 
- Flight crew data  - Air traffic management system 
- Maintenance performed 
- Environmental aspects 
- Actions undertaken by flight crew 
during the accident. 
 
Regarding the flight crew, the program may ask for data related to crew categories and 
experience including any special experience, the validity of the crew members’ medical 
certificate, and if they were wearing corrective spectacles. In addition, maintenance issues are 
covered by questions that look at potentially harmful maintenance or inadequate maintenance 
procedures and plans. The environmental aspect is examined by questions that check if 
inaccurate forecasts of hazardous environmental conditions, failures to report hazardous 
                                                 
25 In this part of the GP1020 software there are a number of questions that originate from the ‘Accident 
Investigation Sheet’ [82], used by CASA (Civil Aviation Safety Authority Australia). 
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conditions, or inappropriate responses to actual hazardous conditions were carried out. In terms 
of the air traffic management system, GP1020 investigates the procedures and navigation aids 
through the questions related to clearance delivery, ground control guidance, tower operations, 
approach, and departure control.  
Just like real investigators, GP1020 considers the actions undertaken by the flight crew 
such as the in-flight shutdown of one or more engines, delayed departure, rejected takeoff, 
dumping fuel, air turn back, ditching, go around, forced landing, and taking evasive action.  
Overall, GP1020, by asking a number of questions learns if the crew undertook 
voluntary acts that were poorly performed, failed to act when particular actions were 
appropriate, or failed to take immediate action, follow air traffic control instructions, use 
checklists, maintain direction control, monitor weather, and/or monitor instrumentation. There 
are also questions that assess potentially inadequate preparation or supervision, poor 
judgement, improper use of equipment, alcohol or other drug use, improper maintenance, 
improper aircraft modifications, and inadequate procedures. 
Analysing the aircraft and its systems is the next task of GP1020. A number of questions 
are included within the program, all of which are designed to examine the aircraft systems 
condition and assess the involvement of those factors as possible cause(s) for an 
accident/incident. Among them the most frequently asked are questions relating to:  
 
- Wreckage and its systems condition, 
- Possible breaking of aircraft limits such as airspeed, power, oil pressure, oil temperature, 
cylinder, fuel flow and so on, 
- Weight and centre of gravity limits, 
- Readings of instruments within the emergency procedures carried out (engine failure, 
smoke and fire, fuel system failure, electrical system generator failure and other).  
 
Like a real investigation, the initial questions from this set correspond to wreckage, 
systems, wings, and engine condition; namely, the program learns the condition of the 
fuselage, airframe cockpit components as well as flight control, electrical, hydraulic, landing 
gear, and other systems. Wings, as a very important part of the investigation, are examined by 
analysing their controls, condition, and position of wings, flaps ailerons, horizontal stabiliser, 
elevators, vertical fin, and rudder.  
Engine condition is expressed through questions including those about the propellers, 
power plants, accessories, controls systems, lubrication systems, fuel systems, transmissions, 
engine controls, and fuel. Special attention is given to the readings of engine components such 
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as the throttle, power, and thrust levers, propeller, ignition and ignite-switches, tachometer 
(engines), cylinder head temperature, oil pressure, and oil temperature.  
Aircraft accident statistics indicate that a number of accidents have occurred due to 
failure or misuse of the de-icer equipment. Hence, GP1020 contains a set of questions that look 
at the condition of this equipment as a possible cause of the accident including propeller de-
icers, wing de-icers, windshield de-icers, windshield wipers, fuel tank and other de-icers.  
Another set of GP1020 questions looks at the condition and readings of flight 
instruments including the altimeter, airspeed indicator, attitude indicator, directional gyro, rate 
of climb, autopilot, and stall warning indicator. Here there are also questions about the battery 
master switch, landing light, navigation light, instrument light, radio master switch, anti 
collision light, and the instrument reading (altimeter, airspeed). As investigators do, GP1020 
will ask for information about aircraft history such as the number of flight hours and landings, 
as well as occurrence reports, and official recommendations.  
The aircraft question set also examines the likelihood of events occurring such as 
depressurisation, fuselage shell opening, uncommanded actuation or aircraft systems or controls, 
oxygen system problems, hazardous cargo, air conditioning and pressurization problems, 
pneumatic system malfunctions, hydraulic system malfunctions, electrical system malfunctions, 
fuel system problems, exceeding ‘g’ limits, and the separation of parts in flight.  
In terms of facility problems, GP1020 also has a set of questions that investigate other 
issues such as possible airfield obstacles, inadequate braking because of runway contamination, 
poor lighting, and malfunctions of air traffic control equipment.  
After collecting the data relating to the aircraft involved in the accident, GP1020 may ask 
several more questions designed to consider in detail the weather conditions during the accident. 
The program will ask for the source of the weather information (pilot, witness, weather 
observation facility) and weather briefing completeness. Next, it learns whether the aircraft 
experienced events like air turbulence, bird strike, volcanic ash, and dust.  
Within GP1020 there are also questions that ask for the event temperature, dew point, as 
well as sky condition (lowest ceiling, cloud condition, non-ceiling height). Several questions are 
directly focused on wind attributes such as direction, speed, velocity, and gust indicators. 
If the user of GP1020 answers that the aircraft involved in an accident was fitted with 
data recorders, then the program would generally ask a broad range of questions that are essential 
in every investigation. The first group of those questions are related to the master warning, 
air/ground sensor & ground proximity warning system, traffic alert and collision avoidance 
system, and engine warnings (vibration, over temperature, oil pressure low, over speed, yaw and 
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roll trim surface position). The next group asks about the automatic flight control system modes 
and engagement status including auto-throttle, glide-slope deviation, icing, windshear, loss of 
cabin pressure, computer failure, selected barometric setting, selected altitude, speed, vertical 
speed, heading, flight path, temperature, wind speed and direction, normal/longitudinal/lateral 
acceleration, and thrust reverser position on each. In addition the program asks about details 
including the cockpit trim control input position (pitch, roll, and yaw), pitch/lateral control input, 
pitch trim surface position, trailing edge flap or cockpit flap control selection, leading edge flap 
or cockpit flap control selection, angle of attack, landing gear position or landing gear cockpit 
control selection, ground spoiler position and speed brake selection. 
Determining the causes of an aircraft accident is a complex process including a number 
of areas, all of which have been represented through the variety of GP1020 questions.  
Symptoms can significantly facilitate the investigation process; therefore, GP1020 also considers 
them by a set of questions, including questions related to visual symptoms such as instrument 
indication, warning or advisory lights, observations of smoke, fire, or other abnormal condition, 
followed by aural, tactile and olfactory symptoms. Aural symptoms are covered by questions of 
possible activation of horns, bells and verbal warnings (central warning system), whereas tactile 
ones refer to control forces, head, cold, pressure change, electrical shock, and vibration [146].  
It must be noted that mainly because of a lack of expert knowledge stored within the 
program the GP1020 prototype is currently unable to ask a number of the questions mentioned 
above. This limitation is discussed in Chapter 8.  
 
7.2.1.2 Classification of the Causes of Aircraft Accidents within GP1020 
As stated above, GP1020 asks a number of different questions that initially look at the 
wreckage and accident site followed by examining the human, aircraft, and weather causal 
factors. According to the answers given, the program will choose the set of most appropriate 
questions in order to determine the causes of the accident/incident. Finally when GP1020 
assesses that there is a significant amount of evidence derived it will release the probable 
causes of this particular safety event. 
 In accordance with GP1020’s approach to determining the causes of an 
accident/incident, the causal factors within GP1020 are stored and available to the program in 
several different ways.26 First of all, the contributory factors are sorted within the three well-
                                                 
26 As addressed earlier, detecting similarities between accidents is one of the biggest concerns among investigators 
in order to prevent future similar reoccurrences. One of the most convenient ways is through classification. [137] 
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known causal factors, namely human, design and manufacturing factors, as well as 
environmental factors. These factors include [146]:  
 
- Human factors: errors of flight crew, errors of air traffic control, errors of maintenance 
and dispatch, and crime & terrorism.  
 
- Design and manufacturing factors: airplane (airplane failure, airplane systems failure, 
and propulsion systems failure), ground support (air traffic control systems failure and 
maintenance facilities and equipment failure). 
 
- Environmental factor including severe weather conditions. 
 
Secondly, for the purposes of GP1020, the causes of accidents are additionally sorted in 
accordance with the nature of accidents [11]:  
 
- Taxiing accidents - Fires while midair 
- Takeoff accidents - Forced landings 
- Collisions  - Landing 
- Tail spins (following engine 
failure, without engine failure) 
- Other accidents 
 
In the taxiing accidents group are listed the causes that can occur while the aircraft is 
moving under its own power on land. In the takeoff group are listed all causes that can occur 
during the takeoff, and in the landing group all causes that can occur during landing. Causes of 
collision accidents include a list of causal events which can lead to collisions with other aircraft 
or objects while the colliding aircraft is at flying speed. The tailspins accidents group are sorted 
into causes that can result in spins, stalls, and collisions with the earth while the airplane is out 
of control. Causes of fire in the air group present a collection of events that can lead to a fire 
while the aircraft is in flight. In the forced landing group are listed all causes that can create 
engine trouble and any defects of aircraft systems that will lead to an emergency landing. In the 
other accidents group are located the causes that are not included in the other groups. 
Finally, the list of all possible causes of accidents within GP1020 is classified according 
to problems that may be experienced during the accident as follows [146]  
 
- Lift problems - Smoke, fire and fumes 
- Thrust problems - Explosion 
- Flight control problems - Collision 
- Weather and environmentally induced 
problem 
- Other problems 
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In the lift problems group are stored causes that can result in loss of lifting surfaces, 
contaminated lifting surfaces, emergency extension, improper configuration of slats, flaps, etc. 
The causes of thrust problems present events that can lead to thrust problems such as in-flight 
engine shutdowns, failure or asymmetric thrust reversers, inadvertent thrust reverser deployment 
in flight, inadvertent thrust reverser, engine flameout, engine fire warning, engine separation, 
high exhaust gas temperature, engine stab or surge, engine power loss, multiple engine failure, 
foreign object damage to engine, and engine over-speed.  
Causes of the flight control problem are focused on gross weight and center of gravity 
problems, jammed or locked controls, aircraft stall, instrument error or false indications, wake 
turbulence, vibrations caused by structural failures, improper actions by the pilot or autopilot, 
uncommanded actuation of control surfaces, and adverse weather. The weather induced 
problems group includes all environmental causes for accidents such as ice formation, ice 
shedding, turbulence, lighting strike and/or static discharge, thunderstorms, wind shear, 
microburst, and all forms of precipitation. The fire and explosion problems group lists the events 
that can cause fire and explosions while the aircraft is midflight. In the collisions problems group 
are causes such as impacting birds, engines, terrain, and foreign objects in flight.  
This approach of multiple classifications of causes of accidents within GP1020 allows the 
creation of a huge and flexible database appropriate for a quick across search. Thus through the 
interactive dialog of questions and answers provided by the user, GP1020 is able to determine the 
chain of events as well as the factors and causes that led to this occurrence.  
As stated earlier, when GP1020 matches a significant amount of evidence by asking a 
range of different questions, it finishes the procedure and indicates the consistent causes as 
possible causes for this particular accident/incident event. During this process, a large ‘mxn’ 
matrix has been created, where ‘m’ represents the number of all possible causes27 of the accident 
(rows of the matrix) and ‘n’ represents the number of different portions of evidence (including 
findings, parameters and evidence) that may be recovered during an investigation (columns of 
the matrix). (An example of such a matrix is presented in Table 35; data is randomly chosen).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27 It is clear that the author’s intention of providing an entire list of all possible causes (as mention above) is probably 
very difficult to achieve. However, this task could be completed with high accuracy by the development of a global 
expert system as suggested in Chapter 8 when discussing limitations and the future work of the GP1020 prototype. 
CHAPTER 7: DEMONSTRATION OF EXPERT SYSTEMS TO AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 168
Table 35: A list of possible causes of accident versus their distinguishing features. 
 
Distinguishing Features 
I II … 
 List of All 
Possible 
Causes  
E1 E2 … E1 E2 … E1 E2 …
1. Cause 1 x   x     x 
2 Cause 2 x  x  x  x   
3 Cause 3  x  x    x  Human Factors 
… … x   x   x   
1 Cause 1  x        
2 Cause 2   x x x    x 
3 Cause 3 x     x    
Design and 
Manufacturing 
Factors 
… … x   x    x  
1 Cause 1  x x    x   
2 Cause 2    x  x   x 
3 Cause 3 x   x x  x   
Environmental  
Factors 
… …  x      x x 
 
The original matrix (for instance the first table of Figure 52) is then converted into 
another format (the second table of Figure 52), which is appropriate to the needs of the GP1020 
program28. 
 
 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6  E5 E3 E1 E4 E6 E2
C1 x   x  x C4 x x x    
C2 x  x x   C8  x x    
C3     x  x C2  x x x   
C4 x  x  x  C1   x x x  
C5  x    x C7   x  x  
C6  x  x  x C3    x x  
C7 x     x C6    x x x 
C8 x  x    
 
 
 
 
 
 
C5     x x 
 
Figure 52: Conversion of the original matrix into GP1020 format. 
 
C1, C2 … C8 - an assumed list of 8 possible causes of accident 
E1, E2 … E6 - consistent portions of evidence (randomly chosen) to the above causes 
 
The second table of Figure 52 shows how GP1020 may ask the user questions in order to 
determine the causes of the accident/incident. Each column of the matrix, which represents a 
different portion of evidence, must be associated with a question. This means that GP1020 is 
composed of a large number of questions similar to the number of distinguishing features of all 
possible causes of accidents. Thus, GP1020 asks questions and depending on answers provided 
                                                 
28 The same approach of conversion of the original matrix is performed in the procedure of the Quantification 
Method III used for multidimensional analysis of incident reports and human factors involved in those occurrences 
[142, p.238]. 
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by the user, the program narrows down the choices to the most probable causes of this particular 
accident/incident. 
For instance (in the case presented in Figure 52) if GP1020 asks the question associated 
with E5 (or QE5) then a positive answer provided by the user will automatically finish the 
procedure as only the ‘Cause 4’ (C4) includes evidence E5. On the other hand if GP1020 asks 
the QE1 and the user provides a positive answer to it then the program will generate further 
questions related to C4, C8, C2, C1, and C7 that include this evidence, and so on. 
 
7.2.1.3 Expert knowledge stored in GP1020 
As discussed previously, the first condition for the successful application of an expert system in 
any scientific field is the amount of specific expert knowledge stored. Therefore, providing and 
storing expert knowledge of aircraft accident investigations within GP1020 was the first goal of 
this part of the research. The GP1020 program must be supplied with a database of all possible 
causes for accidents/incidents as well as evidence whereby those causes could be revealed. While 
this candidate was attempting to solve this task, the following conclusions emerged: 
 
- Creating a comprehensive database of causes of accidents and their distinguishing 
features is far beyond an individual’s or a small group’s capacity, therefore 
- The efforts of providing GP1020 with expert knowledge must be focused on International 
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the main national agencies for transport safety 
investigations worldwide such as ATSB, and NTSB as credible sources of expert 
knowledge. 
 
After considering the above conclusions in detail this candidate was certain that the 
NTSB aviation accident database as stored expert knowledge is an appropriate resource 
available for accomplishing the task of creating an expert system for aircraft accident 
investigation29. The NTSB aviation accident database is available on the NTSB’s web site 
(ftp://www.ntsb.gov/avdata/), which contains highly classified and downloadable datasets of 
more than 140,000 aviation accidents. The computerised findings are identified in a sequence 
of events as occurrences, phases, causes, factors, and/or events. The existing code system 
includes 51 phase codes, 54 occurrence codes, 1593 probable cause subject codes, 422 
                                                 
29[184, p.8, 168] states that the NTSB has computerised summaries of over 90% of the accidents in the United 
States in ‘brief format’ reports. Reports list the factors (findings) and the number of the factors that are considered 
to be causal. These reports as well as FAA files (Accident/Incident files and the Service Difficulty Report files) 
are accessible and potentially valuable to the aircraft accident investigators and researchers. 
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probable cause modifier codes, 52 probable cause person codes. This code system indicates 
how thoroughly the accidents are classified thus making the resource a potentially great base of 
expert knowledge for the GP1020 program.  
For the purposes of GP1020, these causes of accidents are additionally rearranged with 
respect to type (nature) of accidents and problems experienced during the accident (as 
discussed above). Because of this, in the application of GP1020 there are a number of 
questions that are similar to each other or even overlapping in scope, but this is the only way to 
investigate thoroughly a safety event and determine the causes of accidents/incidents. 
 
7.3 GP1020 Prototype 
Reiterating the aim of this software, what was essentially wanted was a program that could 
effectively compare and analyse the causes and factors of an immense number of previous 
aviation incidents and accidents in order to predict and prevent future accidents or to hasten air 
crash investigation efforts. 
As indicated by some of the data requirements previously shown, the current version of 
the GP1020 software was to act as a prototype purely to test some of the fundamental 
mechanisms required by components of the expert system methodology. In other words, a 
basic version of a knowledge base, inference engine and user interface had to be developed in 
order to further understand the required interaction between each component of the program. It 
was expected that by proving the capability of the fundamental mechanisms of the basic 
components, they could be further developed to handle some of the more complex 
codes/instructions at a later date.  
The following sections contain a summary of discussion regarding the initial needs, 
development, results, limitations and recommendations, for each component of the program. 
More detailed information regarding the use of the program can be found in Section 7.3.5. 
 
7.3.1 Programming Software 
The use of Excel to develop this software turned out to be the most appropriate choice for 
GP1020. It had built-in commands for data mining, sorting, statistical analysis and linguistics 
analysis. It also has numerous accuracy checks to ensure that any cell formulae and scripts are 
as correct as possible. Essentially it allowed focus on the development of the fundamental logic 
over any of the program codes required for allowing application execution in any specific 
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operating system. It also avoided the entire issue regarding how to insert the historical data into 
the program as Excel is already capable of handling numerous table data formats. About the 
only thing it may, and apparently did, lack is efficiency in terms of computation speed. 
Throughout the development of the GP1020 prototype this relatively high level of 
inefficiency was the most prevalent limiting factor to the prototype’s capabilities. In the 
following sections, emphasis has been placed on what occurred due to the presence of these 
limitations as well as what could occur if they were absent. It should be noted that while these 
limitations often caused significant changes in intended performance and capability, the 
usefulness of Excel in developing the fundamental logic, as well as its inherent ability to be 
easily transferred to other programming languages, often outweighed using any other 
programming software. 
 
7.3.2 Knowledge Base 
Originally it was hoped to develop a program that could interface with raw historical data and 
be ready for questions moments after the integration. However, given the varying types of 
classifications that different air safety organisations use, it was apparent early on that a separate 
program would be needed to alter the historical data records into a form that the inference 
engine could use. For instance, in the records of the NTSB each investigation that had taken 
place had their generic data recorded simply in classifications by type, however the most 
important data to the program (namely causes, factors and sequences of events) had been 
recorded in a rather particular fashion. First, occurrences were recorded with the specific phase 
they had occurred in, with position determined by their chronological order in the sequence of 
events. Second, each occurrence had its own sequence of events made up of subjects and their 
associated subject modifiers. Each individual flight phase, occurrence, subject and subject 
modifier had a numeric code to describe it (i.e. “500” = “Standing”, “140” = “Decompression”, 
“10400” = “Landing Gear”, “1104” = “Bent”). The historical records carrying this data were in 
a format that separated flight phase and occurrence events from their associated subjects and 
subject modifiers. This form, while great for searches and queries, would require significant 
computing time to handle the comparative programming within GP1020.  
The simplest, and therefore currently ideal, form for the knowledge base to suit the 
comparative programming that GP1020 uses would be as a table where each investigation or 
case is represented by a single row, with consistently occurring types of information 
represented by various columns.  Thus with the NTSB records previously mentioned, the 
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generic data would simply be transplanted or copied into the table with column titles indicating 
the classification types. However, details that have to be pieced together from multiple sources 
need to be constructed prior to interaction with the inference engine. In practical terms, the 
sequence of events as described by the occurrences and their associated flight phases, and 
subjects and their modifiers, all had to be converted into a single string of variables to represent 
the entire sequence of events.  
As this prototype is fairly basic, the only historical data that was really needed to create 
a fundamental program was some generic information to easily identify the case (essentially, 
who was flying what, where, when, and where to?) as well as the causes and factors pertaining 
to the case (as defined by the case’s combined sequence of events, occurrences, flight phases, 
subjects and modifiers). The initial preprocessing spreadsheet contained formulae and other 
extraction methods to create a sufficiently detailed table as defined above including the single 
string of characters representing the combined sequence of events.  
 
 
Figure 53: GP1020 Prototype – Current Knowledge Base – General Detail Vs Occurrences. 
 
 
 
Using the spreadsheet was simple; place the relevant tables in their respective places 
and the spreadsheet calculated the result. Unfortunately the entire process took over 1.5 hours 
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to format a single years worth of historical data for use with the inference engine. As the 
creation of this software was the first test of Excel’s calculation speed, this result indicated the 
need for verification of program data requirements in order to reduce the spreadsheet’s 
formatting time. Thus, development of the inference engine occurred with only one year’s 
worth of data to guide it. After various tests of the engine utilising the knowledge base it was 
shown that only the generic data, occurrences and associated flight phases were required to 
effectively demonstrate the program. The subjects and subject modifiers could have been used 
but the number of designations in the two types was so much that effective demonstration of 
the program was not possible. However, by that time the effectiveness of the program was 
already fairly obvious and while inputting additional information from other years may have 
increased its scope somewhat, the corresponding percentage increase in information would 
have come at an equivalent increase in computation time for the inference engine (i.e. adding 
another year’s worth of data would have doubled computation time, two years would have 
tripled it).  Doing so would decrease the program’s demonstration potential so putting in 
additional years worth of data was avoided. 
In the future, when the program’s operating environment is known, the inefficiencies of 
Excel should be largely reduced when the fundamental logic in the knowledge base’s 
preprocessing is transferred or altered to suit the environment’s chosen operating system or 
program. At the very least, the data limitations of the knowledge base and its preprocessor 
should grow parallel to the increase in computing power that will probably become available to 
it. Given that the program was computed on a personal computer, increasing the knowledge 
base to include all forms of relevant recorded data should be fairly feasible. 
 
7.3.3 User Interface 
In terms of the development timeline the creation of the user interface was the last to be initiated. 
As a fundamental program, only the basics were required; the ability to ask questions, the ability 
to receive questions and the ability to display cases that bear the most resemblance to the case 
currently being investigated. It would have been a very large task had not the NTSB database 
already made numerical designations for occurrences, flight phases, subjects and their modifiers. 
Also, all the important decisions regarding the relative positions of all the cases and all possible 
questions were determined by the inference engine, so the user interface only had to interact with 
the inference engine in terms of inputting answers and displaying results. An in-depth graphical 
explanation for the use of the user interface can be found in Section 7.3.5.  
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The decision to show multiple similar cases as opposed to showing only the most similar 
case was a product of practicality from two perspectives: the user and the program developer. A 
program developer needs to see how the displayed result evolves, or is calculated, to ensure that 
the appropriate functions are occurring. Constant checking of the top 20 results heavily assisted 
in making sure formulae and calculations were performing accurately.30 From the user’s 
perspective there was an obvious requirement, in that one lone case record could hardly be 
expected to meet the user’s information needs. While the most similar case to the user’s 
investigation could well be entirely to the user’s investigation, unless it is exactly the same, the 
most similar case could not fully assist the user in understanding his or her investigation. It 
would be more likely that the sequence of events that the user is trying to establish in his or her 
investigation could be derived from the combination of events from two or more different 
historical records. Essentially, the more relevant historical records are available to the user, the 
better off the user should be. The amount shown should only be limited by the speed with which 
the user can assess previous investigation records. The decision to show the top 20 cases was just 
to improve the effective demonstration of the program and may have to be altered (or at least 
have the option to be altered) at a later date to improve functionality.31  
The details shown in the 20 most similar cases are its event ID (a unique numeric code 
designation for the incident/accident), date, aircraft make, operator’s name, departure location 
and destination location. These details effectively tell who was flying what where when and 
where to. The only other detail shown is the “Level of Relevancy” which indicates the 
proportionate number of questions (and therefore answers) that positively match the case 
shown against the total number of questions asked. Obviously the greater this is the better, 
however with the possibility to give negative (“something did not happen”) or null (“I do not 
know”) answers, the determination of a suitable common (between different investigations) 
percentage, at which questioning can cease, is not possible.  Instead, what Level of Relevancy 
aims to give is the variation in relevancy between the top 20 or so cases; this variation effectively 
determines whether or not a case should be considered as useful research. For instance, among a 
pool of thousands of case records, prior to the 10th question answered, the displayed cases usually 
would share the same Level of Relevancy, suggesting that all of those cases were equally 
relevant to the case being investigated. However between the 10th and 15th question answered a 
                                                 
30 This is reminiscent of Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS), which are used by law 
enforcement agencies for criminal identification initiatives (for more details please refer to Section 7.4) 
 
31 This is an important feature of GP1020 because it does not exclude the cases which are missing portions of 
evidence in later considerations. This is important due to the fact that in massive accidents some evidence cannot 
be recovered during the investigation, though it may have probably occurred. 
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single case would begin to have a level of relevancy that would be noticeably higher than the 
rest. Given more questions, more cases begin to be noticeably more relevant than the 
mainstream.  While the appearance of these noticeably more relevant cases is subject to the 
unlikeliness of the events within the user’s investigation, it still is an effective indicator for the 
point at which questioning can cease.  
Perhaps the aspect of the user interface that will require the most work in the future is its 
linguistics capability, or ability to ask questions. In the current program, the numeric 
designations and their English interpretation were used with a fairly simple “Did a <insert 
English interpretation of occurrence numeric designation> happen?” command to represent the 
questions regarding occurrences or “Did anything happen during <insert English interpretation of 
flight phase numeric designation >?” for queries regarding flight phase. Future variations of this 
portion of the interface will probably have to allow for possible explanations of the questions 
asked. At the very least, the English interpretations will have to be corrected for grammar when 
using the above commands. 
 
7.3.4 Inference Engine 
When discussing the inference engine, the entire capability of the program is dependent on its 
ability to use causes and factors determined in previous investigations to predict future 
investigations. So essentially a likely sequence of events for the user’s investigation is created 
from a) the user’s answers, and b) the probabilities those answers imply. As a fairly simple 
analogy, if someone were to state that a plane had a damaged wing, it would be fair to assume 
the plane had experienced an in air or on ground collision of some sort. Previous experience 
would have suggested such. If later evidence found that there were excessive bird sightings on 
the runway used by the plane, the likelihood of a collision becomes even more likely. If 
however, evidence found that maintenance had recklessly used inappropriate equipment to 
handle the wing thereby damaging it in the process, then the likelihood of a collision becomes 
less likely. Discussion in this section from here on prominently features the development of 
methods of statistical analysis that would effectively and accurately replicate such logic.  
Basically the main concept to be used in the program is that causes and factors have 
relationships that can be defined by verifiable statistics. However, it is important to remember 
that the only distinction between causes and factors in terms of investigation is as a starting 
point for the sequence of events. Considering that factors can become causes under different 
situations, the distinction becomes a nominal one, and it was considered appropriate, especially 
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for the experimental development of this prototype, that when determining the sequence of 
events that there would be no active distinction between the two. Rewriting the main concept, 
unanticipated events that affect an aircraft often have statistically verifiable causative 
relationships with other unanticipated events. 
 
 
Figure 54: GP1020 Prototype – Current Inference Engine – Occurrences Vs Score. 
 
The current method used in the program utilises exact match data mining. Given partial 
sequence of event data (question answers), the engine calculates a score for each historical case 
indicating the number of exact matches between its events and the events contained within the 
partial data. Positive matches increase the case’s score, negative matches decrease it. 
Cases are then ranked according to this score and the events from cases above a certain 
rank are collected and their frequency in that collection determined. The next question that is 
asked of the user asks whether or not the event with the highest frequency had occurred. From 
here, further questions are asked regarding other highly frequent possibilities.  
Questioning ceases when a significant amount of variation occurs between the levels of 
relevancy between the cases displayed.  
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No regard has been made for the sequence of events, or for the possibility that other 
events may have occurred. Obviously the current method can be vastly improved, and during 
the development of the code to replicate the main concept, three other methods or higher levels 
of computation were found that could possibly work. However it is the only one that could be 
successfully demonstrated within the time required. Each of the others has significant 
advantages but come at the cost of other requirements. For future reference the current program 
requires twenty seconds on average to determine a question from a set of answers. It holds 
approximately 3500 cases and uses 102 defined unanticipated event possibilities, and has an 
average appearance of the first variation in relevancy (and thus the first possible solution) after 
12 questions.  
 
 
Figure 55: GP1020 Prototype - Current Inference Engine – Event Frequency & Question Rank 
 
The next level of computation is more representative of the work done in previous 
sections of this chapter (refer to Table 35 and Figure 52). It is defined as the complete 
causative linkage method and improves upon the previous method of computation by altering 
the calculation of case score in the inference engine, as well as adding additional data to the 
knowledge base and more calculation steps in the knowledge base preprocessor. A possible 
problem with the previous method was that it was possible for the inference engine to ask 
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numerous questions before, or even miss, asking a possibly contentious question simply 
because it was not frequent enough among each of the other already asked questions. Imagine 
having 10 incidents that all have different obvious causes, then imagine that all of those 
incidents have a common, but less frequently known, cause. Under the current program, the 
question regarding that common cause would not be asked till all the other obvious causes 
were taken out of contention. The solution to this was to make sure that in calculating the case 
score (as previously determined by matches between the case and the question alone), further 
increases in score could be gained on any positive matches between the case and possibilities 
linked to the question asked. This addition would obviously increase the accuracy of the 
program, however note the amount of computation required. First and foremost, the 
preprocessor would have to, after performing its 1.5 hours of formatting, create a list for each 
defined event possibility containing any event possibility that the event has ever occurred with. 
The increase in computation time required for the program due to the changes to case score 
calculation is equivalent to that used by the program to ask questions (you are essentially 
asking a question after another question), so the effective questioning time of 20 seconds 
would be doubled.  
 
 
Figure 56: GP1020 Prototype – Relevancy Variation. 
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While undoubtedly that method would have increased accuracy, there was some 
concern that if a question were to arise in this manner, there was a possibility that a chosen 
event could be one that generally occurs frequently or may have next to no relevance at all to 
the investigation at hand (i.e. “Did the aircraft experience a hard landing?” The fact that it did 
would usually be of little importance compared to why it landed hard). This would largely be 
due to the fact that all events correlations were considered in that method’s additional score 
calculation. To temper this, the next level, aggregated causative linkage, was considered. 
Basically, it would have reduced the effect of severely unlikely event correlations, by 
introducing degree of separation limits in the sequence of event (altering the amount added by 
event correlations by how far the correlating event is, on average, from the questioned event 
within a given sequence of events). This method is calculated in much the same way as the 
previous one, however, significantly more complex formulae would have had to be created to 
assess, and then handle, the portions of the sequences of events that are wanted. Further testing 
would have had to be conducted in order to determine what degree of separation would have 
generated the best results.  
The last level of computation is still largely theoretical; no attempts have been made to 
try to replicate it as such, particularly since it is essentially designed towards dealing with 
investigations which have largely complete sequences of events. It would also have required a 
method for the program to perceive causative direction in the sequence of events (something 
that due to the limitations in the raw data is not entirely possible yet; it can be done with the 
linear representations of the sequence of events, however, more historical knowledge regarding 
factor relationships within sequence of events is required for the process to be suitably 
accurate). It was perceived that after a significant number of questions were asked time issues 
may come into play and that these would inhibit the possibility of asking the right questions. 
For instance the presence of fire would, in any of the previous models, have totally eliminated 
events that could not have occurred with a fire. However, there would have been points within 
the sequence of events that the fire was not present, and other events could have occurred.   
Essentially, this method is a time sensitive variant of the complete causative linkage method. It 
would require coding to, as already mentioned, define the direction of the sequence of events 
(what caused what caused what?), and it would also require the determination of a period of 
existence for each event in the sequence. Admittedly there are numerous questions to ask but it 
is anticipated that this software would be heading in this direction.  
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7.3.5 GP1020 Prototype – User Instructions 
The use of the GP1020 program requires Microsoft Office Excel 2003 or better. To use simply 
follow the instructions indicated below or as indicated on the introduction page of the program. 
Click on the spreadsheet titled “Query Page” to begin the process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57: GP1020 Prototype - Introduction Page. 
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On the sheet titled "Query Page", two distinct sections will appear; the one at the top 
shows the top 20 most similar cases, and thus be used as a reference in understanding the case 
that the user is currently investigating. The one at the bottom shows the questions that the 
software would ask depending on the data given.  
 
 
 
Figure 58: GP1020 Prototype – Query Page. 
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To begin using the software, answer the two questions already shown in the bottom box 
by clicking on the yellow box next to each question and choosing an appropriate answer from 
the drop down menu (the little downward arrow to the right of the cell appears after clicking on 
the cell).  
 
 
 
Figure 59: GP1020 Prototype – Drop Down Menu. 
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Soon after, a third question should appear (should nothing occur, please set Calculation 
(Tools>Options>Calculation Tab>Calculation) to automatic or press F9 after choosing each 
answer). Similarly, choose an answer to the question that just appeared by clicking on the 
yellow cell next to the question and choosing an answer from the drop down menu. 
 
 
 
Figure 60: GP1020 Prototype – Yes/No Drop Down Menu. 
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Consequently the top 20 most similar cases will be displayed on the top box and a 
fourth question should appear in the bottom box. 
 
 
 
Figure 61: GP1020 Prototype – Fourth Question. 
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Continue answering questions till the Relevancy column (the one in green) begins to 
show different values. From here, two choices become available; either start to use the top 20 
cases to gain understanding on your case, or answer more questions to increase the Relevancy 
or to cause further differences in Relevancy. Ideally, with an increasing amount of variation in 
Relevancy, the 20 cases shown should become more suited to assisting understanding of your 
case. 
 
 
 
Figure 62: GP1020 Prototype – Relevancy Variation. 
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Should you wish to begin a new case simply delete all of your answers (Warning: Do 
not change an answer after it already has been answered, as this basic program does not yet 
have the functionality required to deal with such circumstances).  
 
 
 
Figure 63: GP1020 Prototype – New Investigation. 
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7.4 GP1020 Computer Tool – The ‘AFIS’ of Aircraft Accident Investigation 
As described earlier, GP1020 is a comparative program that utilises understanding of causes 
and factors from an immense number of previous aviation records in order to simulate possible 
future accidents or to hasten air crash investigation efforts. GP1020 computer tool and its 
features resemble the well-known automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS). 
Thereby, GP1020 is often called by this candidate the ‘AFIS’ of aircraft accident investigation. 
Below a brief review of AFIS systems is given in order to provide an insight into these systems 
and the features they have in common with the GP1020 tool.  
 
7.4.1 An Overview of the Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems (AFIS) 
AFIS systems are primarily used by law enforcement agencies for criminal identification 
initiatives, mainly for identifying a person suspected of committing a crime or linking a suspect 
to other unsolved crimes. However, the greatest use of AFIS systems lies in the area of latent 
print identifications.  
As systems, AFIS technology has automated an already existing process for identifying 
individuals. Fingerprint images as the crucial elements of this identification system have been 
collected for over 100 years. To clarify, a fingerprint is an impression of the friction ridges 
which are raised surfaces on the palmar surface of the hands and feet. 
The practical use of fingerprint identification is based on three well-known premises. 
First of all, the friction ridges on each person’s fingers are persistent and unique; even identical 
twins do not have the same fingerprints. Secondly, although all patterns are distinct in their 
ridge characteristics, their overall pattern appearances have similarities which permit a 
systematic classification of the impressions. Finally, when friction ridges come in contact with 
a surface that is receptive to a print, material on the ridges, such as perspiration, oil, grease, 
ink, or other contaminant can be transferred to the item.  
The analysis of fingerprints for matching purposes generally requires the comparison of 
several features of the print pattern. These include patterns which are aggregate characteristics 
of ridges, and minutia points, which are unique features found within the patterns. There are 
four basic patterns of fingerprint ridges shown in Figure 64. 
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Tent Loop Arch Whorl 
 
Figure 64: The fourt basic patterns of fingerprint ridges. 
.  
However, identifiable fingerprint attributes originate from minutia points. The major 
minutia features of fingerprint ridges are: bifurcation, ridge ending, and short ridge (or dot) 
(Figure 65).  
 
 
 
Figure 65: Minutia points of fingerprint ridges. 
(1-bifurcation, 2-ridge ending, 3-short ridge) 
 
On the other hand, automated fingerprint identification is the process of automatically 
matching one or many unknown fingerprints against a database of known and unknown (latent) 
prints. A known print is the intentional recording of the friction ridges, such as fingerprint 
images from persons arrested and charged with a crime. A latent print is the chance 
reproduction of the friction ridges deposited on the surface of an item at a crime scene. AFIS 
systems may contain databases of one, two, three, or more records such as the ten-print 
database, the latent cognizant database, and the unsolved latent database. 
The (AFIS) latent print identification process includes the following steps. Fist, the 
latent fingerprint is recorded, and the image is digitised. Next, the examiner, with the help of 
the coder, identifies and marks each minutia on the image of the fingerprint displayed on the 
input workstation, and repeats the process with each additional latent print. The examiner may 
choose to add additional minutiae points not found by the coder, or remove points considered 
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marginal. In this regard, AFIS systems are capable of extracting the minutia point of 
fingerprints and translating the images into identifiable equations that could be understood by 
any other fingerprint examiner. Pattern based and minutia based algorithms compare the latent 
print in question with those stored in the AFIS data base within minutes, completing the work 
of hundreds or even thousands of latent examiners. 
 
7.4.2 AFIS Identification versus GP1020 Enquiry 
After all latents have been entered, the latent examiner checks the work and launches the case. 
The latent fingerprint is searched by the matchers against a latent cognisant database within 
AFIS containing hundreds of thousands or even millions of images. For instance, the FBI 
database is composed of 46 million records which can be searched within minutes.  
After that, candidates for a match, associated with some numerical measure of the 
probability of a match, are made available and are retrieved for verification (Figure 66). For 
instance, AFIS, utilising the SAGEM ‘Morpho’ operating system, usually provides a list of 30 
candidates for a match. 
 
  
 
A list of candidates for a match displayed on 
AFIS (SAGEM ‘Morpho’) system 
A list of 20 top similar cases displayed on 
GP1020 program 
 
Figure 66: GP1020 Prototype versus AFIS (SAGEM ‘Morpho’) system. 
 
The confirmation of system suggested candidates is usually performed by two 
examiners in forensic systems. There is a general international agreement among experts that a 
successful match requires 12 points to match between the two fingerprints, although in several 
countries the number required varies between 14, 16, and 17 minutia points. 
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 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 … 
C1 x  x x   …
C2   x x  x …
C3  x x x x  …
C4    x x x …
C5   x x  x …
C6    x  x …
C7     x x …
C8      x …
 
A match between two fingerprints  A match within GP1020 enquiry 
 
Figure 67: GP1020 Prototype versus AFIS (SAGEM ‘Morpho’) system. 
 
The photo in Figure 67 shows a match between two fingerprints within AFIS (SAGEM 
‘Morpho’) identification. In addition, the table from Figure 67 presents an assumed list of 
accident causes (C1, C2 … C8) and their consistent portions of evidence (E1, E2 and so on), 
stored within GP1020. The red and blue circles show the matches in evidence during the 
GP1020 enquiry, indicating the accident associated with C3 (cause three) from the GP1020 
database will most likely assist in facilitating the investigation of the current accident. 
It must be addressed that AFIS systems are only a tool used by the latent examiner. 
Namely, the examiner determines if the latent image is of value, then selects the search criteria, 
and examines the lists of candidates produced by the search. At the end, the latent examiner 
makes the identification. However, not every latent print search will result in identification. 
Actual figures show that only 2-3 % of latent print searches will result in identification [131]. 
Despite the low rate of identification, AFIS systems are irreplaceable tools in a police 
investigation worldwide.  
Similarly GP1020, as described before, is a tool that assists in aircraft accident 
investigations. Namely, the GP1020 program is designed to facilitate the conventional 
investigation of an air safety event and enhance the investigation outcomes by retrieving a list 
of top 20 most similar cases.  
Results obtained during the testing of the GP1020 prototype program encourage the 
application of a global expert system, and suggests the program’s knowledge pool should be 
increased to include historical data from many other sources than those currently being used. 
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7.5 Case Study: GP1020 Prototype Enquiry into the Aircraft Accident on 05 
March 1993 at Skopje Airport, Macedonia 
This exercise refers to the accident that occurred on 05 March 1993 at Skopje, Macedonia. At 
the time it was the deadliest aircraft accident in Macedonia killing 83 of the 97 occupants on 
board. 
According to [8, 140] the Fokker 100 seconds after takeoff, experienced heavy 
vibrations followed by a sudden 10° right bank, a 50° left bank and a 55° right 
bank. The right wingtip struck the ground, 382m past the runway end with a 90° 
bank. The wing separated and the fuselage broke into three pieces.  
 
The investigation into the accident determined the cause of the accident to be 
a lack of ice-awareness of the flight crew and the Flight Station Engineer to 
carry out spraying of the aircraft with de-icing or anti-icing fluid in 
meteorological conditions conducive to icing. 
 
7.5.1 Background 
In the above description, both visible events and the causes for those events are shown with a 
significantly high level of detail. Before using the GP1020 prototype, it is first necessary to set 
the situation as if the accident had just occurred, and it is obvious that the GP1020 program 
should be utilised in an investigation that begins in earnest. In other words, all that is currently 
known are the rough visible (as in from a very far distance) events that spectators would have 
seen: 
 
Shortly after the Fokker took off, it banked suddenly right, then left, then right 
again. At this point the right wingtip struck the ground. The wing separated and 
the fuselage broke into several pieces.   
 
The causes are not yet known nor are the measurements in bank angle, or distance/time 
from runway. It is possible to speculate that perhaps not all of the rough description would be 
found shortly after the accident either, but for this case study it is assumed as such. The next 
thing to consider is to try and match up the rough visible events with the events and flight 
phases utilised by GP1020. It would be acceptable to go right into questioning, but doing this 
first will highlight in a layman’s mind the kind of answers they should be giving for each 
question. 
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Table 36 below lists all event and flight phase codes that GP1020 can identify (1XX-
4XX for events, 5XX for flight phases), as well as the likelihood32 that that code had taken 
place33 from the rough description.  
 
Table 36: Event/Flight Phase Code Likelihood. 
 
Did this occur? 
Abrupt manoeuvre (100) Yes 
Altitude deviation, uncontrolled (110) Unknown 
Cargo shift (120) Unknown 
Airframe/component/system failure/malfunction (130) Unknown 
Propeller failure/malfunction (131) Unknown 
Rotor failure/malfunction (132) Unknown 
Decompression (140) Unknown 
Ditching (150) Unknown 
Dragged wing, rotor, pod, float or tail/skid (160) Yes 
Fire/explosion (170) Unknown 
Fire (171) Unknown 
Explosion (172) Unknown 
Forced landing (180) No 
Gear collapsed (190) Unknown 
Main gear collapsed (191) Unknown 
Nose gear collapsed (192) Unknown 
Tail gear collapsed (193) Unknown 
Complete gear collapsed (194) Unknown 
Other gear collapsed (195) Unknown 
Gear not extended (196) Unknown 
Gear not retracted (197) Unknown 
Gear retraction on ground (198) Unknown 
Hard landing (200) Yes 
Hazardous materials leak/spill (210) Unknown 
In flight collision with object (220) Yes 
In flight collision with terrain/water (230) Yes 
Wheels down landing in water (231) No 
Wheels up landing (232) Unknown 
In flight encounter with weather (240) Unknown 
Loss of control - in flight (250) Unknown 
Loss of control - on ground/water (260) Unknown 
Midair collision (270) No 
Collision between aircraft (other than midair) (271) Unknown 
Near collision between aircraft (280) Unknown 
Nose down (290) Unknown 
Nose over (300) Unknown 
On ground/water collision with object (310) Unknown 
                                                 
32 i.e. highly certain = yes, highly certain it did not happen = no, anything else = unknown. 
 
33 That is to say whether an event code had happened or whether something had happened during a flight phase 
code. 
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On ground/water collision with terrain/water (320) Unknown 
On ground/water encounter with weather (330) Unknown 
Overrun (340) Unknown 
Loss of engine power (350) Unknown 
Loss of engine power (total)  - mechanical failure/malfunction (351) Unknown 
Loss of engine power (partial)  - mechanical failure/malfunction (352) Unknown 
Loss of engine power (total)  - nonmechanical (353) Unknown 
Loss of engine power (partial)  - nonmechanical (354) Unknown 
Engine tearaway (355) Unknown 
Propeller blast or jet exhaust/suction (360) Unknown 
Propeller/rotor contact to person (370) Unknown 
Roll over (380) Unknown 
Undershoot (390) Unknown 
Vortex turbulence encountered (410) Unknown 
Missing aircraft (420) Unknown 
Did something occur during this?
Standing (500) Unknown 
Standing - pre-flight (501) Unknown 
Standing - starting engine(s)  (502) Unknown 
Standing - engine(s)  operating (503) Unknown 
Standing - engine(s)  not operating (504) Unknown 
Standing - idling rotors (505) Unknown 
Taxi (510) Unknown 
Taxi - pushback/tow (511) Unknown 
Taxi - to takeoff (512) Unknown 
Taxi - from landing (513) Unknown 
Taxi - aerial (514) Unknown 
Takeoff (520) Unknown 
Takeoff - roll/run (521) Unknown 
Takeoff - initial climb (522) Yes 
Takeoff - aborted (523) Unknown 
Climb (530) Unknown 
Climb - to cruise (531) Unknown 
Cruise (540) No 
Cruise - normal (541) No 
Manoeuvring - holding (IFR)  (542) No 
Descent (550) No 
Descent - normal (551) No 
Descent - emergency (552) No 
Descent - uncontrolled (553) No 
Approach (560) No 
Approach - VFR pattern - downwind (561) No 
Approach - VFR pattern - turn to base (562) No 
Approach - VFR pattern - base leg/base to final (563) No 
Approach - VFR pattern - final approach (564) No 
Go-around (VFR)  (565) No 
Approach - Initial approach fix to final approach fix (FAF) /outer marker (IFR) (566) No 
Approach - final approach fix (FAF) /outer marker to threshold (IFR) (567) No 
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Approach - circling (IFR)  (568) No 
Missed approach (IFR)  (569) No 
Landing (570) Yes 
Landing - flare/touchdown (571) Yes 
Landing - roll (572) Unknown 
Landing - aborted (573) No 
Emergency landing (574) No 
Emergency landing after takeoff (575) No 
Emergency descent/landing (576) No 
Manoeuvring (580) No 
Manoeuvring - aerial application (581) No 
Manoeuvring - turn to reverse direction (582) No 
Manoeuvring - turn to landing area (emergency)  (583) No 
Hover (590) No 
Hover - in ground effect (591) No 
Hover - out of ground effect (592) No 
 
It is clear that the majority is unknown. All events with a ‘yes’ come from the rough 
description, all events with a ‘no’ stem from the understanding of timeline and the flight phases 
that an airplane can go through34. The only discrepancy with the generic way ‘no’ works is 
with regards to any code with the word ‘landing’; without a specific code for ‘crashing’, 
landing is sometimes confused between the ‘intention to land’ and ‘landed’ definitions35. 
Now it is possible to just put the highly certain codes into a generic search program and 
look that way, but it will not usually be possible to appropriately filter the results or gather 
suitable questions that should be considered during the investigation. From the above table it is 
easy to see the large number of unknowns regarding this accident, far too many to determine 
each one’s possibility. Each question that gets asked is indicative of the cumulative experience 
recorded within the GP1020 program and implies that each question that is asked is somehow36 
significant given the data mentioned to the program. 
For now, and in most uses of the GP1020 program, the first thing to do is to choose the 
most obvious/likely event with a known associated flight phases from the above table37 to 
begin questioning in GP1020. It is highly obvious that there is a link between the plane 
somehow colliding with the ground and it occurring shortly after takeoff. The corresponding 
                                                 
34 That is to say a plane cannot have gone through cruise if it crashed while performing its initial climb; also 
planes can’t hover. 
 
35 i.e. Hard landing implies having a hard landing, forced landing implies being forced to land and not necessarily 
having landed yet. 
 
36 With increasing importance the more numerous the questions asked. 
 
37 And thereby making a rough description that could be understood by the program. 
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codes would be: ‘Inflight collision with terrain/water” and ‘Takeoff - Initial Climb’. As an 
explanation of the first, it was the most obvious and the least unlikely out of all the ‘yes’ 
answers. As for the second, the visible definition of takeoff is off the ground but close to the 
runway, so at a far visual distance, only ‘Takeoff - Initial Climb’ of the code subgroup 
beginning with ‘Takeoff’ would be certain. Additionally you could say that it occurred during 
‘Climb’, but since the rough description indicated the occurrence right after takeoff, ‘Takeoff - 
Initial Climb’ would be more likely.  
 
7.5.2 GP1020 Prototype Enquiry into the Skopje Accident 
Before beginning to input the two previous codes, a diagrammatic description of what is 
occurring within the program is given. An initial look at the program would have yielded 
Figure 68 below. 
 
 
Figure 68: GP1020 enquiry into the accident that occurred on 05 March 1993 at Skopje. 
 
This, while very efficient, does not show exactly what is happening within the program. 
The graph below (Figure 69), however, does. It indicates the relative distribution of the cases 
currently stored within the program38 with regards to their current score.  
The current score is determined by how well the given data fits the case data:  
- ‘+1’ for each positive event/flight phase code matches (or ‘yes’ answer), and  
                                                 
38 Due to limitations previously discussed, only 3546 cases are stored within the GP1020 prototype.  
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- ‘-1’ for each negative event/flight phase code (or ‘no’ answer).  
 
The same graph type for the rest of this Chapter shows what occurs as section 2 in 
Figure 68 (red square) is filled in. Figure 69 below indicates the starting position of all 
investigation scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 69: Start Position from all Cases  
 
As you can see, every case has a score of zero. The tiny maroon part on the top of the 
‘0’ column (the magnified part of Figure 69) represents the portion of cases that would 
currently be seen in the top 20 list (for programming reasons, the top 20 are not shown during 
the first 2 questions). Inputting the next two initial codes gives you the following two graphs. 
 
Figure 70: Question 1: ‘What occurred?’ Answer 1:’ In flight collision with terrain/water’. 
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Figure 71: Question 2: ‘During what phase did it occur?’ Answer 2:’ Takeoff – initial climb’. 
 
As you input the two codes, two important things changed; first is the decrease in 
maximum score. Obviously, the more variation in possible scores, the smaller the peak in the 
graph becomes and the wider the distribution. Secondly, the variation in score only went in a 
positive direction. This is due to the way the questions are asked i.e. only positive matches 
were possible. Although repeated questioning would have retrieved the same results, these two 
positive only questions ensured a fast transition to useful cases in the top 20 list, which would 
not have been the case had the first answers been negative in nature. The next figure is of the 
case scores after the third question. 
 
Figure 72: Question 3: ‘Did a loss of control – in flight occur?’ Answer 3: ’No’. 
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Again, two things to note: an increased peak and the presence of a negative score. With 
a negative match, cases that may have had a positive score are driven back, effectively 
squeezing the case scores together again (and unintentionally increasing the peak at the same 
time). As intended however, it does refine the top 20 list of candidates somewhat. 
You can see that this code within Table 36 had an ‘unknown’ likelihood. Unfortunately, 
during testing the “unknown” option (which gave a modifier of +0, and effectively nullified the 
question from being asked again) was shown to cause a lack of change in code ranks (i.e. 
which code would be asked next) in between questions. While great for fine tuning questions 
(i.e. when the list of questions is near the end of being clearly appropriate), such stasis would 
inhibit the program’s ability to proactively search for more appropriate questions early on. 
Additional handling protocols were developed to enable the program to more effectively use 
the “unknown” answer, but would have increased the system’s already high processing 
requirements. Thus currently any question that would have normally required an ‘unknown’ 
answer is treated as requiring a ‘no’ answer. This is actually appropriate since, as the figures 
above just demonstrated, ‘yes’ answers give more possible cases, ‘no’ answers cull those 
possible cases down; what were needed were not more possible cases, but a more refined list of 
those possible cases. It is possible that an appropriate case would have been culled 
prematurely, but it would have been hoped that it, or a very similar case to it, would have 
eventually made it to the top 20 list. 
 
Figure 73: Question 4: ‘Did anything occur during Landing – flare/touchdown?’ Answer 4: ’Yes’. 
 
The above Figure 73 is an affirmative question and, imagining the curve between the 
peak and the highest possible score, has curved outwards, giving the impression of more 
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possible cases being considered at the higher end. True to form as a ‘yes’ answer, the peak 
drops a bit more. 
 
Figure 74: Question 5: ‘Did a forced landing occur?’ Answer 5: ’No’ 
 
Figure 74 is a fairly standard, increased peak; sharper tail (if one should choose the 
graph’s resemblance to a normalized bell curve). 
 
Figure 75: Question 6: ‘Did anything occur during landing – roll?’ Answer 6: ’No’. 
 
Again from Table 36 it can be seen that the above figure’s question was initially 
‘unknown’. Saying ‘no’ here, while admittedly culling the higher section, caused the peak to 
drop. Such an instance could imply that a significant number of cases had their scores dropped, 
and heavily begs the question on whether saying no was appropriate. Alternatively, perhaps, 
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cases that were just maintaining a zero score and had next to no reference to the case except for 
this code finally had their score degraded for the first time. Further research would have to look 
into this effect. 
 
Figure 76: Question 7: ‘Did an in flight collision with object occur?’ Answer 7: ’Yes’ 
 
At this stage, the program highlights “BOEING | AIR FLORIDA, INC | 
WASHINGTON” (square 1, in green, in Figure 68) as the first on the list. According to the 
NTSB data base, this is of the event that occurred on 13 January 1982 at Washington: 
 
According to the NTSB data base a Boeing 737-222 crashed on takeoff from 
Washington National Airport in severe weather conditions.  
 
The investigation of this accident revealed that the major cause for this 
tragedy was crew failure to activate the engine anti-ice systems.  
 
It is obvious that the accident on 13 January 1982 at Washington has similarities with 
the accident that occurred on 05 March 1993 at Skopje and would most likely have assisted in 
understanding the circumstances and causes of the Skopje accident. 
 
Unfortunately this is not indicative of how long it would normally take to arrive at such 
a neat case solution; however it does point out that the chance for finding such is there. 
Additionally it saves the effort of having to repeat showing the similar pattern that would have 
been shown after the ‘top 20 list’ (in maroon, currently spread over two categories) spreads 
itself over 3 or 4 score categories (and their requisite number of questions), which would have 
been required to consistently present highly useful cases.  
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 Chapter 
 8 
 
If you are looking for perfect safety, you will do well to sit on a fence and watch the 
birds; but if you really wish to learn, you must mount a machine and become 
acquainted with its tricks by actual trial. 
WILBUR WRIGHT 
 
Conclusions 
 
Aviation is in a period of sustained growth and that growth is likely to continue. Every year, 
millions of consumers use airlines to convey them to their destinations owing to airline travel 
being an economical and convenient means of long distance transport.  
Successful airline operation worldwide is largely due to the high standards applied 
within the aviation industry that ensure the system works, in spite of existing problems and 
challenges [89, 90, 94]. Overall, commercial aviation is extremely safe, yet safety standards 
throughout the world differ significantly. Airline travel in developed countries tends to be very 
safe, but there are regions in the world where the standards are much lower. The current level 
of safety attained by major airline companies in developed countries is one of the great 
achievements of modern industry.  
Much of the success in air traffic safety has been due to knowledge gained from prior 
aircraft accident investigations carried out with the aim of ensuring that accidents in similar 
circumstances will never recur. As a result of this, investigations have helped alter the course 
of aviation history by maintaining and improving air safety.39 
Despite the huge progress in air safety, accidents and incidents do still happen and can 
cause injuries, fatalities and the destruction of property. Also, while accident rates are 
decreasing, the total number of aircraft accidents is most likely to remain stable or increase 
slightly mainly due to current growth.40 
                                                 
39 An example of investigation impact on airlines was creation of the European black list of airlines. If an EU 
State bans an airline due to safety violation then other EU States would automatically ban it as well [87]. 
 
40 In 2020, when more than 7 billion passengers annually are expected to use airline services worldwide, experts 
predict on average there will be a fatal accident every week (122}. 
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In addition, statistics related to aircraft accidents reveal that the causes for a number of 
them remain unknown. Even after many modern advances in detection techniques the causes of 
several calamitous accidents are still undetermined leaving the possibility that these 
unexplained causes may recur.41 
Thus the conclusion has arisen that despite all of its current strengths, the aircraft 
accident investigation process needs to be improved to both help understand the causes of 
accidents and to prevent future reoccurrences. In this regard, the research contained in this 
work has shown that expert systems methodology is a solid approach to analysing the aircraft 
accident investigation process. The methodology presented has provided a thorough picture of 
the current condition of investigation and has suggested possible solutions for its further 
improvement. 
This chapter discusses the methodology developed and the application of this 
methodology for considering the aircraft accident investigation. The limitations of this 
methodology are examined and possible areas for further research are also suggested. 
 
8.1 Discussion 
The famous Jim Lovell42 message, “Houston, we’ve had a problem here” best expresses the 
way in which all important clues were derived and used in accomplishing this work. Namely, 
this message suggests that aircraft accident investigation and aircraft safety can be improved by 
focusing on current and past problems of aircrafts. 
Improvement in aircraft accident investigation is a challenging task which has required 
substantial efforts to accomplish. This is because air accident investigation is a broad area 
including a number of different disciplines. However this research has produced several key 
results that accomplish the main aim of this thesis, restated below:  
 
To pursue a thorough analysis of the aircraft accident investigation process, 
followed by identifying areas where significant improvements could be 
achieved, and demonstrating an expert system for improving investigation 
outcomes. 
 
                                                 
41 For instance, the accident at Colorado Springs in 1991, and US Air’s flight 427 from Chicago to Pittsburgh in 
1994, both involving Boeing 737s, have not been satisfactorily explained so far [145]. 
 
42 Jim Lovell was the commander of Apollo 13 which crashed on 13 April, 1970. 
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As mentioned earlier, the research contained in this work has shown that expert systems 
methodology is an appropriate approach to analysing the aircraft accident investigation 
process. It includes an analysis of accident statistics, application of a two-round Delphi enquiry 
and introduces the GP1020 computer program as a novel investigation tool in the form of a 
data mining method designed towards giving aircraft accident investigators improved use of 
forensic data.  
There are two main factors which initially determined the course of this research. These 
were the international standards of aircraft accident and incident investigation (Annex 13) and 
the literature review. The international standards describes aircraft accident and incident 
investigation as a process conducted for the purpose of accident prevention which includes 
gathering and analysing information, drawing conclusions, determining causes and making 
safety recommendations when appropriate. Thus the investigation initially examines what has 
happened (generally the easier part) and then determines the events that have contributed to the 
accident. 
In addition, the literature review has shown that there are several prospective methods 
used to consider air safety and the investigation process, the most common of which are 
statistics and comparable statistics, thus addressing the importance of advance data 
classification and the application of survey methods. 
The investigation process, within this work, was initially considered through a brief 
review of statistics of aircraft accidents which occurred between 1950 and 2004. Analysing this 
data with respect to the number of accidents and incidents, their distribution over this time 
period, their causal factors and casualties (if any) has led to overall conclusions regarding air 
traffic safety and accident causes. As mentioned earlier, it is interesting to note that this review 
indicated that the causes for 31% of aircraft accidents between 1950 and 2004 have not been 
completely determined. Another concerning outcome is that a number of accidents which have 
occurred due to human errors or equipment malfunctions are more common in unpleasant 
weather conditions. 
In accordance with the derived methodology, a two-round Delphi survey was then 
conducted which, as discussed in Chapter 6, is a powerful method for establishing a set of 
priorities to further develop and improve a complex system. Originally the Delphi technique 
was mainly used for forecasting future scientific-technological development, but recently it has 
been adopted as a method of systematic opinion gathering from experts. However, this data 
may then be used to foresee developments in technology and other areas.  
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Surprisingly, despite all of these recognised features, a literature search conducted on     
e-journals and e-books using combinations of the terms Delphi, aircraft, accidents, and 
investigation retrieved no articles, and was another challenge in undertaking this work. 
The Delphi survey for this work was conducted in mid-2007 although the preparation 
involved had started several months beforehand. Ten experienced investigators from the 
ATSB, DSTO and other international services considered and ranked the impact of 98 different 
factors on investigation outcomes. The Delphi exercise was concluded after the second round 
when a satisfactory consensus of expert opinions was achieved. 
The Delphi conclusions have shown that there is great potential for further improving 
aircraft accident investigation, and additionally have indicated specific parts of the 
investigation process in which significant improvements could be made. With respect to 
improving investigation outcomes the Delphi results suggested the need for a tool which would 
be able to capture and store the specific knowledge and analytical skills of a large number of 
aviation experts. This research then proceeded with creating such a tool which would be able to 
demonstrate the efficacy of the methodology developed in facilitating air accident 
investigations.  
Hence, taking all research results already derived into account, it was concluded that 
further work should be focused on long-term accident patterns using the benefits of the 
contemporary approach to accidents. This approach views an air accident as a result of a chain 
of events including errors, omissions, or equipment malfunctions (Figure 77). Furthermore, the 
definition also states that if this chain of events is not broken at some point then an accident 
will occur.43  
This idea was the milestone in developing a tool for facilitating the accident 
investigation process, and was further developed by breaking down accidents to a number of 
events leading to occurrences that could be determined during the investigation. Consequently 
the next challenge of the work was to determine whether there is always a logical relationship 
between these events and if these events could be both identified and listed chronologically in 
the investigation process. 
Such a relationship is supported by the theory of investigation which states that nearly 
every accident contains evidence which, if correctly identified and assessed, will allow the 
circumstances and the causes to be ascertained. Furthermore it states that although all aircraft 
accidents are different there are commonalities in aircraft impacts, wreckage distribution, 
                                                 
43 Heinrich’s law for Industrial Accident Prevention states that prior to the occurrence of one major accident, there 
occur 29 minor accidents and 300 problems that do reach the point of becoming accidents [142]. 
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equipment failure, attendance injuries, and many other relevant concerns within accident 
investigations. Additionally, the conventional method of ‘learning from past accidents’ appears 
to be at the root of many accidents to date. By organising all these elements, many different 
causes of accidents can be classified and more easily identified.  
 
 
Figure 77: Unsafe Events – A chain of events leading to an accident. 
(Modified from Figure 6 [142]) 
 
The GP1020 computer program discussed in Chapter 7 incorporates all of the above 
considerations and shows that a global expert system as a tool for storing and retrieving global 
aircraft accident forensic data can significantly facilitate and improve the aircraft accident 
investigation process. The GP1020 program asks the user a number of questions related to 
various factors of the accident/incident and, based on both the information provided and its 
validity the program indicates the most probable causes of the accident/incident.  
To summarise, the expert system methodology developed for this application has 
proven to be extremely capable in examining the aircraft accident investigation process. It is 
also effective and flexible enough to be applied when considering many other complex 
systems. The GP1020 program, which was developed in the final stages of this work, covers a 
diverse range of accident causes and their consistent evidence shows that the methodology has 
resulted in creating a valuable tool for enhancing investigation outcomes.  
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8.2 Limitations  
Like all research, several limitations do exist with the expert system methodology developed 
within this research. Since the methodology contains accident statistics, a Delphi enquiry and 
applying the novel GP1020 program, the limitations of each individual aspect will be discussed 
accordingly. 
Statistics have been shown as an important constituent of two major parts of this work: 
in Chapter 5 statistics about accidents which occurred between 1950 and 2004 were analysed 
to illustrate overall trends in aircraft accidents and to draw some overall conclusions, and in 
Chapter 7 statistics were used as expert knowledge stored in the computer program GP1020. 
Limitations of GP1020 analysis were discussed in the previous chapter and will be briefly 
addressed again when discussing the GP1020 program. 
One noteworthy point is that statistics from different sources can differ for certain 
sampling periods. Conflicting data can particularly be seen in the number of accidents and the 
distribution of accident causes. Therefore this candidate tried to consider the causes of 
accidents which occurred globally between 1950 and 2004 by analysing the brief reports 
available in [9]. He faced another obstacle originating from the ‘multiple causal factors’ 
approach to accidents, which states that before an accident occurs a number of adverse events 
must have preceded it, and as such the major cause of accidents can be difficult to identify 
when there are two or more strong contributing factors (Figure 78)44.  
 
 
 
Figure 78: A chain of events leading to an accident. 
                                                 
44 For instance in Figure 78 there are two events that have significantly contributed to the accident. Event 1 is the 
first event from the chain, whereas Event 5 has the strongest contribution to the accident. Which one will be cited 
as the major cause for this accident? There are examples such as [94], which cite all strong contributing factors as 
major causes of accidents. For such an analysis the total causal figure is greater than 100 %.  
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However, since the goal of this part of the work was creating overall conclusions, these 
obstacles were not insurmountable in reaching the final conclusions of this research but 
nevertheless deserve to be mentioned (as mentioned in Chapter 5, the first event within the 
chain of events that had a significant impact on air safety was cited as the major cause for an 
accident). 
The Delphi technique and its methodology had several limitations. Some of the relevant 
limitations have already been explored in Chapter 4 when discussing the disadvantages and 
organisational problems of the Delphi method, and in this section only those that have had an 
actual impact on the results of this work are addressed.  
The main limitation with applying the Delphi method is that despite its ability to draw 
conclusions for further development of an issue, it does not explain how to implement its 
findings. Therefore a Delphi enquiry is usually associated with another method that 
implements the Delphi outcomes. In the case of this research this is done by introducing the 
GP1020 computer program for facilitating the investigation process.  
Another considerable limitation of the Delphi exercise is the lack of an analytical tool 
to evaluate the quality of questionnaires, as created by the researcher, which is essential for a 
successful survey method.45 Questionnaire quality can however be verified by conducting the 
‘zero’ round, in which a small group of respondents discuss the structure, contents and quality 
of the questionnaire. 
The last major set of limitations of this work originates from problems related to 
establishing the expert team, including team selection and deciding on the number of 
respondents. Since the expert participations in this survey were done on a voluntary basis, there 
was a concern of expert attitude towards providing credible and punctual answers.46 Only by 
careful management of the pool process with feedback were these limitations overcome, and 
this is important in minimising the influence of these limitations on the results of this research. 
The GP1020 computer program does also have certain limitations which are mainly 
related to the specific knowledge stored as well as the limitation of the design technique used.  
 
                                                 
45 It is fundamental to know whether the questionnaire contains all factors relevant to the issue and if they are 
asked in the way that will provide the best expert outcomes. There is no analytical tool to assess this.  
 
46 It is debatable whether the results of the Delphi enquiry will be the same if another team of experts was to be 
surveyed. With respect to this question, based on past experience with Delphi studies, this candidate states that if 
the whole Delphi procedure is followed then very similar conclusions will be drawn.   
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Addressing these limitations was beyond the goals of this work and therefore the GP1020 tool 
was created to successfully demonstrate that using expert system methodology can assist 
accident investigation. 
As mentioned in Chapter 7, the NTSB aviation accident database was used as expert 
knowledge in creating the GP1020 computer tool. It is available online and contains highly 
classified and downloadable datasets of more than 140,000 aviation accidents. Although this 
database is comprehensive in its contents, it has been created according to its owner’s intent 
and does not precisely fit the data requirements of GP1020. Hence the first and major current 
limitation is that there is no uniform data classification method and so it is impossible to 
combine all statistics to form a broad database which is desirable for effective GP1020 
operation. Thus, the main limitation of this application lies in the lack of specific expert 
knowledge that can be used by the GP1020 program. Due to this limitation a number of the 
stored investigative questions are not called by the GP prototype which significantly reduces its 
efficiency.  
The other significant limitation is that of computer power. Either changing the code to 
suit a particular operating system or utilising hardware with greater computing power would 
rectify this problem. 
 
8.3 Future Work 
The results derived from this study suggest several possible areas for further research. An 
immediate area for further research would be the full implementation of a global expert system 
(mainly via the collection of increased stores of historical data) which has been demonstrated 
as an effective tool for enhancement of investigation outcomes via examining the GP1020 
program’s functionality.  
Whilst the GP1020 program is currently working acceptably there is much room for 
upgrades and improvements in its current implementation. Additional analysis on the impact of 
incorporating the ability to define causative direction as well as unanticipated event time 
duration would greatly assist in increasing the program’s scope and accuracy. 
Another major area for further research which has arisen from this study is in the 
general issues related to improvement of aircraft accident survivability.  
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8.3.1 Application of Global Expert System to Improvement of Aircraft Accident 
Investigations and Air Traffic Safety 
One immediate pathway for future research would be a complete implementation of the 
proposed global expert system solution for aircraft accident investigation.  In order to achieve 
this, the limitations of GP1020 must first be overcome.  
The biggest challenge of this undertaking would be collecting and collating all global 
forensic accidents and incident data to date and then using this as stored knowledge within the 
expert system program. From here additional testing of the accuracy of the historical data 
would be necessary to ensure validity of the system’s results. Once successful, implementation 
of the software into the systems of various air safety organisations would have to be considered 
so that the program code can be altered, changed or rewritten to suit the new environmental 
operating system. It is certain that this task would be difficult and time-consuming but 
nevertheless achievable and potentially very useful in the following areas: 
 
- Facilitating and enhancing aircraft accident investigation outcomes. This program 
would be able to determine the causes of aircraft accidents and incidents with a high 
rate of accuracy.  
 
- A permanent assessment of safety threats to aircraft. The program would be able to 
rapidly link updated safety data from many different sources including aircraft, ATC 
and other relevant sources in order to continuously assess the possible danger factors 
for aircraft accidents and provide instant measures to remove or reduce these threats. 
Once this software reaches a certain level of maturity, by significantly increasing 
computation time and accuracy it may well be able to handle emergencies on the fly. 
 
8.3.2 Issues Related to Improvement of Survivability of Aircraft Accidents 
Several other areas have been identified that could be useful avenues for future research. These 
issues concern the survivability of accidents and have been identified via both the Delphi 
enquiry and accident statistics.  
Perfect safety is rare because almost every activity has associated dangers. Sooner or 
later these dangers and/or unexpected interactions will occur resulting in an accident [133]. 
However it is possible to minimise fatalities in air accidents, and this can be accomplished via 
two methods: by preventing accidents or by protecting occupants in accidents that do occur. 
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The NTSB has introduced the most wanted improvements in aviation as discussed in 
Chapter 3. This list includes: reducing the risk of aircraft accidents in icy conditions, design 
changes to eliminate the danger of flammable fuel, improving runway safety, upgrading data 
recorders, reducing the number of accidents caused by human fatigue, and improving crew 
resource management.  
In this research there have been several findings which have not only introduced this 
area for further research but also suggested prospective ways of improving accident 
survivability. For instance, the expert group opinion of factor 98 within the Delphi study states 
that the experience of land traffic accident investigation can contribute to considerable increases 
in air traffic safety. Therefore the positive practices of road traffic and industry as well could 
improve air safety.  
There are studies that have examined the most serious aircraft accidents with respect to 
crash forces, structural collapse or failure, crash fires and crash related injuries, cause-of-death 
information, and design features which diminish the chances of survival and increase the risk of 
injury [153]. This list of possible injuries to a human body in an aircraft is numerous and 
includes injuries to the eardrum by rapid decompression, burns from fires and suffocation due 
to inhalation of toxic gas released from burning cabinet trim as well as broken bones, 
contusions, lacerations, and internal organ injuries, all of which may occur in an accident 
[184]. Furthermore, although fire can kill and injure directly through heat, the toxic fumes and 
smoke produced when material in the aircraft interior burn are more likely to be the direct cause of 
death. As a consequence, the two major factors in causing fatalities in survivable crashes are a 
post crash fire and the inability to quickly exit a damaged aircraft.47 
Thus an obvious avenue for future research is the enhancement of survivability by 
upgrading aircraft structure and introducing new personal safety accessories. These accessories 
would reduce the impact forces and mitigate other severe effects such as fire and toxic gases 
that may impact human health and life during an accident. 
Since this research is not directly related to accident survivability, in Appendix E this 
candidate only expresses his thoughts with respect to improvement of accident survivability that 
are based on his working experience48 and the results derived from this research.  
 
                                                 
47 For instance on 11 July 1973, when a Brazilian Boeing 707 crashed while approaching Orly Airport near Paris, 
123 of the 134 passengers were overcome by smoke and carbon monoxide before the plane could be evacuated. 
 
48 The candidate has worked for over a decade as an Expert for Technical Investigation within the National 
Forensic Science Laboratory in his native Macedonia.  
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8.4 Concluding Statements 
The expert system methodology developed for this application has proven to be a robust 
method of analysing the aircraft accident investigation process. Via an analysis of accident 
statistics which occurred between 1950 and 2004, a two-round Delphi study and the 
development of the novel investigation tool GP1020, the methodology has drawn several 
valuable conclusions related to improvement of investigation outcomes and air safety, shown 
below. 
 
 
 
Figure 79: Outcomes derived by application of the Expert System to aircraft accident investigation. 
 
First of all, statistics have indicated that 31% of aircraft accidents that occurred 
between 1950 and 2004 worldwide have unknown causes, which is a matter of concern (Figure 
31). Next, in contrast to the low rate of fatal aircraft accidents per million departures, the 
accident fatality rate in accidents 1950-2004 is very high: 72% of occupants involved in these 
accidents were killed, and so action is required to help increase passenger survivability in 
aircraft accidents (Table 2 and Table 5). 
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In addition, the Delphi exercise has shown that there is great potential for further 
improvement of aircraft accident investigation, particularly in the areas of: 
 
- Dispatching investigators to the scene of the accident and the process of facilitating 
coordination and cooperation between investigators within an  investigation (Table 16), 
 
- Managing the investigation, wreckage analysis, and data management (Table 20), 
 
- The investigation of human errors, omissions and psychological factors (Table 30),  
 
- Examination of data recorders (Table 28), 
 
- Examination of in-flight safety occurrences such as aircraft system failures and 
explosions (Table 28), 
 
- Investigating criminal activities as a possible cause for accidents (Table 28, Factor 46), 
 
- Managing the amount of time and money spent on investigations (Table 16, Factor 9). 
 
In terms of prospective solutions for improving aircraft accident outcomes, this study 
emphasises the importance of recorders and recorded data. Hence, the investigation results 
could be enhanced through creating and using an advanced database for easier identification of 
an aircraft’s components, and more importantly, through creating and using comprehensive 
databases for storing and analysing aircraft accident forensic data. Furthermore, this study 
addresses the importance of common video recording of various functions in different aircraft 
zones and transmitting the data to ground stations for storage as an ultimate measure for 
improving accident investigation outcomes. This work also indicates that training individual 
investigator knowledge can also significantly enhance investigation results (Table 32, Factor 
79).  
The research concludes by showing that aircraft accident investigations can be 
improved with the application of a global expert system as a tool for storing and analysing 
global aircraft accident forensic data, with the option to learn from aircraft accidents using an 
inference engine to propose possible causes based on any forensic data provided. Such a 
system will ensure that this database is used to its maximum potential. 
Thus, the novel GP1020 investigation tool has been a successful demonstration of 
applying an expert system concept to aircraft accident investigation. The GP1020 has been 
designed towards giving aircraft accident investigators improved use of forensic data by sifting 
through a considerable amount of data related to accidents and indicating the most probable 
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accident cause(s). Results obtained during the testing of the GP1020 prototype encourage the 
application of a global expert system by increasing the program’s knowledge pool to include 
historical data from many other international sources other than those currently being used. 
Finally the expert system methodology developed for this application could potentially be 
successfully used in improving air traffic safety. A fully developed global expert system will be 
able to provide a continuously updated assessment of safety threats to aircraft in flight and 
provide crews with instant measures to remove or reduce those dangers. This could be achieved 
via a continuous communication of current information related to air safety assessed with respect 
to prior historical data stored in the expert system program. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
THE DELPHI TECHNIQUE – QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
 
 Write down your answers in the appropriate cell provided. If you would like to add new 
items and their consistent impacts please do so at the end of the table.    
 
Q1. How much are the below mentioned principles met within an 
aircraft accident investigation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Definitely unfeasible           ↔                                      Definitely feasible  
1. 
Principle of technical – tactical liberty of conducting the 
investigation and principle of adequacy 
(Having the opportunity of applying all means available 
in order to obtain the cause of accident ) 
 
2. 
Principle of methodical approach and planning 
(Fluency of the whole procedure and its carrying out 
according to the plan) 
 
 
3. 
Principle of critical approach of the procedure 
(Expert’s capability of critical thinking about his 
working within the whole procedure. Ability to 
recognize his own mistakes done during the procedure 
and fix them)  
 
4. Principle of operational approach (Quick response to notification of accident occurrence)  
5. Principle of profundity and persistence  
6. Principle of objectivity  
7. Principle of solitary governance of investigation  
8.  Principle of coordination and cooperation  
9. Principle of economical procedure  
10. Principle of secrecy  
 
 Write down your answers in the appropriate cell provided. If you would like to add new 
items and their consistent impacts please do so at the end of the table.    
 
Q2. What are the odds of determining the answers of the questions 
below within an aircraft accident investigation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Definitely unfeasible                     ↔                           Definitely feasible 
11.  When did the accident happen?  
12. Where did the accident happen?  
13.  How did the accident happen?  
14.  Who owns the plane and how has it been maintained?  
15.  Who were the occupants of the aircraft?  
16. Why did the accident happen?  
17. What may have prevented the accident?  
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 Write down your answers in the appropriate cell provided. If you would like to add new 
items and their consistent impacts please do so at the end of the table.    
 
You are expected firstly to give all answers for Q3 (question 3), after that your answers for Q4, 
and finally for Q5. 
 
Q3. In reference to obtaining a better investigation outcome, HOW 
IMPORTANT is [the given item] within the process of aircraft accident 
investigation? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Unimportant                             ↔               Very Important 
Q4. HOW COMPLEX is [the given item] within the investigation process 
as to the requirement of special skills and technique by the examination 
team? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         Not at all (Simple)                           ↔   Very complicated 
 
Q5. IS THERE POTENTIAL for further improvement of [the given 
item] within the aircraft accident investigation by applying the new 
methods and contemporary technology? 
1 2 3 4 5  
Small     ↔  Large 
  
18.  Managing the investigation (Plan, Report, Monitor)     
19. Notification and arriving at the scene of the accident    
20.  Examination of the scene of the accident    
21.  Wreckage analysis     
22.  Finding and interviewing the witnesses    
23. Investigation of Air Traffic Control records & Radar Data 
   
24. Laboratory examination    
25.  Reconstruction    
26. Report writing (Structure & Quality)    
27. Data management    
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 Write down your answers in the appropriate cell provided. If you would like to add new 
items and their consistent impacts please do so at the end of the table.    
 
You are expected firstly to give all answers for Q6, after that your answers for Q7.  
 
Q6. HOW COMPLEX is the EXAMINATION of [the given item] as to the 
requirement of special skills and technique by the examination team? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
         Not at all (Simple)                           ↔    Very complicated 
Q7. IS THERE POTENTIAL for further IMPROVEMENT OF 
EXAMINATION of [the given item] within the aircraft accident 
investigation by applying new methods and contemporary 
technology? 
1 2 3 4 5  
Small     ↔  Large 
 
28. Operations, The Flight Path   
29. Cockpit   
30. Engine and accessories    
31. Mechanical, electrical, hydraulic, pneumatic systems   
32. Landing gear systems and brake systems   
33. Deicing and anti-icing systems   
34. Fuel (quality and amount)   
35. Foreign Object Damage (FOD)   
36. Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR)   
37. Cockpit Sound Recorder (CSR)   
38. Flight Data Recorder (FDR)   
39. Aircraft loading   
40. Hydroplaning    
41. In-flight explosion   
42. In-flight failure (Structural failure – fatigue)   
43. In-flight fire    
44. Lightning   
45. Mid-air collision   
46. Crime activities    
47. Weather conditions   
48. Downwash and wing tip vortex hazards   
49. Microburst, wind gust, wind shear   
50. Stability and control of an airplane   
51. Human error or omission   
52. Psychological factors (fatigue, illusion, perception …)   
53. Design inadequacy   
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 Write down your answers in the appropriate cell provided. If you would like to add new 
items and their consistent impacts please do so at the end of the table.    
 
Q8. What are the odds of PROVING within the process of an aircraft 
accident investigation that [the given item] is cause for an accident? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
  Unreliable                   ↔                                       Certain 
54.  Engine malfunction  
55.  Brake systems malfunction  
56.  Landing gear systems malfunction  
57. Icing  
58. Foreign Object Damage (FOD)  
59.  Inappropriate fuel  
60. Inappropriate aircraft loading   
61. Hydroplaning   
62.  Downwash and wing tip vortex  
63. Severe weather conditions  
64. Microburst, wind gust, wind shear  
65. Lightning  
66. In-flight explosion  
67. In-flight failure (Structural failure – fatigue)  
68. In-flight fire   
69. Crime activities  
70. Human error or omission   
71. Psychological factors (fatigue, illusion, perception, etc)  
72. Stability problems and lost the control of the airplane  
73. Design inadequacy  
74. Mid air collision  
 
 
 Write down your OPINIONS about the STATEMENTS below in the appropriate cell 
provided. If you would like to add new items and their consistent impacts please do so 
at the end of the table.    
 
Q9. STATEMENTS: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
        Strongly disagree                ↔                               Strongly agree 
75. The process of investigation meets the procedures regarding the quality assurance (QA) and quality control (QC)  
76. It is justifiable waiting for a couple of months before releasing the accident investigation report  
77. Reports of investigation carried out are always accurate and well done  
78. Investigators have appropriate and sufficient skills to handle aircraft accident investigation  
79. The excellent knowledge of theory compared to an average one significantly improves the investigation outcomes  
80. The contamination of the scene of the accident is a serious problem within the process of aircraft accident investigations  
81. The presence of landmarks on the scene of the accident provides sufficient information for carrying out accurate mathematical calculations  
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82. It is likely at times inconsistent material is sent for lab analysis  
83. Investigators should believe witnesses of aircraft accidents  
84. The cockpit recorders (FDR, CVR, CDR) record sufficient parameters  
85. We never have a real accident with enough readable data  
86. The severe aircraft manoeuvres can be revealed during the investigation  
87. The aircraft is equipped with appropriate accessories, which provides ice protection during the whole flight  
88. The stall is a serious hazard for the aircraft  
89. The downwash and wing tip vortex is a serious hazard for the aircraft  
90. Investigators have enough resources available to find out the weather conditions during the accident  
91. Human factors have been involved somehow in every single aircraft accident that has ever occurred  
92. It is possible to answer the question if the pilot should have been able to cope with the critical situation  
93. There are always problems with airfield papers analysis (documentation)  
94. The handbook is well composed material  
95. There is a great possibility for increasing the survivability of an aircraft accident  
96. Determining the cause of the accidents is a very tough task if there is not data recorded  
97. The process of investigation as a whole can be improved significantly, by applying new methods and advanced technology  
98. The experience of the land traffic accident investigation can contribute to considerable increase in air traffic safety  
 
Add items in the list of the two questions below: 
 
99. 
The potential hazards for investigators within the process of investigation are: 
 
                                                                                                                                     ,
 
100. 
The following actions could significantly improve the process of investigation: 
 
                                                                                                                                     ,
 
 
 
Your comment about the definition of aircraft accidents, which has been widely 
accepted, and which introduces more causes for an accident or assumes existing 
major and contributing factors. How does it apply in practice? 
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APPENDIX B 
IDENTIFICATION OF EXPERT OPINIONS (THE DELPHI TECHNIQUE) 
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Quantification Method III  
A Statistical Method of Multidimensional Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure C1: A model for representing the stereoscopic 3-D graph of quantification method III  
[142, p122] 
 
 
 
Quantification method III: A method for quantifying the qualitative factors with the concept 
of the coefficient of correlation and clarifying the interrelationships among the factors.  
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APPENDIX D 
 
A Brief Report of an Aircraft Accident Investigation  
 
 
 
Shown below is one of many reports available on [9] used by this candidate to produce the 
statistics presented in Chapter 5.  
 
This particular example refers to the accident that occurred on 01 July 2002, Ueberlingen, 
Germany.  
 
‘Accident Description: 
 
The aircraft, on a flight from Moscow, Russia to Barcelona, collided with a DHL 
Aviation Boeing 757 near Ueberlingen on the northern shore of Lake Constance, which 
borders Switzerland and Austria, around 11:43pm local time. Both aircraft were level at 
FL360, under Swiss air traffic control (Zurich). Approximately 50 seconds before the 
collision, Swiss ATC instructed the Russian Tupolev to descend from FL360 to FL350 
to avoid a conflict with the DHL Boeing 757. No response was registered by the 
Russian crew. A second descent instruction was made by Swiss controllers’ seconds 
later, and the Tupolev crew acknowledged the instruction. The TU-154 initiated its 
descent about 25 seconds before the collision. At nearly the same instant, the Boeing 
757's TCAS (Traffic Collision Avoidance System) issued a Resolution Advisory (RA) 
in response to the threat of a collision with the TU-154, and the pilots began a descent 
in an attempt to avoid the Russian aircraft. The aircraft collided at FL354, broke apart 
and crashed, with debris scattered over an area nearly 40km wide.’  
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